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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the two attempts to control hate speech against the lesbian, 
gay and bisexual communities in New Zealand.  It argues that freedom of 
speech is not absolute and there are methods to control it for the good of 
society.  The thesis examined the primary documents, regarding Living Word, 
tracing the history of that attempt to control the hatred generated by these 
videos.  It examines what happened during that period and how discourse 
developed, and provides recommendations for future consideration.  I argue 
the videos in question form part of the continuum of discourse surrounding 
sexual orientation, and inform, and are informed by, the discourse surrounding 
homosexuality in wider society.  Seen as being at one end of the spectrum of 
that discourse, they encourage discrimination and hatred against members of 
the non-heterosexual communities, and may therefore be regarded as hate 
speech.   
 
There is little in New Zealand that addresses hate speech against these 
communities.  There have been two attempts to control this type of hate 
speech.  The first was regarding Paul Cameron’s Exposing the AIDS Scandal 
(1988) before the Indecent Publications Tribunal, seeking to have the 
publication ruled indecent as it held gay men and people living with AIDS as 
inherently inferior to other people, and it demeaned and degraded them.  This 
attempt failed as the Tribunal held that the invective was not concentrated 
enough to be classed as hate speech.  It did, however, provide a definition of 
hate speech that can be developed in New Zealand law.  
 
The second was the case known as the Living Word case, after the appellant.  
This complaint to the Office of Film and Literature Classification was laid by 
the Human Rights Action Group (Wellington) against AIDS: What you haven’t 
been told (1989) and Gay Rights/Special Rights: Inside the homosexual agenda 
(1993).  
 
The videos represent lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgender people, and 
people living with HIV/AIDS, as inferior to other people by reason of their 
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sexuality or HIV status, and degrades, demeans and dehumanises them.  
Therefore, a classification of objectionable was sought.  The Office held the 
videos to be hateful, but felt that those communities were strong enough to 
withstand the assault these videos made.   
 
On appeal to the Film and Literature Board of Review, the Board concluded 
the video did treat members of those communities as lesser people, and did 
degrade, demean and dehumanise them and classified the videos as 
objectionable.  The New Zealand distributors of the videos, Living Word 
Distributors, appealed to the High Court, which dismissed the appeal.  Living 
Word then appealed to the Court of Appeal, seeking to narrow the gateway of 
material that could be censored and on the grounds the classification interfered 
with their freedom of speech.  The Court of Appeal overturned the earlier 
decisions, narrowed the gateway of material that could be censored, and 
remitted the videos back to the Film and Literature Board of Review. 
 
The study concluded that hate speech is, in terms of the Films, Videos and 
Publications Classification Act, injurious to the public good, and ought to be 
able to be classified. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Speaking on Leviticus 18:22: ‘Do not lie with a man as one lies with a woman; that is 
detestable.’  “The Bible clearly teaches about these abnormalities. Sexual 
abnormalities are a deep cancerous tumor in the entire society. ... We know God's 
righteous decree that those who live that way deserve death”,  
Rev. Äke Green, sermon on “Is Homosexuality Genetic or an Evil Force that 
Plays Mind Games with People? July 20, 2003 - Borgholm, Sweden 
 
This thesis is about one of the two efforts by lesbian and gay activists in New 
Zealand to control part of the discourse of hate speech against their 
communities.  To provide context, it briefly traces the history of the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender (henceforth LGBT) communities in New 
Zealand, and then examines these two attempts to control anti-gay discourse.   
 
The first of these was on the publication Exposing the AIDS Scandal 
(Cameron, 1988) taken to the Indecent Publications Tribunal (IPT) in 1993, 
which was overtaken by changes in censorship legislation. The second, with 
which I was closely associated, was based on what became known as the 
Living Word videos that some regarded as containing hate material targeting 
LGBT people.  Starting at ground level through activist’s work, including 
myself, it proceeded through the legal system before being addressed, in part at 
least, by Parliamentary Select Committees. 
 
The thesis argues that hate speech, whether oral, presented visually, or in 
writing, should be controlled; and that so far – despite apparent provisions in 
law which took that position – this has not been satisfactorily implemented. 
Such control would benefit more than the LGBT communities. I argue that the 
failure to date is due to legal judgements based on a misunderstanding of 
Parliament’s intention and a lack of understanding of the effects of anti-gay 
discourse on LGBT communities.  I suggest in the conclusion some remedies 
that could be used to control anti-gay discourse, and the discrimination, hatred, 
and violence it engenders. 
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The motivation of this thesis is to examine some underlying questions. What is 
it that allows people to think they may discriminate against the LGBT 
community?  Why do governments not act to end active and passive 
discrimination against the LGBT community contained in legislation, despite 
the Human Rights Act (henceforth HRA) being passed in 1993?  I argue that 
the answers may lie in the discourses around homosexuality – in particular the 
anti-gay discourses – that seek to separate out members of the LGBT 
community as “the other”, not worthy of rights. 
 
Despite the freedom from discrimination provisions of s19 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) and s21 HRA, discrimination against the 
LGBT communities continues to exist.  Some of this – such as the restriction 
of marriage to opposite sex couples only, the prevention of adoption by same 
sex couples, or the allowance of the homosexual advances defence (as a 
provocation defence) – is legislative discrimination by Government.  Other 
examples, such as the recent banning of drag queens and gay men from 
Temperance bar in Wellington, are private discrimination (GayNZ, 2008). 
 
I do not examine whether publications may or may not be injurious to the 
public good, or the harms – or absence of harm – that may occur because of the 
availability of any publication.  This has been done elsewhere (Conway & 
Siegelman, 1984; Signorile, 1993), including Parliamentary debates which 
resulted in the passage of the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 
1993 (FVPCA).  As the Hon Jenny Shipley, then Minister of Social Welfare, 
stated: 
The Government has decided that ... it could not take the previous Government’s 
approach.  The Government will not require that a direct link between hard-core 
material and harm to our community be proved before the censor can ban or restrict 
material.  Instead, the Government will instruct the censor to limit material if it is 
likely to result in harm or to cause harm  
(Shipley, in Hansard, 1993a: 15989). 
 
The argument for the FVPCA as currently written  
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links censorship of pornography with realisation of equality.  In an equal society 
there is no place for material which discriminates or degrades one gender or people 
of a particular sexual orientation  
(Butler & Butler, 2005: 361).   
Thus, as Parliament has decided that certain material is harmful, and should be 
censored – a position with which I agree – this thesis does not revisit this issue.  
 
The effects of hate speech, however, are widely debated (Butler, 1997; Kintz & 
Lesage, 1998; Maniaci & Rzeznik, 1993; Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado & 
Crenshaw, 1993; McIlhenny & McIlhenny, 1993; Satinover, 1996; Society for 
the Promotion of Community Standards, 2001a, 2001b; Whillock & Slayden, 
1995).  Historical evidence indicates hate speech leads to actions of hatred and 
violence (Goldhagen, 1996; Hørnshøj-Moller, 1997), while more recent 
evidence indicates violence against the LGBT communities is inflamed by 
anti-gay statements made by religious and political leaders (Agence France 
Presse, 2008; Alexeyev, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Green, 2003).  Examples 
include the Mayor of Moscow calling gay pride parades  
satanic, 
 and homosexual relations 
unnatural for human nature  
(Alexeyev, 2007a), 
or Pastor Äke Green (2003) calling gays a cancer on society.  Such comments 
negatively affect the prevailing discourse surrounding LGBT people, the social 
milieu and climate, which in turn increases levels of violence against them 
(Herek, 1992, 1999). 
 
Furthermore, including ss61, 63, and 131 in the HRA, which target racial 
harassment, racial disharmony, and its incitment, the New Zealand 
Government has already agreed that some forms of speech may be harmful 
against certain groups and have further impact than just the words themselves. 
 
Organisation of the thesis 
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This thesis is divided into fifteen chapters including this introduction.  The 
second chapter provides definitions for the terms used throughout, providing 
an understanding of the issues at the core of the debate.  The third chapter is 
the literature review, examining the literature used in writing this thesis, and 
which informed me about the issues discussed, while the fourth examines the 
methodology used.  Chapter five briefly examines a history of homosexuality 
and censorship in New Zealand from pre-colonial times to 1993, when the 
HRA and FVPCA were enacted.  The sixth chapter examines some of the 
debate around the Human Rights Bill 1992 (HRB) while it was before the 
Select Committee in 1993 prior to passage and enactment.  This indicates the 
discourse of the time, which had changed little between the debates over the 
Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986, and the Civil Union Act 2004 (CUA). 
 
Chapter seven examines the effects of hate crimes, and the use of the 
homosexual advances defence.  This includes discussion of the effects of hate 
speech and the general discourse around homosexuality on these Acts, and the 
passage of the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2000 (as the Sentencing Act 
2001 and Parole Act 2001).  This legislation included a specific section dealing 
with violent crimes motivated by hate.  Chapter eight examines the case 
against Exposing the AIDS Scandal (Cameron, 1988) before the IPT. 
 
Chapters nine, ten, eleven and twelve follow the Living Word case, from the 
time the initial complaints were laid before the Office of Film and Literature 
Classification, hereinafter, OFLC, (chapter nine), then before the Film and 
Literature Board of Review, henceforth, the Board, (chapter ten), and then 
before both the High Court (chapter eleven) and the Court of Appeal (chapter 
twelve).  Chapter thirteen examines the debates before Parliamentary Select 
Committees that were charged with looking at the operation of the FVPCA and 
the issue of hate speech in general, though both referred to Living Word. 
 
Chapter fourteen brings together discussion on the issues centring on the hate 
speech controversy.  It covers an analysis of the effects of hate speech and how 
they may be controlled.  I argue that the Court of Appeal exceeded its authority 
in reaching a decision that effectively nullified the intent behind the relevant 
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part of the legislation in question, contrary to s4 BORA.  In the conclusion in 
chapter fifteen, I make recommendations on what I believe should have 
happened, and what may yet happen. 
 
The thesis is informed by feminist and queer theories, as well as gay 
liberationist politics, as discussed in the methodology chapter.   
 
In the next chapter, I explain and define some terms used in this thesis, and, in 
particular, the genesis in law of the term “freedom of speech”. 
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Chapter 2: Terms and definitions 
 
During this thesis, there will be terms continuously used, so it is important to 
clarify and define them.  Meanings may differ when applied to other topics, 
and are crucial to the debate on hate speech.  Such terms include “freedom of 
speech” “injurious to the public good’, “social justice”, “hatred”, “hate 
literature”, “harassment”, and “harm minimisation”.  Some of them, such as 
“hatred”, contempt, etc., carry the dictionary definition. 
 
Freedom of Speech 
 
That the freedome of speech and debates or proceedings in Parlyament ought not to 
be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parlyament 
Bill of Rights 1688 c.2 1 William and Mary Session 2 (An Act declareing the 
Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the Succession of the 
Crowne). 
 
That for redress of all greivances and for the amending strenthneing and preserveing 
of the lawes Parliaments ought to be frequently called and allowed to sit and the 
freedom of speech and debate secured to the members 
Claim of Right Act 1689 c.28, Scotland (The Declaration of the Estates of 
the Kingdom of Scotland containing the Claim of Right and the offer of the 
Croune to the King and Queen of England). 
 
It is from these two Acts of two separate Parliaments, which were later to form 
the Parliament of the United Kingdom, that the idea of freedom of speech 
exists.  It is from these that descend the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution, passed over 100 years later, then to s14 BORA, passed over 300 
years later: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
Rather than its American constitutional counterpart: 
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech  
(Cornell University Law School, undated) ,  
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which appears to brook no limitations, the Title of BORA states it is based on 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  Article 19 
of that, dealing with freedom of speech is: 
 
Article 19 
a) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
b) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.  
c) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with 
it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary:  
i. For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
ii. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), 
or of public health or morals  
(United Nations, 1966a, emphasis added). 
It is clear, 19(3) does allow for limitation on freedom of expression. 
 
Although I can find nothing earlier, there were probably debates about freedom 
of speech in Parliaments prior to the Commonwealth of Oliver Cromwell.  
Nevertheless, there appears to be no act of Parliament that enshrined freedom 
of speech until the 1688 and 1689 Acts.  The Magna Carta is silent on the 
issue, and although the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 implies such freedom 
though does not mention it, that Declaration was never an Act of Parliament.  
The original freedom of expression in the Bill of Rights 1688 and Claim of 
Right 1689 applied only to Parliament, as part of Parliamentary privilege, yet it 
later devolved upon the people.  While those Acts are primary pieces of 
legislation, BORA is a subsidiary piece of legislation that can be overridden by 
Parliament. 
 
While Parliamentary privilege is now a given – things can be said in 
Parliament that cannot be said elsewhere (though even that is subject to 
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restrictions) – there are restrictions on the freedom of expression provided in 
BORA.  These restrictions are meant to be  
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society (s5 BORA). 
Nevertheless, although some legislation is clearly in breach of BORA, a court 
may not  
hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in 
any way invalid or ineffective; or decline to apply any provision of the enactment  
simply because it contradicts BORA (s4 BORA, emphasis added).  It is this 
section that makes BORA subsidiary legislation. 
 
BORA contains other freedoms as well.  A right to certain things, such as 
speech, religion, movement, etc., which may be termed positive freedoms, and 
freedom from certain things, such as not to be deprived of life, not to be 
subjected to torture, etc., which may be termed negative rights.  Positive rights 
and negative rights are not opposites, but are worded differently.  While 
freedom of speech is often claimed to be a positive right, freedom from 
discrimination contained in s19 of BORA has been termed a negative right 
because of its wording, as it  
does not explicitly require positive Governmental action to prohibit private acts of 
discrimination  
(Geiringer & Warburton, 2000: 23).   
As Butler and Butler (2005: 529) indicate,  
in some instances the government will be required to undertake positive action in 
order to prevent the denial of minority rights 
such as in s20 BORA.  The same could therefore be said of s19 BORA, 
dealing with the right not to be discriminated against. 
 
Marketplace of ideas 
 
First mooted by Holmes J in Abrams v United States, the marketplace of ideas 
is essentially an adaptation of Adam Smith’s economic ideas being applied to 
speech, relying on faith being: 
placed in the market to reach the correct conclusion provided that the market is 
allowed to function uninhibited by external restrictions.  The central concern is to 
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find the truth, and the best way of achieving it is seen to be unrestricted public 
debate  
(Butler & Butler, 2005: 307).   
Nevertheless, there are problems with this, although it has been one of the 
most influential and pervasive theories supporting freedom of expression.  
Public discourse is often through the media, who chose what, or what not, to 
report.  Thus facts can be hidden, while a truth, as revealed by the media and 
whatever vested interests they support, prevails (Butler & Butler, 2005: 308).  
Consequently, the dominant discourse can prevail over minority rights. 
 
Hatred 
 
Collins Cobuild Dictionary (2003: 667) defines hatred as  
an extremely strong feeling of dislike for someone or something. 
The Indecent Publications Tribunal (IPT), in its ruling on Exposing the AIDS 
Scandal (Cameron, 1988), used the definition  
emotion of an intense and extreme nature that is clearly associated with vilification 
and detestation. … Hatred in this sense, is a most extreme emotion that belies 
reason; and emotion that, if exercised against members of an identifiable group, 
implies that those individuals are to be despised, scorned, denied respect and made 
subject to ill treatment on the basis of group affiliation  
(IPT, 1993: 3). 
 
Although these appear to be different, because of their wording, they are 
essentially the same.  Synonyms for hatred: revulsion of feeling, aversion, 
antipathy, odium, enmity, phobia, etc., (Kirkpatrick, 1998: 607, entry 888) 
emphasise these meanings. 
 
Nevertheless, as Whillock and Slayden (1995: x) point out in their introduction  
each culture has approved objects of hatred.  We may hate liars and thieves.  We 
hate those who murder.  We may even hate those who hate others.   
 
They also point out that hatred  
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is more encompassing, as Aristotle noted, than lesser emotions such as anger, which 
is directed against individuals.  Hatred may also take aim at whole classes of persons 
or people  
(Whillock & Slayden,1995: xiii).   
and point to the American McCarthy hearings of the 1950s as an example of 
how  
whole cultures may be induced, invited, or permitted to hate people or ideas they 
fear, or who are perceived as threats to their dearly held values  
(Whillock & Slayden,1995: x). 
 
Therefore it can be seen that “hate” or “hatred” can not only have a narrow 
application through the use of the terms “dislike” or “revulsion” in relation to 
individuals who are murderers, thieves, or liars, which may be personal 
dislikes or hatreds; but can in fact be widened to encompass whole groups of 
people who can be hated on the basis of their political affiliation, their race, 
religion, or sexual orientation. 
 
“Degraded”, “dehumanised”, “demeaned”, “hostility”, “contempt”, 
“disharmony” and “harassment” 
 
Although some words may be defined in the legislation to which they pertain – 
in the case of this thesis, the HRA and the FVPCA – most of the words 
pertaining to those Acts: “degraded”, “dehumanised”, “demeaned”, “hostility”, 
“contempt”, “hatred”, “disharmony” and “harassment”, all have the ordinary 
dictionary meaning attached to them (Personal communications, OFLC, 10 
June 2005; Human Rights Commission, 20 May 2005).  Nevertheless, the 
OFLC also uses the terms “degraded”, “dehumanised”, “demeaned”  
collectively to refer to depictions where people are reduced to the status of objects  
(Personal communication, OFLC, 10 June 2005). 
 
11 
 
Gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, homosexual, LGBT, and sexual 
orientation. 
 
In this work, I use the terms “gay”, “lesbian”, and “homosexual”, as well as the 
term “sexual orientation”.  In section 21(1)(m) HRA, the term “sexual 
orientation” is defined as  
a heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation.   
While it would be acceptable to leave it as such a definition, this may be taken 
to mean only those who identify as such, and not those who may be lesbian or 
gay but do not identify as such, or people who may be perceived as such.  I 
believe that in order to include those who may not necessarily self identify, it 
is necessary to include that part of the definition contained within section 
21(2)(b)(ii) HRA where it includes people who are a specific prohibited 
ground for discrimination is  
suspected or assumed or believed to exist or to have existed. 
Thus, for the purposes of this work, the terms “lesbian” and “gay” will include 
people who self identify as such, but also to those who may be lesbian or gay 
but do not identify as such, or those who may be perceived to be so.   
 
There is, however, much debate about the use of these terms.  Lillian 
Faderman, for example, has difficulty with these terms as a descriptor of 
identity.  She has suggested using the term lesbian  
as an adjective 
to describe women’s  
committed domestic, sexual, and/or affectional experiences 
 rather than using it as a noun  
to describe their identity 
 agreeing with postmodern views of identity as precarious and unstable 
(Faderman, 1999: 1−2).  Nevertheless, the terms are defined in the New 
Zealand law in the HRA, and thus must be retained here. 
 
Although I will mainly be concentrating in this thesis on issues surrounding 
hate speech aimed at the lesbian and gay communities, the same sort of speech, 
or worse, is also directed at the transgender communities. Thus I also include 
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those communities within this work, even if I do not always make this explicit.  
Communities may also experience the effects of hate speech based on race, 
ethnicity or colour, or a number of other grounds.  However, this is outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
Community 
 
Opponents of LGBT equality, including Joseph Nicolosi (1991) and Elizabeth 
Moberly (1983), argue there is no such thing as a “gay community”, but rather 
a “homosexual lifestyle” or “subculture”. Some queer theorists, for different 
reasons, also state that there is no such thing as a gay community.  Michael 
Warner (1993: xxv-xxvi) argues that the idea of a  
community also falsely suggests an ideological and nostalgic contrast with the 
atomization of modern capitalist society.  And in the liberal-pluralist frame, it 
predisposes that political demands will be treated as demands for toleration and 
representation of a minority constituency.   
However, there are many different communities which make up the society in 
which we live.  Some, such as the Maori Community, are based on familial, 
ethnic, or racial backgrounds.  A religious community consists of people who 
share the same faith and set of values.  A community can also be defined 
through Sarason’s (1974, cited in D’Augelli & Garnets, 1995: 294) definition: 
A community is more than a political or geographical area.  It contains a variety of 
institutions which may or may not be formally or informally related to each other – 
or not related.  It is made up of myriads of groups, transient or permanent, which 
have similar or different purposes and vary in size, power, and composition.  It 
possesses resources and vehicles for their distribution.  Its groups and institutions 
vary considerably in size, purposes and the power they possess or seek.  And a 
community has a distinctive history, which, although it may be no longer relevant in 
the psychological sense, is crucial for understanding some of its present qualities and 
social, political, religious and economic characteristics. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis then, “the community” or “communities” will be 
restricted to those men who identify as gay and women who identify as 
lesbian, who may or may not be still coming to terms with their sexual 
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orientation, including those who identify as “queer”, and those who are 
perceived to be such.  
 
Human Rights Action Group, (Wellington) 
 
The Human Rights Action Group, (Wellington), consisted of 12 people from a 
variety of representative groups, including some lesbian, gay and bisexual 
members as well as heterosexual members, but also members from the 
Disabled People’s Assembly, a Catholic nun, and other groups.  There were 
similar groups in Auckland and Christchurch.  We all had an interest in human 
rights issues, having been formed during the debates on the HRB as that 
proceeded through Parliament prior to its 1993 enactment.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, which looks at an action taken by the Human Rights Action Group, 
(Wellington), it is referred to after this as ‘HRAG’, or ‘we’.  I was the co-
ordinator of this group. 
 
Hate literature, hate speech 
 
Although dictionary definitions are relatively clear for some words, and some 
phrases, such as “inherently inferior” defined as 
a permanent attribute of lower status, rank, or ability” (OFLC, personal 
communication, 10 June 2005)  
are defined elsewhere, there are some words which, when combined, may have 
a different meaning from their individual dictionary meanings – a form of 
linguistic Gestalt where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.  “Hate” 
and “literature” have two specific meanings in the dictionary:  
“Hate” 
an extremely strong feeling of dislike 
“ Literature”  
i. novels, plays, and poetry,  
ii. all the books and articles published about a subject, and  
iii. information produced by people who want to sell you something or give 
you advice  
(Collins Cobuild, 2003: 666, 841).   
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However, although hate literature may consist of “novels, plays and poetry”, 
and also be “information produced by people who want to sell you something 
or give you advice”, the product for sale being hate, or the advice being offered 
is on who or what to hate, it certainly isn’t “all the books and articles published 
about a subject”. 
 
In New Zealand law, hate literature has been defined as material that: 
a) expresses views about a minority group which is identified by one or more 
characteristics to which stigma is attached; 
b) expresses those views with malice or hatred or opprobrium; 
c) attempts to persuade others to adopt those views thereby inciting prejudice, 
discrimination or violence against the minority; 
d) by its manner of expression would be emotive, hyperbolic or offensive to the 
minority; and 
e) has expressed the vitriol contained within it in a concentrated manner  
(IPT, 1993: 2, 11). 
 
This seems a definition that can be applied succinctly to published material 
that is intended to cause, or bring about  
an extremely strong feeling of dislike for someone  
that  
takes aim at whole classes of people  
(IPT, 1993: 3)  
based on their race, religion or sexual orientation. 
 
Hate speech may be defined in a similar way.  However, Whillock and Slayden 
(1995: xiii) point out that  
the deliberate use of hate by rhetors is an overt attempt to win, to dominate by 
rhetorical – if not physical – force  
and that  
strong emotions such as hate are used to polarize particular groups in order to 
organize opposition, solidify support, and marshal resources toward forcing a ‘final 
solution’ to a thorny problem.  This polarization predisposes audiences to negate 
likely opposing claims, typically utilizing a literal and often highly symbolic object of 
hatred at which anger is focused. … any culture (and any group, dominant or 
subordinate) can and does use hate speech to establish in-groups and out-groups. 
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As Mari Matsuda (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw, 1993: 23) 
points out,  
hate speech flaring up in our midst includes insulting nouns for racial groups, 
degrading caricatures, threats of violence, and literature portraying Jews and people 
of color as animal-like and requiring extermination.   
She also reasons that  
racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and disparagement all hit the gut of 
those in the target group. The spoken message of hatred and inferiority is conveyed 
on the street, in school yards, in popular culture, and in the propaganda of hate 
widely distributed in this country (Matsuda, et al, 1993: 23).   
In terms of sexual orientation, these insults can be seen in the use of ‘faggot’, 
‘poofter’, ‘queer’, etc., and even use of the word ‘gay’ has recently become 
disparaging, meaning ‘stupid’ in street parlance.  These are often blended with 
other more traditional offensive words, such as ‘bloody’, ‘fucking’, and others. 
 
I would, however, suggest that the use of these derisive terms cannot be seen in 
isolation.  I believe they are part of the greater picture, and people feel ‘safe’ 
using them, because they are not, in their view, violent.  Although such words 
may be, as Matsuda (et al, 1993: 18) indicates  
a psychic tax imposed on those least able to pay,  
I also believe that people feel ‘safe’ in using such epithets because the societal 
beliefs that allow what appears to be less offensive material to be published 
encourages such hatred: the discourse of ‘gays are paedophiles, gays are 
diseased, which leads to ‘gays are satanic, gays are …’. 
 
These are included in the five definitions above, from the IPT.  Therefore hate 
speech, which in this thesis includes oral, written and visual representations, is 
that which meets those five points. 
 
“Injurious to the public good” 
 
This latter phrase is used in the FVPCA, and is defined by the OFLC, but is 
often used by groups or people who think they understand what it means.  I 
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have seen and heard it used by members of the Society for the Promotion of 
Community Standards (SPCS) in submissions to Parliamentary Select 
Committees to describe sex work (SPCS, 2001a) in what was a moral 
condemnation of sex work, rather than looking at it as a whole.  Although the 
phrase “injurious to the public good” does include harm to the public as a 
whole, it  
is different from harm to individuals or to particular groups, though harm of subsets 
could injure the good of the public as a whole  
(Personal communication, OFLC, 10 June 2005). 
 
In defining the phrase, the OFLC consulted widely with various groups, and 
through that consultation, it was considered that a publication is likely to be 
injurious to the public good if it: 
a) creates or reinforces inaccurate stereotypes about women 
b) creates unrealistic expectations about sexual behaviour and appetite 
c) increases the risk of inappropriate behaviour 
d) promotes unsafe sex which in turn undermines personal and public health 
e) encourages violent tendencies in society through repeated exposure to violent 
imagery 
f) erodes widely agreed moral standards 
g) encourages young people to have sex 
h) changes attitudes to women in a negative way 
i) increases the risk of copycat behaviour 
j) exposes people to bad ideas they might otherwise never have been exposed to 
k) offends or shocks viewers with unexpected language or images 
l) frightens, upsets, or disturbs particularly younger viewers  
(Personal communication, OFLC, 10 June 2005). 
 
In their decisions, the OFLC therefore  
tend[s] to focus on injury caused by altering public perceptions, attitudes or 
tolerances rather than caused by a publication bringing about certain kinds of 
behaviour  
(Personal communication, OFLC, 10 June 2005).   
When the OFLC classified the video game Manhunt (OFLC, 2003: 11), they 
stated that injury to the public good occurred through personal injury as  
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the likelihood of injury arises from a player’s lengthy and repeated exposure to the 
game's extreme violence, significant cruelty and horror, and from the gameplay 
constantly encouraging the player to escalate the levels of violence. While it is 
acknowledged the game involves fictional characters and settings, its entertainment 
value lies in allowing the player to enact and repeat regular acts of violence upon 
human characters over a long period of time, and in encouraging the player to 
increase the brutality and goriness of the violence he or she inflicts. 
 
Similarly, in their decision on Postal 2: Share the Pain (OFLC, 2004: 9), the 
OFLC stated that injury to the public good occurred through personal injury as  
the game is designed, and has the capacity, to allow the player to test how much 
violence and humiliation he or she can infliction human beings and animals in a 
variety of everyday settings and circumstances.  Players choose to expose 
themselves to most of the violence in the game, the quantity and cruelty of which 
can be gradually accommodated and increased as the player becomes increasingly 
callous and inured to the violence inflicted.  A player’s power both to initiate 
violence and to control the level of violence is a part of the process by which this 
accommodation is made.  The constant crass racist, sexist, and homophobic 
references motivate the player’s crimes and further encourage the player to accept 
and escalate the violence he or she inflicts.  The player’s ability to elect the amount, 
type, and speed with which the violence is escalated into extreme cruelty requires 
an antisocial attitudinal shift, (and reinforces such attitudes in those who already 
have them) that is likely to be injurious to the public good. 
 
In reference to hate speech, perhaps the phrase “injurious to the public good” is 
already covered by the definition of “hate literature” by the IPT.  Such a 
definition can be seen to cover several of those points made by the OFLC, 
slightly amended.  It: 
a) creates or reinforces inaccurate stereotypes about a group based on 
a defined trait 
b) increases the risk of inappropriate behaviour 
c) encourages violent tendencies in society through repeated exposure 
to violent imagery, or incitement to violence 
d) changes attitudes to a group based on a defined trait in a negative 
way 
e) increases the risk of copycat behaviour, and 
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f) exposes people to bad ideas they might otherwise never have been 
exposed to. 
 
Therefore, I believe hate speech can indeed be defined as “injurious to the 
public good”.  This is amplified when speech directly encourages violence 
against a group by the use of the phrase “and needs to be eliminated”, or 
similar, such as Anita Bryant’s clarion call of the 1970s  
Kill a Queer for Christ  
(Donaghe, 2002).   
This may particularly be the case where hate speech may alter “public 
perceptions, attitudes or tolerances rather than [causing] a publication [to 
bring] about certain kinds of behaviour”, as indicated above, thus reducing 
LGBT people to the status of objects to be ridiculed at best, or killed at worst. 
 
Similarly, the OFLC also has a compounded definition of “highly offensive 
language”.  Rather than just being  
language that only offends individuals or that is vulgar only mildly offensive,  
the OFLC defines it as  
language that is highly offensive to the public in general. 
The OFLC  
does not consider any particular word to be ‘highly offensive’.  Instead [they] judge 
the language on the context in which it is used and the extent, manner and degree of 
the language  
(personal communication, OFLC, 10 June 2005).   
For example, in considering the classification of the DVD Curb Your 
Enthusiasm: Season 3 Disc 2, and eventually classifying it R13, the OFLC 
looked into the context of the expletives that were used throughout.   
The extent and degree is such that the material has the potential to shock and 
disturb.  Children do not have the emotional maturity to deal with language at this 
level and are particularly likely to be affected.  A related harm is the possibility that 
the humorous context might encourage very young viewers to use the language 
themselves or be harmed by the associated stigma of using such highly offensive 
language  
(decision 500504, cited in personal communication, OFLC, 10 June 2005). 
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Harm minimisation 
 
The term “harm minimisation” is usually applied to public health objectives 
where it means minimising the potential harm to an individual rather than 
trying to prevent a particular behaviour.  In a public health context, harm 
minimisation accepts that some people always have and always will engage in 
risky behaviour, such as using drugs. Harm minimisation seeks to minimise the 
harm associated with these behaviours without proscribing them entirely. 
Harm minimalists believe no one should be denied health services merely 
because they take risks. Further, harm minimisation seeks a social justice 
response to drug use, rather than criminalising it (Ministry of Health, 2003). 
 
Often used in respect to drug use, “harm minimisation” is based on the 
following rationale: 
Despite drug education and treatment programmes many individuals will choose to 
inject illicit and licit drugs for varying periods of time. 
 
People must be provided with knowledge and skills necessary to make informed 
choices about risk behaviours. 
 
The wider, non drug using community faces a greater danger from the wider spread 
of HIV and hepatitis infections than it does from the effects of drug use itself. 
 
The harm reduction model accepts that in the absence of a vaccine or an effective 
cure behavioural change is the only device we have to minimise the spread of HIV 
and other blood-borne diseases. 
 
Needle Exchange offers an excellent opportunity to educate people who inject drugs 
on an individual basis. Through regular contact the safer injecting/safer sex message 
can be reinforced  
(Needle Exchange New Zealand, 2003-2006). 
 
Nevertheless, the term “harm minimisation” may also be applied to censorship 
issues, and, I believe, to human rights issues.  In classifying publications with 
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an age restricted classification, the OFLC admits the behaviour exhibited in the 
publications occurs within society, but by restricting the availability of that 
material to people over a certain age, it reduces harm to those under that age, 
thus minimising harm to society as a whole.  The case of Curb Your 
Enthusiasm noted above is an example of harm minimisation within censorship 
at work.  In doing so, the OFLC examines how a publication may  
a) cause people who lack sufficient emotional and intellectual development and 
maturity to: 
b) Be disturbed or shocked 
c) Be more likely to harm themselves or others 
d) Regard others or themselves as degraded, demeaned or dehumanised  
(personal Communication, OFLC, 10 June 2005). 
 
Although the Human Rights Commission (HRC) does not regard the concept 
of harm minimisation relevant as they are concerned with the impact of the 
type of harassment (under ss 62 and 63 HRA) on the individual (personal 
communication, HRC, 20 May 2005), I believe that it is.  The HRC, through 
the applications of sections 61 to 63 HRA admits that certain behaviours – 
racial disharmony and racial and sexual harassment – exist.  By seeking 
remedies through mediation between the person harassed, or the group to 
whom disharmony was directed, and the person who did either of these, the 
HRC is educating the person who committed the harassment or disharmony.  
While it may not stop the person who committed these types of acts from 
thinking about that person, or target group, in such a way, such mediation 
allows that person to realise the harm they have caused to the person or group 
targeted, in the hope of modifying their behaviour.  By seeking to modify 
behaviour rather than outlaw it, such mediation is a form of harm minimisation 
as it reduces the possibilities of that person causing the same harms to others, 
and makes other people aware that such behaviour is not acceptable, thus 
modifying their behaviour, preventing those harms from occurring. 
 
Indeed, in the case Bissett v Peters [2004] Human Rights Review Tribunal 33, 
the HRC stated, at paragraph 4 of their submission that  
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a ‘harms based’ analysis supports the proposition that people should be spared the 
psychological harm and alienation that can result from racist remarks.  The harm is 
not so much the attitudes engendered in others, as the erosion of self-worth in the 
victims, their withdrawal from society and the inequality that results.  Hate speech 
silences its victims and contributes to a climate of disrespect for women and 
minorities.  Regulation that limits speech about race is seen as symbolic, sending 
positive messages of inclusion and concern to ethnic minorities and demonstrating a 
legislative commitment to eradicating racism  
(HRC, 2004: 2). 
 
Thus, sections 61to 63 HRA, in seeking to reduce the “psychological harm and 
alienation” and the “erosion of self-worth … withdrawal from society and 
inequality”, can be seen to be harm minimisation at work. 
 
Social justice 
 
Social justice is another term often used.  I have heard it used to refer to issues 
pertaining to equality when attending Select Committee hearings on the 
Human Rights Amendment Bill 1999, the Prostitution Reform Bill 2000, and 
the Civil Union and Relationship (Statutory References) Bills 2004.  Caritas, a 
Catholic Justice and Peace organisation defines social justice as allowing a 
person to live 
in freedom and dignity  
(Caritas, 2001). 
 
Thomas Behr, writing for the Acton Institute, indicates the term was first used 
in 1840-1843 by a Sicilian priest, Luigi Taparelli d’Azeglio (Behr, 2003).  
South Africa’s Ministry for Welfare and Population Development (1997) 
defines social justice as an  
ideal condition in which all members of a society have the same basic rights, 
security, opportunities, obligations and social benefits.   
John Rawls (1999), drawing on writings of Mill, Bentham, Kant, and Locke 
proposed that each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that 
even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice 
denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared 
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by others.  Rawls (1999) conceived this idea as being apolitical and consisting 
of six basic liberties, being: 
i. freedom of thought;  
ii. liberty of conscience as it affects social relationships on the grounds of religion, 
philosophy, and morality;  
iii. political liberties (e.g. representative democratic institutions, freedom of speech 
and the press, and freedom of assembly);  
iv. freedom of association;  
v. freedoms necessary for the liberty and integrity of the person (viz: freedom 
from slavery, freedom of movement and a reasonable degree of freedom to 
choose one's occupation); and  
vi. rights and liberties covered by the rule of law. 
 
Nevertheless, Rawls indicates that some restrictions on freedom of speech, for 
example, must exist in order to balance these liberties (Rawls, 1999: 178).  
These basic liberties give rise to two principles of justice: 
a) Each person is to have an equal; right to the most extensive scheme of basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme for others; 
b) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
i. Reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and 
ii. Attached to positions and offices open to all  
(Rawls, 1999: 53). 
 
This gives us some idea of what social justice may be concerned with, and, in 
the case of Caritas, how it may be applied.  Brian Barry (1989: 146), states that  
social justice is predicated primarily of the basic structure of a society. This structure 
is made up of the institutions that together determine the access (or chances of 
access) of the members of a society to resources that are the means to the 
satisfaction of a wide variety of desires. These resources can be grouped under three 
headings: power, status, and money.   
That is, that all people have equal rights before the law, not special rights 
granted by belonging to one particular group.  For example, if someone has a 
right under law provided by their race or religion, (such as freedom from 
harassment or discrimination [c.f., ss61, 63, 131 HRA 1993]), then all people, 
regardless of their race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc., should have 
access to that same right.  This is not the case at present, and is witnessed by 
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the personal observation that some people seem to think that because they have 
a certain religious belief, they should have rights others should not have, or are 
free to denigrate others, or deny others access to equal rights, on the basis of 
their sexual orientation, or other grounds, including a differing religion.  While 
these people claim that allowing LGBT people the same rights they enjoy is 
giving LGBT people “special rights”, they get upset when others point out that 
they are claiming that same right.   
 
This was particularly so in front of the Select Committee considering the 
Parliamentary Inquiry into the Operation of the Films, Videos and Publications 
Classification Act 1993, that was held in 2001.  When claiming that I, as the 
respondent in the Living Word case,  
was seeking the right on the part of the censor to ban forms of harm which lie not in 
some form of depicting, debasing or degrading activity, but in the hearing of or the 
promotion of ideas – in particular ideas which the majority may consider wrong or 
harmful. … The Living Word case is an example of the desire of a minority group to 
close off debate on contentious views with respect to their lifestyle and the moral 
acceptability of their conduct  …  
(McKenzie & Rishworth, 2001: 2, 3),  
Mr McKenzie was asked if he felt that I had been asking for “special rights”, to 
which he replied that was indeed the case.  However, when later asked if it 
could therefore be implied that he, and other groups, were seeking to deny 
equality of rights to LGBT people, by denying them freedom from harassment, 
could it also be true that he was championing the “special right” of those 
groups to espouse discrimination and harassment against those groups, he 
reluctantly agreed that was the case, while looking surprised that such a 
suggestion could even be made (personal notes, discussion with Sue Bradford 
MP, 2001). 
 
“Special Rights” 
 
What then are “special rights”, given this phrase is used so often by those 
opposed to the equality of rights for LGBT people?  To those who oppose this 
equality, the struggle by LGBT people to have equality before the law in all 
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things are “special rights” (Jeremiah Films, 1989, 1993; The Report, 1992, 
1996).  The implication being that in order to qualify for certain types of rights, 
deemed as “special” by the commentators, you must meet a definition of 
“minority status”.  That “minority status” was given in the video Gay 
Rights/Special Rights: Inside the Homosexual Agenda (Jeremiah Films, 1993, 
henceforth GR/SR) as being delivered by a US Supreme Court Ruling that 
stated that in order to qualify for such status, the grounds on which it is sought 
must exhibit  
immutable characteristics like race and gender, financial discrimination, and political 
weakness.   
Arguing that LGBT people did not qualify for “minority status”, they stated 
that being gay or lesbian is a choice, not immutable, that LGBT people are 
richer than the average American (by the use of an unscientific poll reported in 
the gay magazine The Advocate), and that LGBT people demonstrate anything 
but political weakness. 
 
What they omit is that this ruling they claim defines “minority status” was 
over-ruled long before the video was made and is therefore irrelevant.  The 
term “minority class status” in itself does not appear in US law, but is a term 
invented by the religious right (DeLapp, 1993: 6).  Furthermore, writing in 
BLK, Arlene Zarembka (1993: 18) stated: 
On the one hand, the right-wing uses the phrase to drive a wedge between 
racial/ethnic minorities and lesbians and gay men, arguing that discrimination 
against racial/ethnic minorities is 'status based,' whereas discrimination against 
lesbians and gay men is ‘behavior-based’. In fact, most discrimination and violence 
against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals occurs because a person is or is thought to 
be gay, and not because of any behavior. On the other hand, (the Right wing) uses 
the ‘protected minority class status’ phrase to undermine white support for civil 
rights protections in general, by falsely claiming that laws give racial and ethnic 
minorities some sort of ‘special rights and privileges’, ‘advantages’, and ‘elevated 
status’. 
 
Thus it can be seen that the term “special rights”, dependent as it is upon a 
non-existent quasi-definition, is built upon a foundation of sand.  However, can 
the term “special rights” be used to mean anything?  I believe it can.  I believe 
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the term can indeed be used where some group, based on race, ethnicity or 
other status, enjoys legal rights not allowed to other members of society by 
right of their membership of a group not covered under s19(2) BORA.  But, if 
the term can be so defined, does this have any relevance to New Zealand? 
 
Although discrimination on many grounds is prohibited under the HRA, and 
Acts which have been passed since then seeking to ensure equality for X 
(where X is any particular group in society), they have always been inclusive 
and sought to include other groups to ensure equality.  An example of this is 
the CUA 2004, where no distinction is made by reason of race, colour, 
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, etc.  Yet even then, the Christian right 
called it “special rights” for LGBT people (SPCS, 2004d; Whitehead, 2004).  
The only distinctions being on the grounds of age – a person must be over 16 
to enter a Civil Union, and not in a familial relationship within the bounds of 
consanguinity.  Although countries overseas have passed such laws, they have 
generally excluded heterosexuals from being able to form Civil Unions.  The 
UK Civil Partnership Act 2004 is an example of this exclusive legislation.  
 
I therefore believe the term “special rights” may only be used in New Zealand 
– if at all – where a protection under law is given to a certain group, or groups, 
but denied to others.  Examples of this in New Zealand law may be sections 
61, 63 and 131 HRA, which aim to prevent disharmony and harassment based 
on  
the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons,  
yet are denied to people on the basis of disability or sexual orientation who are 
also targeted by such actions.   
 
The “Vox Deus” argument 
 
In seeking to prove that homosexuality can be changed, many opponents of the 
LGBT communities cite various Biblical verses.  However, New Zealand is a 
secular country in which many religions are represented.  To give favour to 
any one religion over another in law could be seen as a breach of ss13 and 15 
BORA.   
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Furthermore, many verses in the Bible are highly contested in their meaning 
(Boswell, 1980; Wright, 1985), and different Christian denominations often 
interpret the same verse in different ways.  This would make it difficult to 
come to any definitive interpretation of what a law based on any particular 
biblical verse that some claim to condemn homosexuality was intended to 
mean. 
 
I believe then, that the Vox Deus argument, where one uses the words of any 
sacred book to lend credence to an argument (“Because god says ...”), is a 
convenient way of getting out of an inconvenient situation, and can be 
compared to the deus ex machina plot. 
 
This chapter has given the terms and definitions used in this thesis.  The next 
examines the literature reviewed during the writing of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
“Hate speech” is a wide topic, covering many areas, with each group of 
affected communities being subjected to different sorts of hate speech.  
Nevertheless, often the results are the same, and the motivation of those 
seeking to denigrate, demean and dehumanise certain groups of people because 
of some characteristic that binds that group as one, are often similar.  To 
examine all the different aspects of hate speech, and how those aspects affect 
different groups in different ways, is beyond the scope of this thesis.  The 
focus of the present study is hate speech affecting the LGBT communities. 
 
There is very little previous analysis of hate speech in New Zealand as it 
affects these communities (Beck, 2000).  Internationally, however, there is a 
large corpus of work that analyses hate speech, or supports freedom of 
expression, or supports greater controls on hate speech (Allport, 1958; Butler, 
1997; Clayton, 1997; Collins, M, 1992; De Cecco, 1985; DeLapp, 1993; 
Farrior, 1996; Goldhagen, 1996; Herek, 1992; Huebner, Rebchook, & Kegeles 
2004; Kintz & Lesage, 1998; Knoll, 1994; Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado & 
Crenshaw, 1993; Puplick, 2000; Scahill, 1994; Tomasulo, 1998; Whillock & 
Sladen,1995; Zarembka, 1994). 
 
Linda Kintz and Julia Lesage (1998) have collected a range of essays which 
examine how the Christian right have used the media – mainstream and 
Christian – to increase their power and visibility, and the effect the media has 
had on the organising practices and political mobilisation of the Christian 
Right.  The chapter in their book by Ioannis Mookas looks directly at the 
effects of, and harms caused by, Gay Rights/Special Rights. 
 
New Zealander David Beck (2000) examines the legal rationale behind the 
Court of Appeal’s Living Word decision, comparing it to the intention of 
Parliament, and indicates how it deviates from those intentions when the 
FVPCB 1992 was debated. 
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Chris Brickell (2008) examines the history of gay men from the goldfields of 
Otago of the 1860s, where sexual activity between men seemed rife yet rarely 
commented on if taking place in private, to law reform in the 1980s.  Brickell 
indicates there have been a series of changes in the way homosexual activity 
between men has been treated, swinging between tolerance and bigotry and 
back again.  Brickell (1999) examines the New Zealand mainstream media 
portrayal of lesbians and gay men.  This indicates there has been a shift in the 
portrayal of homosexuality in New Zealand, but that there remains a deep 
seated homophobia under the surface by positioning heterosexuality as 
normative yet neutral, thus marking homosexuality as illegitimate.   
 
Similarly, Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman (1984) demonstrate how 
propaganda put out by religious right has had negative effects on American 
society.  This was one of the earliest analyses of the religious right and the 
negative impact their propaganda has on society.  It can be seen how these 
same tactics have been used here in New Zealand by similar groups, almost as 
if they have been directly imported.  Similarly, Michael Signorile (1993) 
indicates how powerful anti-homosexual discourse in the media can be, and the 
effects this has on people’s lives, not just at a personal level, but also a national 
level. 
 
Various articles examine the important role cinema has played in the 
propagation of propaganda and hate speech, ranging from the anti-Jewish 
rhetoric of films made in Nazi Germany to articles about The Gay Agenda (The 
Report, 1992), and political campaign films.  Among these is Frank 
Tomasulo’s (1998) examination of how the anti-Semitic discourse of film 
influenced the mind of the German people during World War II, and allowed 
the Holocaust to occur.  Daniel Goldhagen (1996) did a similar examination to 
the same ends.  David Deitcher (1994) investigates how The Gay Agenda (The 
Report, 1992) has been used to attempt to limit public arts funding.  Again 
examining how film captures the minds of viewers, Joanne Morreale (1991) 
dissects Ronald Regan’s 1984 campaign film and how that affected the 
political mind of America during a period in American politics when the 
religious right felt themselves to be under political threat. 
29 
 
 
Gordon Allport (1958) examines the ideas behind prejudice and hatred, how 
these affect people, and how hate speech eventually leads to violence through a 
five point scale: antilocution (the open expression of antagonism), avoidance 
(of members of the disliked group), discrimination, physical attack, and 
extermination. 
 
Australian Anne Scahill (1994) examines the validity of hate speech and its 
control in her home country and the effects those controls have had.  Chris 
Puplick (2000) examines other issues surrounding hate speech, with particular 
focus on the negative effect it has on the Australian LGBT communities. 
 
Both the United Nations and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
have a large amount of information about freedom of expression, and how it 
should be allowed or controlled in certain circumstances.  These documents are 
mainly covenants and declarations.  These also allow a stronger theory of 
liberation to be developed, that enhances the lives of the targeted communities. 
 
Stephanie Farrior (1996) examines the before and after discussions about the 
control of certain types of hate speech in international documents, primarily 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), 
henceforth UDHR.  She completes this by looking at the travaux preparatois, 
the drafts and related legal preparatory papers of human rights instruments, 
indicating restrictions on freedom of speech which may be reasonable.  David 
Knoll (1994) examines the developments in anti-vilification law in Australia 
and allowances for freedom of expression in both Australia and the USA, and 
agrees with Farrior in an Australian context. 
 
Andrew and Petra Butler (2005) provide an overview of BORA, a commentary 
on each of the rights secured by that Act, and how they related to the ICCPR.  
They devote considerable comment to freedom of expression, the restrictions 
on that already in place in a New Zealand context, and show how the Court of 
Appeal has allowed BORA to restrict private rights, not just those provided by 
legislation or the judiciary.  They indicate that prohibitions on hate speech, 
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which they state has a destabilising and divisive effect on society (2005:364), 
can be a justifiable limitation on s14 BORA (2005: 370). 
 
Grant Huscroft (1995: 212) argues the opposite, and states that  
personal and group reputations, long valued in New Zealand can no longer be 
presumed to justify the limitations on freedom of expression which now exist  
and asks if this is 
a price we are willing to pay  
for freedom of expression.  In so doing, he seems to support the repeal of 
defamation law and other restrictions on freedom of expression which are duly 
allowed under article 19 ICCPR, and would thus form reasonable limitations 
on s14 BORA.  If this were so, then anyone could say any number of untruths 
about someone, or some product, without any factual basis, and ruin their 
reputation or the market value of that product unfairly.  Huscroft (2003) 
repeats this.  I strongly reject this proposal. 
 
Examining the effects hate speech has on groups targeted by its authors, Rita 
May Whillock and David Slayden (1995), looking mainly at issues of culture 
and society, have assembled a collection of essays examining the definitions, 
stratagems, symbolism used, and issues of freedom of expression.  They 
indicate hate speech has negative effects on those it is targeted towards.  
Similarly, Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and 
Kimberlè Crenshaw (1993) discuss the effects of hate speech on people of 
colour, and how serious and wide ranging these adverse effects can be.  
Although this concentrates on people of colour, parallels can be drawn to 
sexual orientation and gender issues. 
 
In particular, Lawrence (in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado & Crenshaw, 1993: 
69-70) notes: 
One of my students, a white, gay male, related an experience that is quite instructive 
in understanding the fighting words doctrine. In response to my request that 
students describe how they experienced the injury of racist speech, Michael told a 
story of being called “faggot” by a man on a subway. His description included all of 
the speech-inhibiting elements I have noted previously. He found himself in a state 
of semishock, nauseous, dizzy, unable to muster the witty, sarcastic, articulate 
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rejoinder he was accustomed to making. He was instantly aware of the recent spate 
of gay bashing in San Francisco and that many of these incidents had escalated from 
verbal encounters. Even hours later when the shock subsided and his facility with 
words returned, he realized that any response was inadequate to counter the 
hundreds of years of societal defamation that one word —”faggot”— carried with it. 
Like the word “nigger” and unlike the word “liar,” it is not sufficient to deny the truth 
of the word's application, to say, “I am not a faggot.” One must deny the truth of the 
word's meaning, a meaning shouted from the rooftops by the rest of the world a 
million times a day. The complex response “Yes, I am a member of the group you 
despise and the degraded meaning of the word you use is one that I reject” is not 
effective in a subway encounter. Although there are many of us who constantly and 
in myriad ways seek to counter the lie spoken in the meaning of hateful words like 
“nigger” and “faggot,” it is a nearly impossible burden to bear when one is 
ambushed by a sudden, face-to-face hate speech assault. 
 
But there was another part of my discussion with Michael that is equally instructive. 
I asked if he could remember a situation when he had been verbally attacked with 
reference to his being a white male. Had he ever been called a “honkey,” a 
“chauvinist pig,” or “mick”? (Michael is from a working-class Irish family in Boston.) 
He said that he had been called some version of all three and that although he found 
the last one more offensive than the first two, he had not experienced—even in that 
subordinated role—the same disorienting powerlessness he had experienced when 
attacked for his membership in the gay community. The question of power, of the 
context of the power relationships within which speech takes place, and the 
connection to violence must be considered as we decide how best to foster the 
freest and fullest dialogue within our communities. 
 
Furthermore: 
Racist speech also distorts the marketplace of ideas by muting or devaluing the 
speech of Blacks and other despised minorities. Regardless of intrinsic value, their 
words and ideas become less salable in the marketplace of ideas. An idea that would 
be embraced by large numbers of individuals if it were offered by a white individual 
will be rejected or given less credence if its author belongs to a group demeaned and 
stigmatized by racist beliefs. ...  
 
[R]acist speech decreases the total amount of speech that reaches the market by 
coercively silencing members of those groups who are its targets. I noted earlier in 
this chapter the ways in which racist speech is inextricably linked with racist conduct. 
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The primary purpose and effect of the speech/conduct that constitutes white 
supremacy is the exclusion of nonwhites from full participation in the body politic  
(Lawrence, in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw, 1993: 78-79). 
 
While concentrating on the psychological sequelae of hate crimes, Greg Herek 
and Kevin Berrill (1992) examine the negative effects that hatred has on the 
lesbian and gay communities.  Herek (1992, 1997-2008, 1999) has also 
independently published several psychological papers dealing specifically with 
the negative effects of hatred on the lesbian and gay communities.  Similarly, 
Anthony D’Augelli and Charlotte Patterson (1995) show the negative 
psychological, social and physical effects of hatred aimed at members of the 
LGBT communities. 
 
Other studies examining the effects of hate on the lesbian and gay communities 
are those by David Huebner and colleagues (2004) who examined the 
experiences of verbal and other harassment, discrimination, and violence that 
occurs against members of the LGBT communities.  James Warner and his 
colleagues (2004) examined how speech and violence negatively effects the 
mental health of LGBT people in England and Wales. 
 
These studies report on the causes and adverse effects of hate speech.  Many 
also propose remedies, some of which have already been enacted in various 
pieces of legislation.  Legislation that specifically deals with hate speech 
would have to be examined, then adapted to a New Zealand context.  Already 
Canada (1985), the United Kingdom (both Westminster, 1986, 1998; and the 
Scottish Parliament, 2004), various Australian states (Australian Capital 
Territory, 1991; New South Wales (NSW), 1977; Queensland, 2001; South 
Australia, 1996), and New Zealand (HRA, 1993) have some types of 
legislation targeted at controlling forms of hate speech.  Some of this 
legislation covers only hate speech directed at race or ethnicity.  Others are 
wider, and include sexual orientation specifically, or as “other grounds”. 
 
In New Zealand, the debate over the CUA 2004 gave opportunities for many 
who thought antagonism shown by some during the debates on the 
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Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986 was a thing of the past, to see that these 
same points of conflict continue to exist.  In some cases, they may be put more 
delicately – if that is an appropriate word to use – but in many others, they are 
just as blunt and hateful as ever. 
 
Literature on hate speech increases daily.  This overview has addressed the 
major books and articles dealing with hate speech up to and including 2007.   
 
In the next chapter, I explain the methodology used, and the theories that 
informed me during the period of the Living Word case as it progressed from 
1995 to 2001. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
Some information about the Living Word case is contained in Hansard, the 
record of the Parliamentary debates, and in submissions to Parliament on Bills 
that affect the lives of LGBT people, and in Parliamentary Enquiries into 
specific topics, such as hate speech, or the operation of the FVPCA.  The 
major resource is the Living Word case, over the videos AIDS: What you 
Haven’t Been Told (Jeremiah Films, 1989, henceforth AWYHBT) and GR/SR.  
These videos became central to what was later referred to that case, after the 
appellants, Living Word Distributors Ltd. (LWD), in the cases before the High 
Court and Court of Appeal in Wellington.  On behalf of HRAG, I was the 
respondent in those cases.   
 
Until now, there is no complete written record of how the Living Word case 
developed, from its beginning in Wellington when one of the above videos was 
shown, to its finale with the Court of Appeal narrowing the gateway and 
ordering the Board of Review to look at the case afresh, putting more emphasis 
on the right to freedom of expression, and the subsequent Parliamentary 
hearings.  Available resources are my collections held at the LAGANZ and the 
decisions of the OFLC, the Board, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal.  
But these are disjoint, separate and difficult to obtain.  The history of the case 
can, however, be traced in its entirety from these. 
 
In order to put the case in perspective, it is also necessary to look at what has 
happened in the past, to examine the discourse on homosexuality at the time 
the Living Word case wound its way through the judicial process, tying in 
streams of thought from LGBT history in New Zealand.  Also important are 
the debates around the HRB, and hate crimes, as well as issues of hate speech 
and its effects. 
 
While much of the hateful articles against LGBT individuals and communities 
are from overseas, there is also much that is “home-grown”, particularly in 
submissions to Parliament on issues affecting the LGBT communities, for 
example, those by Adams, (1993); the Coalition of Concerned Citizens, 
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(1993); McKenzie & Rishworth, (2001); and SPCS (2004a).  Some of this 
material may not initially appear to be hate speech, because it doesn’t 
immediately use the expression “kill a faggot”, but the intention behind the 
speech – to prevent equal rights for LGBT people, or to promote the view that 
discrimination against them is a good thing – may be enough to bring it into 
the hate speech arena.  In this context, I define hate speech at its widest – not 
only that which outrightly states “kill a queer”, but also that which may be 
classed as vilification, in that it seeks to demean and dehumanise people within 
those communities.  
 
The most informative sources of information for this thesis are the primary 
documents held by myself, the OFLC, the Lesbian and Gay Archives of New 
Zealand, and in the Parliamentary Library.  I have kept extensive files on the 
cases I have been involved with since the first complaint was laid in February 
1995.  These may be more comprehensive than any other single source, as it 
includes all the submissions made, by HRAG, myself and others up to and 
including the rehearing by the Board, and the submissions specifically 
mentioning hate speech issues that have been made to Parliament.  Reading the 
submissions to Parliament on almost any Bill that has had a positive effect on 
the lives of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, such as the HRB, the Civil Union 
Bill 2004 and the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, as well as 
Inquiries by Parliament into Hate Speech, gives an idea of the absolute need 
for the control of hate speech on the one hand, and the total opposition to any 
controls on the other.  I shall deal with the submissions on the HRB later in 
this thesis, as these provide an insight into the discourse around homosexuality 
in New Zealand at the time the videos in question were shown here. 
 
During these public debates, through newspaper reports and letters to the 
editor, through broadcasts on television and radio, and latterly over the 
Internet, it was clear that a dichotomy existed, and still exists, in society in 
regards to the causes of homosexuality.  The nature versus nurture or 
inherent/learned debate proved to be very strong, with a large number of 
people opposed to LGBT rights favouring the nurture/learned behaviour side 
of the debate, and many of those supporting equality of rights favouring either 
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the inherent/nature argument or not favouring either side, but noting that 
certain other chosen behaviours are provided protection from discrimination, 
such as political opinion and religious belief, effectively choosing the “does it 
really matter?” stance. 
 
Of note to the majority of those opposed to controls on hate speech is the 
social standing of homosexuality, thus, it may be necessary to examine some 
theories regarding the origin and basis of homosexuality to put the claims 
made in the submissions against controls of hate speech into context.  Andrew 
Sullivan (1996) identifies some arguments about homosexuality.  These are the 
prohibitionist, who  
wishes to cure or punish people who practice homosexual acts  
thus deterring  
others who might be tempted to stray into the homosexual milieu  
(Sullivan, 1996: 22);  
the conservative, who  
combine[s] private tolerance of homosexuality with public disapproval  
while not wanting  
to see legal persecution of homosexual, they see no problem with discouragement 
or disparagement of homosexual sexual behaviour in the abstract  
(Sullivan, 1996: 97);  
the liberal, who  
believe, like conservatives, that homosexuality as a social phenomenon is a mixture 
of choice and compulsion  
yet they differ from conservatives as  
liberals ask first how the individual is affected  
seeing  
the homosexuals rights infringed in various areas  
including the right to privacy, freedom of expression, and to housing, 
employment, etc. (Sullivan, 1996: 135-136); and the liberationist who hold that  
homosexuality is a construct of human thought, not an inherent or natural way of 
being,  
yet for liberationists  
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full end of human fruition is to be free of all social constructs ... not only to rebel 
against the fiction of nature, but to rebel against the rebellion against nature, to defy 
the ways in which human thought seeks to constrain and control human freedom  
(Sullivan, 1996: 57).  
 
Two of these, the prohibitionist and the conservative arguments against 
homosexuality, can easily be seen in the submissions against the addition of 
sexual orientation to the HRB.  However, the liberationist and liberal 
arguments in favour of homosexuality are not so easily identified in those 
submissions favouring of the addition of sexual orientation to the Bill. 
 
Vera Whisman (1996) looks at the oral histories she collected during 1987 and 
1988 of lesbians and gay men and their attitudes to how much choice they had 
in their sexual orientation, and if it really was a choice for them.  Some 
believed it was a choice, others did not, while some had elements of both.  
Whisman (1997: 37) came to realise that  
accounts of choice cannot be so neatly dichotomised. 
 
Simon LeVay (1996) examines much of the research that has been done into 
the causes of homosexuality from the time of Magnus Hirschfeld, through 
Freud, to studies that have looked at the effect of hormones, stressors and 
mental traits, to genetics.  He examines what the result of this research has 
been, the effects of this research on LGBT people, and indicates some form of 
biological beginning to sexual orientation, rather than a behavioural beginning. 
 
Timothy Murphy (1997) also looks at this research, noting that much of it has 
been questionable in its motives and is often methodologically unsound.  He 
specifically looks at Simon LeVay's (1991) study of brain structure, Joseph 
Nicolosi's (1991) reparative therapy methods, and other studies from the 
1990s.  Murphy argues those scientists studying sexual orientation should not 
look at it simplistically, focussing upon homosexuality exclusively, or 
presupposing the pathology of that sexual orientation. 
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Michel Foucault (1978) looks at the construction of sexuality, how this has 
varied with changing language, societal beliefs and opinions resulting from 
that variation, and the corpus of knowledge that has been established around 
sexuality, with a greater discourse in more recent times opposing the theory of 
repression of sexuality occurring since the 17th century.  Rather than the 
repression of sexuality, this discourse has allowed a greater acknowledgement 
of sex and sexuality, establishing it as the core of our identity.  David Halperin 
(1995) expands on the interpretation of Foucault, looking at some of the 
critiques and criticisms that have been made of Foucault's work.  In the first of 
two essays, he shows how – despite criticism from non-gay identified liberal 
critics – Foucault has been almost saint-like in the eyes of many LGBT 
activists and political thinkers.  In the second essay, Halperin (1995: 13-14) 
shows how Foucault’s life has provided a powerful model for many LGBT 
academics to allow them to combine critical analysis and political activism. 
 
Michael Warner (1999) questions the concept of normalcy and the normalising 
of LGBT communities, asking if equal rights with heterosexuals, and any of 
the trappings that go along with that, are of any use to those communities.  I 
agree with his comment that the disavowal of sex and sexuality in an attempt 
to fight stigma increases that stigma (1999: 46).  However, I disagree with the 
politics he advocates:  
a frank embrace of queer sex in all its apparent indignity, together with a frank 
challenge to the damaging hierarchies of respectability  
(1999: 74). 
I do not, however, support assimilation.  A gay or lesbian identity is more than 
just sex, and focusing on such a narrow aspect omits other facets of identity 
upon which a person is built, such as race, ethnicity and other cultural and 
political characteristics.  Indeed, in the videos in question, gay men and 
lesbians are often reduced to only their sexual components in efforts to oppress 
them (Jeremiah Films, 1989, 1993).  When considered with his comments on 
community (Warner, 1993: xxv-xxvi), I do not find his position entirely 
convincing. 
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Judith Butler (1997: 4) critiques Matsuda et al (1993) with a response that 
appears to be sticks and stones will break my bones.  This ignores the negative 
impact words have on people that increases their risk of suicide (Clayton, 
1997; Fergusson, Horwood, Ridder & Beautrais, 2005: 979; Petrie and Brook, 
1992; Rosenhan and Seligman, 1985: 342-343).  Furthermore, Butler argues 
against the point made by Matsuda and McKinnon regarding the singular yet 
universalist nature of hate speech, seemingly indicating that such speech can 
be one or the other, not both (Butler, 1997: 92).  She ignores their claims that a 
small number of a group of people who hear a statement about a minority may 
be offended by that statement, yet the majority may accept it as true, thus 
stigmatising the stated minority.  Furthermore, some of that majority may act 
upon it as being true, thus discriminating, or committing acts of violence, 
against the now stigmatised minority. 
 
These books allowed me to examine the nature/nurture, inherent/learned 
debate, as well as how sexuality has been constructed by societal expectations 
and norms.  While I would still tend towards a belief that homosexuality is not 
something that is learned or is something that you can be “recruited” to, the 
“does it really matter” stance is more inclusive of the complexity of sexual 
orientation and its genesis, and is more supportive of liberation theory, which I 
do support. 
 
Liberation theory holds that all LGBT people should be free from oppression 
and discrimination, allowing them to have the same full civil rights as other 
members of general society.  This can be seen in the statement of the Auckland 
Gay Liberation Front Manifesto (1972).  The first four demands are: 
i. That all discrimination by society against gay people should end and that all 
means should be utilised to remove the present attitudes existing so that gay 
people can live in freedom – now. 
ii. That all discrimination in law against gay people should end. 
iii. That all people have the right to sexual self-determination.  We believe that all 
people should have the unhindered right to be homosexual, heterosexual or 
bisexual, according to their own free will, and appreciate the validity of their 
own sexual preference. 
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iv. That we shall oppose all oppression against gay people and fight to overcome 
individual cases of discrimination, so that all gays shall have full civil rights – 
(“the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”). 
 
It was through this liberationist lens I examined the material, books and 
articles used in this thesis.  HRAG believed that the material contained within 
the videos in question, and other anti-gay material, led to the oppression of 
LGBT people, thus to discrimination and to violence against them.  Evidence 
gained from eyewitnesses during the screenings of the videos, and from 
personal testimony by those involved, indicated that violence was occurring as 
a result of the screenings of these videos.  
 
During the Living Word case, material was selected because it supported the 
case we were building.  Material opposing our point of view was also 
examined to develop counterarguments against it.  During the writing of this 
thesis, material outside this rather narrow focus was examined in order to 
develop arguments and examine counterarguments opposing the point of view 
the HRAG had taken.  As a result of this reading, some of my attitudes have 
changed, while some have been strengthened.  My conclusions, including 
those on the most appropriate remedies, are argued at the end of the thesis. 
 
Shulamit Reinharz (1992: 240) states ten themes used in feminist research.   
1. Feminism is a perspective, not a research method;  
2. ongoing criticism of non-feminist research continues;  
3. that feminist research is guided by feminist theory;  
4. strives to represent diversity;  
5. attempts to develop special relationships with those studied;  
6. defines a special relationship with the reader;  
7. such research may be transdisciplinary;  
8. may use a variety of methods;  
9. aim to create social change; and  
10. includes the researcher as a person.   
As a member of HRAG, I was intimately involved in this case, although my 
views have modified by reading the materials from others, many of which 
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included alternative or conflicting views to my own.  As Reinharz (1992: 34) 
indicates, this is an important feature of feminist research, as the problems 
caused from being that experiential insider are modified by including opposing 
views.  Furthermore, in completing this thesis, I aim to create some form of 
social change to the current dominant discourse on hate speech in New 
Zealand.  While much of this thesis is essentially an historical overview of the 
Living Word case, and thus may not have an immediate change on society, it 
provides information that others may use as background to research they may 
undertake, or cases they seek to be heard before the Film and Literature Board 
of Review and the Courts. 
 
My status as an insider 
 
During the debates in question, as a member of HRAG, helping to drive the 
issues forward, speaking to others in the LGBT communities, contacting 
similar groups overseas and within New Zealand, and often acting as the front-
person for this campaign, I was clearly an ‘insider’.  As Trinh Minh-ha (1991: 
65) notes in respect to outsiders looking in: 
An objective constantly claimed by those who “seek to reveal one society to 
another” is “to grasp the native's point of view” and “to realize his vision of his 
world.” Fomenting much discord, in terms of methodology and approach, among 
specialists in the directly concerned fields of anthropology and ethnographic 
filmmaking in the last decade, such a goal is also diversely taken to heart by many of 
us who consider it our mission to represent others, and to be their loyal interpreters.  
The injunction to see things from the native's point of view speaks for a definite 
ideology of truth and authenticity; it lies at the center of every polemical discussion 
on “reality” in its relation to “beauty” and “truth.” To raise the question of 
representing the Other is, therefore, to reopen endlessly the fundamental issue of 
science and art; documentary and fiction; universal and personal; objectivity and 
subjectivity; masculine and feminine; outsider and insider. 
 
Nevertheless, an outsider can never truly experience, but can only present  
a form of legitimized (but unacknowledged as such) voyeurism and subtle arrogance 
– namely, the pretense to see into or to own the others' minds, whose knowledge 
these others cannot, supposedly, have themselves; and the need to define, hence 
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confine, providing them thereby with a standard of self-evaluation on which they 
necessarily depend  
(Trinh, 1991: 66). 
This imposes a ‘we know better’ type of attitude. 
 
Yet I was an insider looking in as well as looking out, though trying to be, at 
the same time, an objective observer.  As Trinh (1991: 69) indicates: 
An Insider's view: the magic word that bears within itself a seal of approval.  What 
can be more authentically “other” than an otherness by the Other him/herself?  Yet, 
every piece of the cake given by the Master comes with a double-edged blade.   
 
Nevertheless, Trinh (1991: 74) states: 
The moment the insider steps out from the inside, she is no longer a mere insider 
(and vice versa).  She necessarily looks in from the outside while also looking out 
from the inside.  Like the outsider, she steps back and records what never occurs to 
her the insider as being worth or in need of recording.  But unlike the outsider, she 
also resorts to non-explicative, non-totalizing strategies that suspend meaning and 
resist closure.  (This is often viewed by the outsiders as strategies of partial 
concealment and disclosure aimed at preserving secrets that should only be im-
parted to initiates.) She refuses to reduce herself to an Other, and her reflections to 
a mere outsider's objective reasoning or insider's subjective feeling.  She knows, 
probably like Zora Neale Hurston the insider-anthropologist knew, that she is not an 
outsider like the foreign outsider.  She knows she is different while at the same time 
being Him.  Not quite the Same, not quite the Other, she stands in that 
undetermined threshold place where she constantly drifts in and out.  Undercutting 
the inside/outside opposition, her intervention is necessarily that of both a decep-
tive insider and a deceptive outsider.  She is this Inappropriate Other/Same who 
moves about with always at least two/four gestures: that of affirming “I am like you” 
while persisting in her difference; and that of reminding “I am different” while unset-
tling every definition of otherness arrived at. 
 
Nevertheless, this does leave me open to criticism: “Of course he’d say that, 
he’s biased towards the homosexualist point of view, and seeking to impose 
those points of view on others”.  Yet people who would use that type of 
criticism would all too often omit their own heterocentrist bias that treats 
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homosexuality as “the other”, and therefore something lesser.  As Matsuda, 
Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw (1993: 14-15) state these are: 
arguments for absolutist protection of speech made without reference to historical 
context or uneven power relations. Academic freedom and intellectual pursuit are 
alleged to be threatened by ‘leftist speech police.’ People of color, women, gays, and 
lesbians who insist on the inclusion of their voices in academic discourse and who 
speak out against persons and practices that continue to injure and demean them 
are said to impose a ‘new orthodoxy’ upon the academy. 
 
Similarly, Lawrence (in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw, 1993: 78-
79) noted: 
the experience of one of my gay students provides a paradigmatic example of how 
ideas are less acceptable when their authors are members of a group that has been 
victimized by hatred and vilification. Bob had not “come out” when he first came to 
law school. During his first year, when issues relating to heterosexism came up in 
class or in discussions with other students, he spoke to these issues as a sympathetic 
“straight” white male student. His arguments were listened to and taken seriously. In 
his second year, when he had come out and his classmates knew that he was gay, he 
found that he was not nearly as persuasive an advocate for his position as when he 
was identified as straight. He was the same person saying the same things, but his 
identity gave him less authority. 
 
Being so close to the case, I believe I am in an expert position.  I am “the 
Other”, and am able to understand that viewpoint, yet from my readings and 
listening to the debates, I can also understand the position of those who took 
the opposing view, and can look at those views objectively, seeing their faults 
and good points, where those who espoused them may not. Nevertheless, by 
taking this to the academic sphere, I am no longer ‘the Other’, or merely an 
insider, I look  
in from the outside while also looking out from the inside  
(Trinh, 1991: 74),  
yet I believe I have been able to prevent myself from suspending meaning or 
resisting closure.  I would hope, however, that, being an insider, my arguments 
are taken seriously and that identifying as such does not lessen my authority, 
but gives me more. 
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This thesis is to provide information about a particular case.  I hope that the 
arguments presented will enable those interested in the control of hate speech 
to gain knowledge of that pivotal case, and that it will add to the knowledge of 
hate speech in general.  I trust that it will produce the required changes in 
societal thought, judicial processes and legislative action to benefit the LGBT 
and other relevant communities affected by hate speech. 
 
In this chapter, I examined the methodology used in this thesis, while in the 
next, I begin looking at a brief history of homosexuality in New Zealand. 
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Chapter 5: Homosexuality and Censorship in New Zealand to 1993 
 
This chapter is a brief history looking at specific events affecting, and affected 
by, the dominant discourse around homosexuality in New Zealand.  I argue 
that these events, and the censorship affecting all things homosexual, were part 
of, and caused by, the dominant discourse of the time, yet also helped that 
discourse evolve.  This is an illustrative background only, and is not to be 
taken as exhaustive. 
 
Prior to colonisation, several sources indicate that homosexuality was accepted 
among Maori (Te Awekotuku, 2001; 2005).    
 
In 1836, during European colonising, the preacher William Yate left New 
Zealand for Sydney, where his past behaviour caught up with him.  He had 
been a missionary in New Zealand since 1828, though was subsequently sent 
back to Britain in disgrace following a church hearing into his behaviour in 
New Zealand and elsewhere.  During his time in New Zealand, Yate formed 
sexual relationships involving mutual masturbation and oral sex with as many 
as 100 young Maori men (Parkinson, 2005: 19).  Henry Pilley, a contemporary 
of Yate, was also returned to Britain in 1838, proven to be  
a most depraved young man  
(Chapman, 1838, cited in Parkinson, 2005: 21) 
 after committing 
very indecent conduct with some of the European boys  
(Wade, 1837, cited in Parkinson, 2005: 21). 
Pilley’s interests had been among the sons of other missionaries (Parkinson, 
2005: 19). 
 
With the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, English law had effect in New 
Zealand, and homosexuality became illegal.  Initially punished with life 
imprisonment, with a minimum of 10 years, with, or without, hard labour 
(ss58-60, Offences Against the Person Act 1867).  Flogging was added to the 
punishment in 1893 (ss153-154, Criminal Code 1893) in the wake of the Wilde 
trials in the UK, and carried over into the 1908 Crimes Act.  Although flogging 
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and hard labour were deleted from the list of punishments in 1941, it was not 
until 1961 that the sentence was reduced from life imprisonment to a 
maximum of seven years (ss141-142, Crimes Act 1961).  
 
The law was clear: homosexuals who indulged in certain acts were to be 
punished.  Although secular law had moved away from Old Testament 
injunctions of death in Leviticus 20: 13, such men were still a moral 
abomination requiring punishment. 
 
From 1908 on, the law was applied to men who were caught having sex with 
other men.  Generally, though not exclusively, homosexuality only made 
headlines where gay men or lesbians were described in terms of perversion, 
were murdered, or were murderers – or attempted to commit murder – and as 
such were a stern warning to the general population about “people like that”.  
 
Christoffel (1989) states that in 1910, the first Indecent Publications Act was 
passed, combining various pieces of censorship legislation, staying in force 
until 1954.  There was no definition of ‘indecent’ in that Act, but it did specify 
criteria that magistrates  
should take into account when determining the indecency of material  
(Christoffel, 1989).   
As the Act  
deemed indecent ‘any document or matter which relates or refers ... to any disease 
affecting the generative organs of either sex, or to the complaint or infirmity arising 
from or relating to sexual intercourse, or to the prevention or removal of 
irregularities in menstruation, or to drugs, medicines or appliances, treatment, or 
methods for procuring abortion or miscarriage or preventing conception’ there were 
concerns from the medical authorities  
(Christoffel, 1989).   
However, if  
the work was of ‘literary, scientific, or artistic merit or importance’, and that the act 
of the accused was not of ‘an immoral or mischievous tendency’,  
a defence was available.  Christoffel (1989) thus noted  
the Act thus spelt out for the first time the distinction between work which was of 
‘literary, scientific, or artistic, merit’ and that which was not. The purpose, according 
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to the Attorney General, John Findlay, was to protect the ‘liberty which improves 
and ennobles a nation’ while removing the ‘license which degrades’. 
 
The Cinematograph Film Censorship Act was passed in 1916, which  
made it illegal to show any film which had not first been approved by a government-
appointed censor. Virtually the only directive given to the censor was that no film 
should be approved which ‘in the opinion of the censor, depicts any matter that is 
against public order and decency, or the exhibition of which for any other reason is, 
in the opinion of the censor, undesirable in the public interest’  
(Christoffel, 1989).   
W. Jolliffe was appointed New Zealand’s first Chief Censor.  When Jolliffe 
died in office in 1927, his assistant, W.H. Tanner, replaced him.  The phrase 
‘in the opinion of the censor’, in this Act provided wide powers to the Censor, 
and although there was a provision for distributors to appeal to a Board where 
cuts were made, or a film banned, it was impossible to appeal the approval of a 
film.  The other phrase within the Act that was of concern, which led to 
questions in Parliament, was ‘undesirable in the public interest’.  As a result of 
these Parliamentary questions, it was revealed that these were  
specifically included so films could be censored for political reasons, in particular 
their effect on army recruitment  
(Christoffel, 1989). 
 
When the Evening Post interviewed Jolliffe about his role as Censor in 1917, 
he said  
It is difficult to formulate principles which will apply to every case, but matter 
coming within the following classes is not allowed to pass: 
The commission of crime in a manner likely to be imitated, especially by the 
young, or to give information as to methods to persons of a criminal 
tendency; 
indecency in the matter of dress; 
the treatment of religious subjects in an irreligious or irreverent manner; 
matter likely to promote disloyalty to the King and country, or to adversely 
affect friendly feeling towards our Allies; 
matter likely to effect class hatred  
(cited in OFLC, 2006: 5) 
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In 1920, Charles McKay, then the Mayor of Wanganui, shot and wounded 
D’Arcy Cresswell, following threats from Cresswell to expose McKay as 
pervert after McKay had given him a private viewing at the Sarjeant Art 
Gallery, which included a copy of Wrestlers, and a viewing of McKay’s 
collection of female nude pictures.  At the trial, McKay’s lawyers claimed he 
was seeking treatment for ‘homosexual monomania’.  McKay was sentenced 
to 15 years imprisonment with hard labour, serving seven years.  He then left 
for the UK, becoming a successful journalist.  Cresswell may himself have 
been blackmailed to get rid of McKay as mayor of Wanganui, for McKay was 
not popular at that time (Parkinson, 1985). 
 
Illustration 1: Photo of Wrestlers, © Peter Peryer   
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Also in 1920, the Legislative Chamber, Parliament’s former appointed upper 
house,  
debated the need to ‘strengthen and make more drastic the censorship of cine-films 
... with the object of eliminating the noxious elements which are tending to destroy 
the moral sense of so many young persons’. The capture of the film market by 
Americans, observed the editor of the Manawatu Daily Times, meant that New 
Zealand youth were seeing life 'through the artificial, spurious and meretricious glare 
of Broadway, New York' (Editorial, 18 October 1920).  Thus in 1920 a system of 
classification was introduced, although these served merely as recommendations 
and it was left to parents to police their children's choices. A ‘U’ (for ‘universal’) 
certificate indicated ‘suitable for everyone’, while ‘A’ indicated ‘suitable for adults 
only’  
(Watson & Shuker, 1998). 
 
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, an increasing number of films had 
sound, and were thus more complex than the earlier silent movies.  While few 
films had been banned prior to the advent of sound,  
in 1930, a record 102 films (3.9 percent of the 2,626 submitted) were banned, 
indicating that the censor was taking a cautious approach to the sound revolution. 
The introduction of the voluntary Hays Code in the American industry in 1932 seems 
to have made films from that country more acceptable to the censor, and bannings 
were rare by the end of the decade  
(Christoffel, 1989).   
While  
in 1935 a Committee of Inquiry into the Motion Picture Industry, after considering 
various submissions and evidence on ‘the effect of films on juveniles’, came down in 
favour of the status quo.  Its report concluded that ‘the censorship of films is at 
present carried out in a very satisfactory manner’, and that it was up to 'parental 
control' to observe the certificates issued by the censor  
(Watson & Shuker, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, during the 1930s, comic books began arriving.  Initially reprints 
from newspaper comic strips,  
During the 1930s, these became orientated more towards action, violence, romance 
and adventure with the likes of Buck Rogers becoming popular.  Action and violence 
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became more predominant from 1937, when comic books started to feature original 
material, thus removing the restrictions imposed by the family orientation of most 
newspapers.  Superheroes such as Batman and Superman appeared on the scene....   
In 1938 a deputation met with the Ministers of Customs and Education to discuss 
their concern about comic books.  Later that year several comics were banned under 
the new import licensing regulations, which restricted publications placing ‘undue 
emphasis’ on sex, obscenity, horror, crime and cruelty  
(Christoffel, 1989). 
 
Eric Mareo killed his wife in 1935 because of her lesbian relationship with 
Freda Stark, and in 1944 a 19 year old New Zealand soldier killed a 25 year 
old American soldier.  Claiming the US soldier had made sexual advances 
towards him, the New Zealand soldier was acquitted (Laurie, in Laurie & 
Evans, 2005: 13).  
 
During World War II, censorship reached new heights as the country sought to 
protect itself and its soldiers.  In that year,  
the Labour Government introduced stringent censorship of newspapers, the post, 
telegraph, radio, and books. The Director of Publicity, J.T. Paul, was placed in charge 
of press censorship. In April 1940 he announced that he would suppress all outgoing 
news ‘likely to convey a prejudicial view to overseas countries concerning the 
National War effort in New Zealand’. Newspapers were forbidden to publish stories 
on certain topics without his approval, and he could prosecute the publishers of any 
item he judged prejudicial to the public interest.  Internal mail was selectively 
censored, and there was blanket censorship of all other postal communications. Up 
to 250 staff were employed to censor letters, including 22 full-time and seven part-
time translators. Radio scripts were previewed by the censor, but there was no need 
to censor radio news, which at the time consisted entirely of summarised newspaper 
stories. A special Customs Department committee was set up to examine books; it 
banned many political works  
(Christoffel, 1989). 
 
The late 1940s saw a Parliamentary Commission into censorship.  When Mr 
Nordmeyer, the Minister of Industries and Commerce at the time asked the 
Chief Censor Arthur von Keisenberg what he disliked about films, he was 
reported in the Dominion of 26 May 1948 to have said he disliked, 
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things that might be regarded as salacious or suggestive. He also objected to the use 
of swear words. He added that he thought it undesirable that children should see 
pictures dealing with marital problems and infidelity, unhappiness in the home and 
ill-treatment of children. He added that a survey of the excisions and rejection in 
films over a given period disclosed for the most part scenes and dialogue that 
ordinary decent and just-minded people would agree upon as being undesirable.  
Ordinary men and women did not wish in their entertainment to have their moral, 
religious, nervous or political susceptibilities offended. In New Zealand the code of 
censorship appeared to be broadly more liberal than in most English-speaking 
countries. The fact that extremely few complaints were received from either the 
public or welfare organisations would indicate that the public’s feeling was generally 
accurately gauged.  It must be admitted, however, that there appeared to be room 
for improvement. There was also a lack of awareness among the public as to the 
significance of censorship recommendations. The commonest fallacy was that the 
adult certificate was a covert hint that there was something naughty in the film, and 
that it was a trade trick to entice patronage  
(cited in OFLC, 2006: 5). 
In the post war era, it is likely any film portraying homosexuality as normal 
would have been classed as offending the ‘moral, religious, nervous or 
political susceptibilities’ of ‘ordinary men and women’. 
 
In June 1954, Juliet Hulme and Pauline Parker murdered Pauline’s mother, 
Honora, in Victoria Park, Christchurch.  As much has been written about this 
case – books, chapters in books, novels, and even a film – it is sufficient to say 
that entries in Pauline’s diary indicated there may have been a sexual 
relationship between her and Juliet.  This linked lesbianism and murder, a 
doubly unpleasant prospect in the public view at that time.  Excerpts from 
Pauline’s diary, printed in various tabloid newspapers, entered New Zealand’s 
mythology on homosexuality.  It acted as a cautionary tale with which to warn 
women, especially young girls, of the possible consequences of such 
‘unnatural’ relationships.  The jury took less than three hours to convict them 
on 28 August 1954.  As they were under 18, they were sentenced to be 
detained at Her Majesty’s pleasure, but were released after five years 
(Glamuzina & Laurie, 1991). 
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In 1957, new regulations related to film censorship were promulgated.  This 
provided a range of classification: G for general release, replacing the former 
U; Y for material approved for people 13 and older; A for adult viewing, adults 
being classed as people over 16; S for a special class where it may be released 
for general viewing but where parts may be disturbing to young children and 
nervous women; and R, restricting the film to various age groups, gender 
segregated audiences, or specialised groups, such as film societies, etc., 
(Mirams, 1957).  These regulations were later formalised in the 
Cinematographic Films Act 1961, which also liberalised laws around the 
licensing of projectionists and exhibitors licences, but criminalised the 
transportation of inflammable films around the country (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 1962).   
 
The 1959 novel A Way of Love by New Zealander James Courage was 
published in the United Kingdom.  However, with  
its subject a young man’s homosexual relationship with an older man,  
despite being  
discreet to a fault, and even self-apologetic by modern standards …  
it was banned in New Zealand under the censorship laws in place at the time 
(Harris, 2006).   
 
In that same year, the Government realised something had to be done about 
censorship laws.  The Secretary for Justice formed a committee of people 
working in the book trade to examine how changes could be made.  This met 
four times, with the final meeting in April 1962, and resulted in a major 
overhaul of the way publications were classified by the introduction and 
passage of the Indecent Publications Act 1963.  The formation of the IPT, to 
which people could appeal the Censor’s classification, was an important 
improvement (Christoffel, 1989).  It was under this Act action was later taken 
by Customs against Lawrence Publishing, the publishers of OUT! Magazine, 
and by Phil Parkinson against Cameron’s Exposing the AIDS Scandal (1988).   
 
In 1960 a judge sympathised with two sailors who had assaulted homosexual 
Roy Jackson, who died from a fall from a deck on board the Whangaroa, 
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which “was their home”, acquitting them of manslaughter (Laurie, in Laurie & 
Evans, 2005: 13).  But the fall followed the assault.  Was Jackson pushed, or 
was he trying to escape from an assault that may have killed him?  
 
On 23rd January 1964, Charles Aberhart was killed in  Christchurch’s Hagley 
Park by a group of youths, aged between 15 and 17.  They assaulted him, one 
robbing him, and they left him dying.  His body was found by a passing cyclist 
at 10.30 that night, who had seen the offenders, and knew them.  When 
questioned by police, all but one of the perpetrators admitted it, and pointed 
their finger at the person who denied guilt.  They described it as a “queer 
bashing”.  On 5 May, they were tried for manslaughter, a lesser charge than 
murder, and the trial took 5 days.  On summing up the case, the judge 
reminded the jury it was not necessary to specifically identify the actual person 
who had struck the blow in order to prove the case.  Yet seven hours later, the 
all male jury returned a verdict of not guilty for all six accused.  Despite the 
admissions of guilt, and the judge instructing them to produce a guilty verdict, 
the jury seemed to have tried Aberhart rather than the accused.  While 
Aberhart had earlier been imprisoned for one year following a conviction of 
indecent assault after consensual sex with another man, his killers walked free 
(Simpson, 2009). 
 
Simpson (2009) cites Ian Breward’s (1965) article in Landfall: 
Homosexuals in New Zealand labour under a triple disadvantage.  They are regarded 
with disgust, suffer severe legal penalties if convicted, and worst of all, are not even 
guaranteed the posthumous satisfaction of seeing their assailants brought to justice; 
that is, they are not considered equal with other citizens before the law. 
 
Yet despite this seeming condemnation of the way New Zealand treated gay 
men, Simpson (2009) points out that Breward’s framework is tempered with 
the words “abnormal” and “sickness”, and that he describes homosexuality as  
not exactly a sickness but as something which should not be regarded as a crime.   
 
Simpson (2009) also cites Vincent O’Sullivan’s (1964) article in Comment, 
which shows that the trial was not about the accused but  
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a conspiracy against a dead man … infused with the notion that ‘the sexual 
proclivities of the victim should somehow alleviate the guilt of the accused, as if in 
some way the vice of one rubbed off as virtue on the other’.  [O’Sullivan] was 
particularly outraged by the statement in the summing up of one of the defence 
lawyers who said ‘Even if they went to Hagley park to look for homosexuals, there is 
no offence in this’. 
 
As a result of the then dominant discourse, ineffective medical treatments were 
often imposed for homosexuality.  These involved the use of drugs to make a 
person sick, or electric shock aversion therapy – not to be confused with 
electro-convulsive therapy.  In the former, a mild to sharp shock is 
administered to a person to make them averse to certain stimuli.  In the case of 
gay men, the stimuli were images of naked, or near naked men, in an attempt 
to cure them of their attraction to men.  The latter involves applying a large 
shock to a restrained person, making their entire body convulse, and was used 
in the treatment of various mental illnesses such as severe depression (Davison 
& Neale, 1996: 33). 
 
One person who underwent such aversion therapy in 1964 was Ralph Knowles, 
at that time 20.  He states he was not unhappy being homosexual, but pressures 
from his church and serious conflicts with his religious views led him to be 
treated.  This consisted of two five day sessions of drug therapy where 
apomorphine was administered, whisky drunk, and images of homosexual 
activities shown in order to get him to associate the images with severe illness.  
Electroshock treatment, administered on an outpatient basis was also attended.  
Nevertheless, the treatment failed, and Knowles found himself cruising for 
men shortly after treatment.  He records that rather than feeling sick, he felt 
relief at being back to normal (Knowles, in Edgecombe, Keevil and Bowers, 
2008).  
 
Upon reporting this, Knowles was persuaded to take a second course, 
including injections of testosterone to increase sexual desire, though not 
affecting the direction of that desire, this also failing.  Knowles does not regret 
the treatment, saying it was what society expected, but is grateful the therapy 
55 
 
showed him that such treatment was futile, and he was therefore able to get on 
with his life as a gay man (Knowles, in Edgecombe, et al, 2008).  
 
Perhaps it was as a result of this dominant discourse – that homosexuals were 
either morally repugnant or mentally ill – or perhaps because the jury was all 
male, who may have felt finding in favour of a dead gay man would have been 
an affront to their masculinity (also as a result of the dominant discourse), or 
perhaps because of the youth of the defendants, they were all found not guilty 
of manslaughter.   
 
This occurred less than two years after the publication of Irving Bieber’s 
(1962) study, which described homosexuality as a mental illness caused by an 
absent/distant father and a close/binding mother, and that it should be treated 
in a medical environment.  As Simpson (2009) points out  
In 1964, to describe a homosexual as sick rather than morally evil was actually a 
rather daring thing to do publicly. 
Homosexuality was regarded as a sickness until 1973 when the American 
Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from the DSM, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Illness (Herek, 1997-2008).   
 
Although the general feeling among psychologists is that Bieber’s outdated 
theory is not the ‘cause’ of homosexuality among men (Davison & Neale, 
1996: 361), there are some people who continue to believe and promote 
Bieber’s scenarios as the ‘cause’ of homosexuality among men and women 
(Rogers & Medinger, 2008; Moberly, 1983; Nicolosi, 1991), even within New 
Zealand (Belding & Nicholls, 1996).  Nevertheless, the ideas at the time, and 
for some time afterwards, centred around the claims that homosexuals were 
either evil and therefore had to be punished, or sick and thus had to be treated 
(Davison Neale, 1996, 361-362; Ings, 2008;  Simpson, 2009).  Sex and 
sexuality education in New Zealand at the time, where such existed, was 
focused on promoting the heterosexual ideal of opposite sex parents and their 
children.  Sexual intercourse was something that happened between a man and 
a woman, and only after marriage (Glamuzina & Laurie, 1991: 151; Cox, 
2005: 68). 
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In 1965, the Chair of the IPT, Sir Kenneth Gresson, said  
The dominant consideration is that freedom of expression must be restrained when 
the welfare of the public so demands. The Tribunal established by the Indecent 
Publications Act 1963 has the difficult task of determining, in a particular case, the 
line which must not be overstepped. Many factors are relevant – the age of the 
prospective reader, the quality of the writing, the apparent purpose of the writer, 
race, tradition, philosophy, religion, education, morality and the opinion and 
sentiment of the community so far as ascertainable. Of necessity the decisions of the 
Tribunal must be the judgment of the members subjectively regarding the particular 
publication (or sound recording) which the Tribunal has to consider.  … It remains to 
be seen whether the new legislation (the Indecent Publications Act was two years 
old at the time of writing) will be regarded as an advance. So far there seems to be a 
disposition on the part even of those who are opposed to any censorship at all to 
accept the decisions of the Tribunal as the conscientious discharge of a difficult task, 
though inevitably there are critics of such decisions as have been given  
(OFLC, 2006: 5-6). 
 
Nurse Doreen Davis cut the throat of her colleague Raewyn Petley in 1967 and 
was acquitted of murder, with Petley  
portrayed as a ‘hunting lesbian’ who had cut her own throat, and that Davis, her 
former lover, was an innocent seduced by [Petley]  
(Laurie, in Laurie & Evans, 2005: 13). 
 
New Zealand’s Wolfenden Committee, later known as the New Zealand 
Homosexual Law Reform Society (NZLRS) continued campaigning to reform 
sections of the Crimes Act 1961 criminalising male homosexual behaviour.  
Mainly lobbying MPs and conservative people and groups in society, it hoped 
to gain support for a law change.  Morrison (1975, cited in Glamuzina, 1993: 
34) noted the Wolfenden Committee was  
a reformist organisation with no in-depth analysis of the causes of oppression of 
lesbians and gay men;  
believing  
politics was the part of the possible  
and that  
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it would be best not to upset those Parliamentarians who just wanted to reform the 
law.   
The following year, 1968, the Association presented a petition to Parliament 
with 75 prominent signatories, asking for the laws regarding homosexuality to 
be reformed.  As Glamuzina (1993: 34), notes  
Predictably, the petition was ignored. 
 
It can therefore be seen that in New Zealand up until 1972, the dominant 
discourse said that gay men were sick, needing treatment, and they could be 
subjected to violence: either by external means, or internally by subjecting 
themselves to demeaning and degrading treatment.  Although some of this 
attitude was to remain, change was in the air. 
 
From 1972 onwards, a major redefining of what it meant to be gay began in 
New Zealand, when an increasing number of lesbian and gay rights groups 
appeared.  Rather than sitting passively, as victims of the law, they began to 
demand equality under the law.  Rather than as murderers and murdered, they 
began to turn the tide against the homophobia endemic in society, and the 
dominant discourse that homosexuality was a sickness. 
 
Although there were calls for legislation decriminalising male to male sex 
prior to the beginning of Gay Liberation, the push for a change to the laws 
became stronger in 1972, with several ‘gay liberation’ groups being formed, 
lesbians prominent in this.  From then on, Gay Liberation groups formed, split, 
and re-formed.  Many later groups used the term “rights” instead of 
“liberation”, a reflection of growing conservatism (Glamuzina, 1993: 36), 
though I think it may have been a political move to link “gay rights” with 
“human rights”. 
 
1974 was also a busy year for lesbian and gay activists as momentum built.  
Most importantly, for lesbian (and particularly) gay male rights, the Crimes 
Amendment Bill 1974, which would have decriminalised homosexual activity 
between two men over 21, but not containing any anti-discrimination clauses, 
was introduced by the Hon Venn Young, MP for Egmont – the electorate in 
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which I lived at that time.  This Bill was sent to a Select Committee, which 
reduced the age of consent to 20, but did not include any recommendations 
made by Gay Liberation groups, who protested the Bill as a result.  Gerald 
Wall, Labour Member of Parliament for Porirua, introduced an amendment 
which made any communication that homosexuality is ‘normal’ to people 
under 20 punishable by two years imprisonment.  This would have made the 
Bill intolerable if it had passed.  The Bill was defeated on its second reading on 
4 July 1975 with a vote of 34 to 29, with 23 MPs absent or abstaining – a 
highly criticised figure.  The defeat of this Bill appears to have been the reason 
for the collapse of many Gay Liberation Groups around the country (Auckland 
Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 93; Glamuzina, 1993: 25).  
 
Despite this setback, the struggle for lesbian and gay rights continued.   
 
Two important things in the world of politics happened in 1976.  Early that 
year, the tabloid newspaper The New Zealand Truth sensationally claimed 
Marilyn Waring, the National Party MP for Waipa, was a lesbian (Young, 
2005).  The second event was more insidious, with an even greater level of 
homophobia, relating back to the “homosexual = disease” discourse as well as 
the “homosexual = criminal” discourse.  Chris Brickell (2008: 335) describes it 
thus: 
In 1976 Robert Muldoon, the National Party Prime Minister, announced to 
Parliament that Labour MP Colin Moyle had been ‘picked up by the police for 
homosexual activities’ several months earlier.  Muldoon claimed he had received a 
phone call from the police who told him that Moyle had been driving slowly past the 
Harris Street toilets, a long-established Wellington beat, with his window wound 
down.  An undercover officer, suspected Moyle of soliciting, Muldoon said, and 
approached him for questioning.  First Moyle told the police he was researching 
homosexual men’s lives in advance of Venn Young’s legalisation Bill, then he said he 
had been tailing the detective, thinking him a burglar, Muldoon heightened the 
discrepancies in Moyle’s explanations, an enquiry ensued and the MP resigned from 
Parliament. 
 
In 1976, the Government passed the Film Act.  The Chief Censor was now to 
determine only whether a film “is or is not likely to be injurious to the public 
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good”. In determining injuriousness to the public good, the censor was 
required to take into account a number of specific criteria. These included: 
i. the likely effect of the film on its audience; 
ii. its artistic or other merits; 
iii. the way in which the film depicts anti-social behaviour, cruelty, violence, crime, 
horror, sex etc; 
iv. the ‘extent and degree to which the film denigrates any particular class of the 
general public by reference to the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins, the 
sex, or the religious beliefs of the members of that class’; 
v. other relevant circumstances, such as likely time and place of exhibition  
(Christoffel, 1989). 
 
Also during 1976 the Human Rights Commission Bill was introduced, and in 
October the formation of a national lobby group was proposed by a group of 
Christchurch activists (Turner 1980, cited in Glamuzina, 1993: 39), bringing 
about the formation of the National Gay Rights Coalition (NGRC), consisting 
of a loose federation of many small gay and lesbian rights groups in June 1977 
(Glamuzina, 1993: 40; Auckland Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 93).  
Later that month Gay Liberation, Victoria University, submitted to the Select 
Committee on the Human Rights Commission Bill, demanding an end to 
discrimination against LGBT people, and that these two groups be included in 
the prohibited grounds of discrimination (Glamuzina, 1993: 39). 
 
The Human Rights Commission Act 1977 (HRCA) was passed in July 1977, 
and included sex, marital status, or religious or ethical belief of that person as 
prohibited grounds of discrimination.  Despite vigorous lobbying by lesbian 
and gay groups, sexual orientation was omitted from this Act (Auckland Gay 
and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 93).  Protection from discrimination on the 
grounds of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins had been included in the 
Race Relations Act 1971. 
 
In 1979 NGRC stated that the bottom line for any future legislation 
decriminalising sex between men was to have an equal age of consent to that 
of heterosexuals, and contain anti-discrimination clauses.  While Labour MP 
Warren Freer from Mt Albert Electorate, was willing to put forward a 
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decriminalisation Bill in 1979, it contained an age of consent of 20, and was 
abandoned.  He again put forward another decriminalisation Bill in 1980, 
essentially the same, but with an age of consent of 18, but it too was 
abandoned, and  
the sabotaging of two decriminalisation Bills contributed to the demise of the NGRC 
over the next two years  
(Auckland Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 94). 
 
In July 1980 Wellington lesbians sought to place an advertisement on local 
buses.  Despite widespread protest, the Council refused the advertisement, 
which was simple and non-confrontational, reading  
Lesbians – contact your local community 
with a contact Post Office box number (Lesbian-feminist Circle, 35, 1980: 16-
18, cited in Glamuzina, 1993: 58). 
 
In December 1980 the NGRC submitted demands that protection be given to 
LGBT people to the HRC, giving them the same protection as groups already 
protected under the HRCA 1977.  This was rejected.  Wellington lesbians 
connected with the Lesbian Centre, also made submissions to the Commission, 
and these were similarly rejected.   
The Chief Human Rights Commissioner, anti-lesbian P. J. Downey, who supported the 
rejection of these submissions, said that he thought in some circumstances 
discrimination was justified  
(Glamuzina, 1993: 44).   
This resulted in pickets of the HRC offices in Christchurch and Auckland in 
January and February 1981.  A ‘dykecott’ of the March 1981 census also 
resulted as a consequence of the Commissioners comments and  
some lesbians defaced their census forms with the slogan ‘No rights – no 
responsibilities’  
(Wellington Lesbian Newsletter, 13, 1981, cited in Glamuzina, 1993: 59). 
 
After defeating the Freer Bill in 1980, the NGRC asked a group of Auckland 
lawyers to draft a Bill that would ensure decriminalisation and equality.  This 
group became one of many Gay Task Forces which sprang up around the 
country after the demise of the NGRC in 1981, writing what became known as 
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the Equality Bill, which went through several rewrites, before the draft Bill 
collapsed in 1983 over disputes relating to the degenderising of laws 
(Auckland Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 94). 
 
In 1985, after sixteen drafts, and consultation dating from 1984 between 
members of the various Gay Task Forces, lesbian groups, and Fran Wilde, the 
Homosexual Law Reform Bill was presented to Parliament as a Private 
Members Bill by Wilde.  Consisting of two parts, the first contained the 
decriminalisation of homosexual acts between consenting men over the age of 
consent, set at 16; the second contained an amendment to the HRCA to include 
sexual orientation in the relevant sections.  It was referred to the Justice and 
Law Reform Committee – by 51 votes to 23 – on its introduction.  Opposition 
by a group of cross party MPs and the Salvation Army saw a petition against 
the Bill being organised.  This was presented to Parliament  
‘in a spectacle which to many suggested a Nuremberg rally’ and claimed to have 
835,000 signatures  
(Auckland Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 95). 
 
The second reading passed in late 1985, but the stress of the campaign was 
leading to trade-offs among MPs, with some supporting decriminalisation but 
opposing human rights legislation, thus appearing “liberal”, but cautious – 
attempting to be seen as “balanced”.  Amendments to see the age of consent 
raised to twenty, then eighteen, were successively defeated, but in doing so, it 
was realised that it would not be possible to have both the age of consent at 
sixteen and the human rights clauses.  Accordingly part two of the Bill was 
defeated, but part one went through to a third reading passage on 9 July 1986 
with 49 MPs voting for decriminalisation, and 44 against, despite a report by 
the Haylen Research Centre stating that 75.5% of people were against an 
employer being able to discriminate against homosexuals by firing them, and 
only 12.1% support for employers being able to discriminate in such a way 
(Auckland Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 96). 
 
At a dinner held in July 1996 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the passage 
of the Homosexual Law Reform Act, Wilde spoke of some of the horrors of 
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the campaign, and the hate mail she received during it.  While some was 
religiously based, much of it was an expression of sheer hatred, which only 
strengthened her resolve to ensure the passage of the Bill.  The hatred and 
violence expressed in the letters did, however, have its toll (personal 
discussion with Wilde, 10th Anniversary, Homosexual Law Reform). 
 
In 1987, the HRC marked its tenth anniversary with a review of the HRCA, 
and recommended the addition of several new prohibited grounds of 
discrimination, among which was sexual orientation.  The memory of the 
1985/1986 campaign may have been too close for comfort, as the Government 
seemed to be unwilling to revisit the subject at that time.  The Minister of 
Justice, and later Prime Minister, the Hon Geoffrey Palmer was more 
interested in passing his New Zealand Bill of Rights Bill.  This Bill was passed 
in 1990, and contained at s19(1) the following: 
Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the ground of colour, race, 
ethnic or national origins, sex, marital status, or religious or ethical belief. 
 
A Department of Justice memo of 21 December 1987 on the HRC and the draft 
HRCA Amendment Bill to Palmer did not contain any reference to sexual 
orientation (LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
Following the review of the HRC in 1987, various gay and lesbian groups met 
with the Human Rights Commissioner in 1988 and 1989 (Discussion with Phil 
Parkinson, curator LAGANZ, September 1999).  In April 1989 Salient 
interviewed Belinda Howard of Lesbian Action for Visibility Aotearoa and 
Paul Kinder of Gays and Lesbians Against Discrimination about the possibility 
of a Bill being put before Parliament later that year which would  
outlaw discrimination against gays and lesbians  
(Dawson, 1989: 9). 
 
Kinder identified two types of discrimination that exists in society: that which 
is overt and blatant, and that which is surreptitious and subtle; with the latter 
type  
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by far the majority, and the most assiduous and hurtful. ... because they are more 
difficult to pin down  
(Dawson, 1989: 9).   
Howard stated that the wording of any clause inserted in the HRCA 1977 to 
protect lesbian and gay men should not have the expression “sexual 
orientation”, but that  
the crucial expression should be ‘lesbianism or gayness’, or a phrase of like effect  
(Dawson, 1989: 9).   
The rationale may have been that the inclusion of the already privileged 
heterosexuality would have given it more prestige, while this wording would 
probably have made the prohibitions against discriminating against people on 
the basis of being lesbian or gay more effective, and would make the terms, 
and people, more visible, though this is not stated in the article. 
 
In a memo by the Ministry of Justice (14 March 1989) to Palmer on the draft 
HRCA Amendment Bill, the Ministry recommended at page 9 that sexual 
orientation be defined as  
heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual preference or the condition of being a 
transsexual or a transvestite (LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers).   
 
In the Christian newspaper Challenge Weekly (2 February 1989), Graeme Lee, 
who became the co-leader of the Christian Coalition prior to the 1996 election, 
knowing a draft Bill was being prepared, said  
Imagine the chaos of the military, schools, police, Christian churches and others if 
they are forced by law to employ homosexual personnel.  On April 16 1986 
Parliament defeated the discrimination clauses of the Homosexual Law Reform Bill 
by 49 to 31 votes.  This is the way it should remain.   
He expressed concern that as the inclusion of sexual orientation may be 
presented as part of the HRCA amendment Bill  
it will be a Government measure and not open to a conscience vote,  
and therefore he said  
the move is deceitful and hypocritical  
(Challenge Weekly, 1989).   
Lee expressed this attitude several times until after the passage of the Human 
Rights Act 1993 (personal recollection).  John Terris MP wrote to Ms Wilde 
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six days later about this article to let her know about it, asking for her opinion 
and if a response was needed.  It is not recorded if she replied (LAGANZ 
manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
Similarly, in the Nelson Evening Mail (14 March 1990), the National party 
candidate for Nelson, Nick Smith, attacked an advertisement aimed at 
promoting male sexual health and containing information on a gay support 
group, which included a post office box number: 
it is disgusting that public money from the health budget is being used in this way 
when hundreds of Nelsonians are unable to get proper medical care because of long 
waiting lists and a lack of funds.   
The report further stated Mr Smith said the use of  
taxpayer funds to promote homosexuality is obscene  
(Nelson Evening Mail, 1990).   
Nick Smith, who became Minister for the Environment in 2008, also voted 
against the Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) introduced by the Hon 
Katherine O’Regan to amend the HRB to include sexual orientation. 
 
On May 16 1989, Labour Party Caucus Justice Committee urged the inclusion 
of sexual orientation in any antidiscrimination legislation as it  
will enhance male homosexual self-worth which in turn will reduce unsafe sexual 
practices and save lives; 
 also noting that exemptions for the police and military are  
not to be considered to be founded unless they come up with specific cases  
(LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
In a Justice Department brief for the Caucus Committee of 27 June 1989, at 
point 4, page 1, the Department urged the inclusion of sexual orientation in the 
proposed HRCA Amendment Bill as 
sexual orientation is an inherent part of a person’s nature. 
 
The reasoning was that 
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of political belief does not involve a 
judgement about the desirability of particular political views.  Equally, preventing 
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discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation does not apply any view on the 
respective merits of homosexuality or heterosexuality  
(LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
Sometime in May or June 1989, Deirdre Milne, Chairperson of the NZAF 
wrote to Brion Duncan, Assistant Commissioner, Human Resources, for the 
Police.  She pointed out that New Zealanders did not want discrimination 
against gays in any employment.  Duncan replied on 28 June saying that the 
Police had  
not yet formally decided the issue,  
but that  
it is the opinion of senior officers that [the police] should continue to press for an 
exemption from the provisions which would allow homosexual persons into the 
police  
(LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
In July 1989, TV1 announced the formation of the Christian Heritage Party 
(CHP), interviewing John Allen, the founder and first leader of the Party.  
Allen admitted the newly formed party wants to stop homosexuality being 
promoted as an  
acceptable alternative lifestyle  
as  
this is contrary to God’s law,  
but would be unable to recriminalise homosexuality as doing so 
would not, in itself, have any real effect  
(Newstel Log, 13 July 1989, in LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
Graham Capill, then leader of the CHP, stated in the 1999 and 2002 election 
campaigns that they would seek to overturn the Homosexual Law Reform Act 
1986 (personal recollection), their manifesto in 1999 stated that they 
support the right of individuals to choose their own lifestyle, but press for 
restrictions on the promotion or advertising of liquor, cigarettes, gambling, drug 
abuse, pornography, suicide, prostitution and homosexuality (especially to school 
students) 
(CHP, 1999: 9). 
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In September 1989 the New Zealand Nurses Conference urged the passage of 
the HRCA Amendment Bill to include sexual orientation (LAGANZ 
manuscripts, Wilde papers).  However, in May 1999 Gays and Lesbians 
against Defamation, Hamilton, opposed  
i. using the words ‘sexual orientation’ in place of ‘gay’ and 
‘lesbian’;  
ii. the inclusion of bisexuality or heterosexuality;  
iii. any exemptions for any occupational groups such as teachers, 
police and armed forces;  
iv. and any provision which was not positive discrimination and 
affirmative action for gay and lesbian people;  
but supported efforts of the transsexual and transvestite communities and 
sought their inclusion in the Bill (Minutes of the meeting held 25 May 1989, 
LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
Later in 1989 the NZAF released the results of two studies.  One, by Lee 
Rampton (1989), indicated that 75% of gay and bisexual men living in the 
Auckland region had been subjected to verbal abuse, physical assault, 
threatened with violence, or feared for their safety.  The other, by Rosser and 
Ross (1989), compared data obtained in Auckland and Adelaide.  
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation had been illegal in South 
Australia since 1985.  The results showed that 20.1% of the Auckland 
respondents had been subjected to physical violence, 56% subjected to verbal 
threats, 64.2% subjected to blatant homophobia in the workplace, 49.1% had 
non accepting family members, and 93.1% had been subjected to anti gay 
jokes.  The Adelaide results indicated there was a significant differences on 
two of these variables: homophobia in the workplace (49.2%), and anti gay 
jokes (77.2%). 
 
On 10 October 1989, D. W. Farlow, the Occupational Health and Safety 
Technical Advisor of the Employers Federation wrote to the Wellington Gay 
Task Force reiterating that  
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the Federation clearly stated its opposition to widening the Human Rights 
Commission Act to include sexual orientation as an unlawful ground of 
discrimination in employment. ... the Federation made the point that 
any extension in antidiscrimination legislation limits the employers ability to manage 
anti discrimination legislation does not bring about a change in attitude; education is 
preferable to statutory constraint. … practical difficulties are likely to be 
encountered by employers  
(LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
In November 1989 the Labour Women’s Council wrote to the Wellington Gay 
Task Force supporting their call for human rights legislation to include sexual 
orientation (LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
In December 1989 the New Zealand AIDS Foundation (NZAF) made its 
written submission to the Select Committee considering the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Bill 1989.  They strongly supported the concept of a Bill of Rights 
which would attempt to specify the fundamental rights and freedoms of all 
New Zealanders (NZAF, 1989: 3), and wished to have clause 18, (now s19), 
amended to have sexual orientation included as well as HIV/AIDS disability 
(NZAF, 1989: 67).  The Foundation was strongly against the creation of a 
hierarchy of rights: being either explicitly mentioned, interpreted by the 
Courts, or not covered at all, as this implies 
that discrimination against members of some groups is less serious than that against 
members of other groups and continues to reinforce the message that some New 
Zealanders are second class citizens  
(NZAF, 1989: 62).   
They gave 157 examples of discrimination against gay men (NZAF, 1989: 6-
27). 
 
The Foundation felt a Bill of Rights would be 
an unequivocal declaration of public policy 
and cited the Human Rights Commissioner, Rae Julian, as saying 
By having a law which states where you may not discriminate, there’s automatically 
an implication to discriminate on other grounds.   
The NZAF therefore claimed that 
68 
 
the Bill of Rights will worsen discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and 
disability unless these are explicitly listed in clause 18  
(NZAF, 1989: 61). 
The Foundation also suggested a definition of discrimination devised from 
Canadian State and Federal law: 
any differential treatment that disadvantages an individual on the basis of that 
individual’s actual or presumed membership in, or association with, some class or 
group of persons, rather than on the basis of personal merit  
(NZAF, 1989: 65). 
No definition of discrimination exists within either BORA or the HRA. 
 
During 1989 the press had been cautiously supportive, with the Dominion 
reporting the results of Rosser and Ross (1989) in May, discussing the dangers 
of violence against a group in the community.  However the Dominion Sunday 
Times reported in September 1989 the formation of gay cure groups New 
Image in Lower Hutt, Exodus in Auckland, Rock of Life in Christchurch, and 
Renew in New Plymouth; and how these groups had the support of MPs 
Trevor Young, (Labour, Eastern Hutt), Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, (Labour, 
Southern Maori), and Jim Bolger, leader of the National Party.  Nevertheless, 
rural newspapers such as the Marlborough Express, the Wairarapa Times Age 
and the Bay of Plenty Times all reported, under different headlines, the delay in 
drafting the HRCA Amendment Bill.  All of these reports discussed 
deficiencies within current laws and identify sexual orientation as one of these 
deficiencies (LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
In March 1990, Richard Northey’s electoral newsletter, Northey News, 
surveyed people within his electorate.  Of the people who responded, 79% 
thought that employment discrimination against people on the basis of their 
sexual orientation should be banned (Northey, 1990: 1).  In that same month 
the NZAF made a press release giving the figures of the Rampton and the 
Rosser and Ross studies (LAGANZ manuscripts, Wilde papers). 
 
BORA came into force on 25 September 1990.  Sexual orientation was 
omitted, but pressure within the governing Labour Party to introduce an 
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amendment to the HRCA led to the Hon Bill Jeffries, then the Minister of 
Justice, to introduce such an amendment  
as the last work Parliament prior to the 1990 Election  
(Auckland Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 96).   
Mr Jeffries had voted against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill in 1986, and 
his attitudes had not appeared to change over the intervening years, and upon 
introducing the HRCA Amendment Bill 1990, stated that he would vote 
against it because it contained sexual orientation as one of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination (Auckland Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 
96). 
 
The incoming National Government after the 1990 election decided to 
introduce a new Bill rather than proceed with the Bill introduced by Jeffries, 
though it was not until 15 December 1992 that the Minister of Justice, Douglas 
Graham, introduced the HRB which would extend the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination and restructure the Commission in the way proposed in 1987 
(Auckland Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Group, 1994: 96).  Debate had raged 
among the National Party caucus over the inclusion of sexual orientation.  
Initially Katherine O’Regan, Associate Minister of Health, wanted sexual 
orientation to be added to the Bill before it was presented to the House, but this 
was vetoed by the caucus (Personal discussion, 1999). 
 
Debate over this Bill was strenuous.  A number of submissions, predominantly 
from Christian groups, opposed the addition of sexual orientation.  Much of 
this is covered in the following chapter. 
 
The Films, Videos and Publications Classification Bill (FVPCB) was also been 
introduced in 1992, a Bill which rolled censorship of films, books, etc., into 
one office under the supervision of a Chief Censor, all under one standard, and 
updated the definitions to take into account modern technology.  Debate was 
held up until after the HRA had been passed, although that Act did not come 
into force until February 1994.  During the Committee Stages of the FVPCB 
the Government added sexual orientation, among other grounds, to what was 
to become subsection 3(3)(e).  This had the effect of allowing publications that 
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held people to be inherently inferior as a result of their sexual orientation, 
disability, race, ethnicity, or other ground under the HRA 1993, to be censored.  
This seemed to be the solution to combating hate speech.  Nevertheless, this 
was not to be, as I shall show in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 6: The debates around the Human Rights Bill 1992 
 
In this chapter I examine the debates and activities around the HRB, introduced 
to Parliament in December 1992.  Much of this discourse indicates the 
polarisation of homosexuality in society, and sets out the two opposing 
discourses that continued to exist at that time, when the Living Word videos 
were being discussed, and at other times when issues affecting the rights of 
LGBT people have been debated in Parliament since.  I was an active 
participant during this debate, taking part in the lobbying process writing 
numerous letters to MPs. 
 
The rights of LGBT people had long been supported by Katherine O’Regan, 
who stated during the second reading of the bill on 27 July 1993:  
The issue of human rights and sexual orientation began for me many, many years 
ago after watching the BBC production of the life and times of Quentin Crisp, called 
The Naked Civil Servant. That was a true story, and I believe that much 
discrimination continues today for those people who are either homosexual or 
lesbian men and women  
(Hansard, 1993b: 16948). 
 
During the Bill’s introductory debate, Graeme Lee stated: 
I totally object to and oppose the amendment that seeks to introduce another right 
– the right of sexual orientation – which is in itself a soft word for sexual behaviour. 
It is totally preposterous to consider sexual behaviour as a basis for a right. ... Back in 
1986 Parliament rejected that change by 49 votes to 31 on the very simple basis that 
sexual behaviour was not an appropriate reason to change a law and to give to a 
minority certain rights that deny at the same time freedoms to the majority. ...  If 
homosexuality was an unchangeable condition it might have been different.  
Homosexuality is a learned behaviour.  Homosexuality is a learned behaviour, it is a 
changeable condition, and we are debating the introduction of a matter that not 
even the United Nations in its International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
acknowledges.  We do not want to discriminate against people in this country, and 
there is no discrimination against the homosexual community in the context that has 
been suggested. ...  The goal of the international homosexual groups is to achieve 
that bench-mark, because from that flows the right to make claims to have 
homosexual marriages, to make claims to have homosexual adoptions, and to have 
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quotas in the work-place. ... What is for the greater good of society in New Zealand 
today? If there was one single thing, surely it would be the upholding, the 
continuance, and the strengthening of the family unit. Homosexuals are declared to 
be anti-family. They state themselves to be anti the family  
(Hansard, 1992b: 13211-12).   
This outlined Lee’s Christian position, consisting of claims made without 
supporting evidence. As will be seen, the same tack was taken by many anti-
gay groups. 
 
Upon introducing the SOP that added sexual orientation to the HRB as a 
ground of prohibited discrimination, O’Regan quoted part of a letter from an 
ex-serviceman who, while gay, had not experienced any problems in the 
military during World War II, but who was concerned about the discrimination 
that was then current in society (Hansard, 1992b: 13209).  O’Regan stated that 
the Hon Warren Cooper, Minister of Defence, had no difficulties in accepting 
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should be prohibited in 
the armed forces (Personal discussion, (1999).  This was also reported in the 
New Zealand Herald, which also reported on O’Regan’s encouragement of 
people to write submissions in support of her SOP to the Select Committee 
(Collins, S., 1992; Orsman, 1992a, 1992b).  While cautiously supportive, 
Wellington’s Evening Post did not report this encouragement (Evening Post, 
1992).  The final version of this SOP included the word “lesbian” in the 
definition of sexual orientation (O’Regan, 1993). 
 
During the campaign, O’Regan received many letters.  Some were negative, 
with some of these quoting Biblical passages.  While O’Regan did not tell me 
which passages they were, I suspect they were from Leviticus 18: 22 and 
20:13; Deuteronomy 22: 5 and the Pauline Epistles: Romans 1: 24-32; 1 
Corinthians 6:9-10, and 1 Timothy 1: 9-11 (Collins, 1958: 116, 118, 193, 148-
149, 164, and 200).  Many were written by D. Elliott-Hogg of Tauranga and 
Mies Oomen of Pahiatua, some which were also published in newspapers.  
Most of the letters were supportive.  Unlike Wilde during the Homosexual 
Law Reform campaign, she did not receive any threatening or abusive phone 
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calls (Personal discussion, 1999).  Her private secretary, Beverley Kirbell, 
confirms this (Personal communication with Beverley Kirbell, 1999). 
 
Lianne Dalziel, as a member of the Select Committee, was impressed by the 
number of gay and lesbian teachers who put their employment at risk to make 
submissions to, and appear before, the Committee, and was grateful the media 
did not report this.  She feels that the lack of reporting about individual lesbian 
and gay teachers was a positive thing.  The established Churches – Anglican, 
Catholic, Methodist and Presbyterian – tended to show acceptance and 
understanding of the issue as a whole, though some individual churches among 
these did not support the inclusion of sexual orientation.  The largest group of 
Churches opposed to the inclusion of sexual orientation were fundamentalist: 
Baptist, Evangelical and Pentecostal churches.  She became very sick of 
hearing the Bible being abused during the whole procedure, though LGBT 
religious groups, such as Ascent and Galaxies also made submissions, and 
appeared to be supported by their Churches (Personal discussion, 1999). 
 
Dalziel also noted that the extreme religious groups tended to focus on, and 
appeared obsessed with, male to male sexual acts – never lesbian sex.  The list 
they gave her of homosexual activities is almost the same that appearing in 
Exposing the AIDS Scandal (Cameron, 1988: 148-152). Dalziel believes the 
submission of The Lion of Judah, formerly New Image, later known as The 
Community of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, would have been the most 
negative submission received by the Committee.  She believes it would have 
been laughable if they had not been so serious.  In it, she states they outlined 
their methods of curing people of their homosexuality.  She believed these to 
be derived from methods used in World War II, complete with deprivation, 
excessive guilt, and brainwashing techniques (Personal discussion, 1999). 
 
During the Select Committee process, it became apparent to Dalziel that 
lesbians should be visible in the proposed legislation, and convinced the 
Committee that the word “lesbian” should be included in the definition of 
“sexual orientation”, the Committee then discussed the matter with O’Regan in 
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order that it be added to her SOP (Personal discussion, 1999).  Indeed, during 
the second reading of the Bill on 27 July 1993, Dalziel said  
When one talks about homosexual people one is talking about gay men and lesbians. 
One is talking not just about men, but also about women, and that seems to have 
been lost in the debate.  This apparent obsession with a particular sexual act ignores 
lesbians completely  
(Hansard, 1993b: 16911). 
 
During the debate, Grant Thomas, National Party MP for Hamilton West, 
reminded people that  
Prior to the 1990 election, the National Party promoted the clarion call for the 
promotion of a decent society  
(Hansard, 1993b: 16931).   
Indeed, The Hon Jenny Shipley, in her reply to me of 27 April 1993, stated  
A ‘decent society’ does not discriminate against its citizens  
(LAGANZ manuscripts, Sawyers papers).   
An unexpected boon, it allowed me to relate antidiscrimination to a “decent 
society” and discrimination to an “indecent society”.  In my letter to Grahame 
Thorne, I referred to this ‘decent society’, and in a hand written reply he said  
It is not about homosexuality although the extreme elements of NZ society will make 
that their big play!  ‘The Decent Society’ doesn’t want bigotry, hatred and violence ...  
(LAGANZ manuscripts, Sawyers papers).  
 
During the campaign, I wrote in excess of 750 letters to MPs, community 
groups, and newspapers.  Of the 133 petitions presented to the Select 
Committee, 56 petitions were against the inclusion of sexual orientation, 
mainly received during the period 10 November 1992 to 22 April 1993, and 57 
petitions were in favour of the inclusion.  The majority of petitions in favour of 
the inclusion of sexual orientation were received between 5 May 1993 and 21 
June 1993, with 19 being presented on 6 May (LAGANZ manuscripts, 
Sawyers papers).  It was reported in Challenge Weekly (1993: 1) that the CHP 
had organised 2000 petitions against the inclusion of sexual orientation to be 
presented to Parliament (LAGANZ manuscripts, Sawyers papers).  These did 
not appear, and one wonders how many of the 56 petitions against the 
inclusion of sexual orientation originated from the CHP. 
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There were 697 submissions on the HRB, but when supplementary 
submissions are included (two or more submissions from the same person or 
group), that increases to 748.  Only 81 of these did not include a reference to 
sexual orientation, and seven submissions were from Government 
Departments, such as the Ministry of Justice, who provided advice to the 
Committee.  The majority of the submissions supported the inclusion of sexual 
orientation to the Bill, but an examination of some of those that were opposed 
revealed that the discourse of “homosexuality = evil and must be punished” 
still existed. 
 
For example, the Reverend Barry Buckley (1993: 1), a Pentecostal Minister, 
said the addition of sexual orientation  
will contravene the already established prohibition on the grounds of religion or 
ethical belief.  ... homosexuality is not acceptable practice and contravenes the basic 
tenants of their [Christian] religious or ethical beliefs.   
Joanne Phimester (1993: 2) said:  
My objection [to the addition of sexual orientation] stem not only from my moral 
and ethical position as a Jewish Christian, but also as a citizen concerned for the 
whole of New Zealand society if passed.   
She cites (1993: 2) Genesis 19: 1-29 and 1 Corinthians 6: 9-11 by reference 
only rather than quoting the passages, and states that  
To pass the proposed amendments would be to further turn New Zealand, 
traditionally Godzone, a country internationally reknowned [sic] as a decent society, 
into another Sodom and Gomorrah. 
 
A letter from Mrs Nelly Mojel to Jim Bolger was passed on the Committee as 
a submission by his office at her request.  In it she said:  
Dear Prime Minister, I implore you to intervene in this ugly battle between 
CHRISTIAN LIFE STYLE and HOMOSEXUAL LIFE STYLE.  ... I wish this entire Bill 
concerning discrimination would be dropped altogether (1993: 1).   
She attached a copy of the editorial from Challenge Weekly (Massam, 1992), 
claiming “lobbyists would deny us our rights”.  Also attached is a letter of 23 
February 1993 asking for her letter to the Prime Minister to be treated as her 
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submission.  A further attachment, as 19A, gives more information behind her 
pleas, predominantly that homosexuality is  
against GODS Law  
(1993: 1; 19A, p1).   
 
Slightly differently, Jill Ferguson (1993: 1), submitted against the addition of 
sexual orientation, etc., as  
This will put an additional strain on our already over-burdened medical resources, 
and of course our over-burdened tax-payers. ... Far more people will have their 
'human rights' denied by the above changes than will be helped by them.   
Similarly, Mr R.S. Challis (1993: 1) stated he does not  
belong to or subscribe to any narrow-focus church or community group. ... The 
practice of homosexuality is unnatural conduct.  Between males this act is dirty, 
revolting and abhorrent practice.  Nature in its wisdom rebels against the practice – 
(to whit) the Aids [sic] epidemic. 
 
Women for Life (1993: 1), opposed the Supplementary Order Paper, and 
requested a greater restriction on HIV positive people: 
If homosexuals are allowed to teach and display their sexual orientation, they will be 
in a powerful position to present homosexuality as the norm.  Sexual orientation 
may be the business of the person concerned, but when it involves influencing young 
people, it ceases to be their business. 
 
... Churches must have the right to exclude practicing homosexuals from preaching 
when it comes to the teachings of the Church. 
 
We are also concerned that this Amendment will mean that homosexual, bisexual 
and transvestites will be able to demand acceptance as foster or adoptive parents.  
We believe the children have the right to be brought up in a normal heterosexual 
environment for the benefit of their health and mental and emotional stability 
(emphasis in original). 
 
The Coalition of Concerned Citizens (1993) also submitted.  Similar to the 
handbook they put out in 1985 during the Homosexual Law Reform Bill 
debate, the main point of their argument is that HIV will become more 
prevalent and spread quicker if people are unable to discriminate on the basis 
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of a person's HIV status, and that this will therefore put “innocent” people at 
greater risk of HIV infection. 
 
In their submission the Coalition points to the case of Dr David Acer and six of 
his patients who contracted HIV after visiting his dental surgery.  The 
Coalition indicates this is a case of non-sexual transmission of HIV, and uses 
this as an example to oppose the SOP.  Yet they omit the contradictory 
evidence regarding that case.  Although patient I claimed they had seen Dr 
Acer three times, in 1987, 1988, and 1989, to have cavities filled, records of 
their visits show their first and only visit was in 1988 to have their teeth 
cleaned by a dental hygienist, and were not seen by Dr Acer.  Their family 
moved to another practice in May 1989.  Patient G also claimed he had only 
injected drugs once, in 1973, and had only had sex with women twice.  Yet 
evidence indicated patient G continued to use drugs, and had been having 
unprotected sex with an HIV positive sex worker.  Patient C denied he had 
ever had sex with men, yet evidence showed he had anal sex with other men on 
at least six times, and that one of these men had tested positive for HIV.  
Kimberly Bergalis, the patient named by the Coalition, who was patient A in 
the case, claimed to have been a virgin, yet a gynaecological examination 
indicated she was not.  She tested positive for the sexually transmissible HPV 
type 18 – unlikely to appear internally if it had not been transmitted sexually.  
Similarly, other patients were untruthful about their sexual histories and risk 
factors, and there were several other errors in the original CDC investigation 
(Barr, 1996).  Nevertheless, there are some who argue in favour of the CDC’s 
initial findings (Brown, 1996). 
 
Later in their submission, the Coalition (1993:4) attempts to paint gay men as a 
vector of disease, claiming  
homosexual intercourse is the most sexually efficient way to spread hepatitis B & C, 
HIV, Syphilis and a host of other blood borne diseases.  This is because rectal sex, 
which about 90% of homosexuals engage in is dangerous 
Yet the Coalition ignores the fact that heterosexuals also engage in anal sex.  A 
study by the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Centre examining the incidence 
of anal cancer, found that 21.5% of the women in the control group – the group 
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which showed no signs of cancer – reported having anal sex.  This compared 
to 11% of controls from an earlier 1987 study (Woodward, 2008).   They also 
claim that because homosexuality is  
an unhealthy activity and a threat to non homosexuals by the way of the spread of 
contagious diseases like hepatitis, and as is starting to emerge, Aids (1993: 5) 
society must be free to discriminate against homosexuals.  
 
A number of submissions were sermons on the evils of homosexuality.  
Typical of this type of submission was the one from the Upper Hutt Baptist 
Church (1993: 1-2), who submitted that  
Our opposition arises out of our concern for the moral well being of our nation and 
our desire to see God's standards for sexual morality upheld in our nation.   
They also note the  
Moral decline of our Nation, 
that the  
proposed amendment will promote [this] Moral Decline 
which will result in  
God's Judgement of New Zealand. 
They quote 2 Chronicles 7: 14 in a paragraph on the “Churches Part in Moral 
Decline”, and also Ezekiel 16: 49 – 50.  The submission claimed that Sodom 
and Gomorrah were destroyed because  
It was known for it’s sexual sin, but it was also for it's arrogance,   
They also quoted in full Leviticus 18: 28, Amos 4: 7 – 9, and Isaiah 45: 7.  In a 
section on “God's Compassion”, they quote in full Jonah 3: 10 and John 3: 16. 
This established their submission as a purely Vox Deus argument. 
 
Mrs Mies Oomen (1993: 1) stated:  
If this legislation is passed into law, it would give a privileged status to homosexuals, 
bisexuals, transsexuals, transvestites and would automatically deny other law-
abiding citizens their democratic rights to have their children protected from 
unnatural sexual influences in school, youth clubs, Boy Scouts, sports clubs, etc.. 
Similar claims were made by many others. 
 
The CHP (1993: 5-6) stated in part of its submission: 
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Homosexuality is not a disease/sickness, but a chosen behaviour.  Those who have 
given up homosexuality bear testimony to this.  We should not therefore pamper to 
them, but give them a measure of hope that it is possible to change.  To ban 
discrimination simply leaves them, unchallenged, in their current condition and 
confirms them in their morally repulsive practices [sic]. 
 
Homosexuality is immoral and unnatural.  The very biology of mankind suggest it to 
be such.  It leads to the destruction of the human race, as propagation is impossible.  
It therefore should not be tolerated, let alone provided for. 
 
Homosexuality is destructive of family life.  God ordained marriage between one 
man and one woman in a lifelong relationship.  To ban discrimination is to 
'normalise' these relationships, putting it on equal footing with other forms of 
sexuality, thus redefining family life away from the normal expectation. 
 
Having decided that homosexuality and bisexuality are 'conditions' like other 
handicaps or diseases, what is there to stop us from considering paedophiles or 
bestiality to also be other valid options that should receive protection from the law?  
We must not forget that just 15 years ago homosexuality was considered just as 
repulsive as some of these other sexual practices.  Where do we draw the line? 
 
To ban discrimination is to remove traditional freedoms and rights from others.  As a 
Christian landlord, I have the right to discriminate as to who I have on my property.  
This will be removed.  As a Christian Headmaster, I have had a choice as to who I 
employ on my staff, thus choosing how I ultimately train students in my school.  As a 
Christian Parent I could object to my children attending sex education classes, 
especially where I believe that homosexuality is wrong and that that is being 
promoted.  If I find out my dentist is a practicing homosexual and therefore at 
greater risk of AIDS than a heterosexual, I will not be able to change dentist for that 
reason.  What this legislation does is removes freedoms from decent, good, law-
abiding citizens and grants privileges to a small group of 'alternative' life stylers. 
 
It is argued that we need this legislation for health reasons; that as more freedom is 
given to homosexuals the easier it will be to educate them about AIDS.  This is utter 
rubbish!  This argument was used when the Government wanted to decriminalize 
homosexuality.  If that move did not help then, neither will this.  It is a fact that 90% 
of AIDS victims are homosexual and far from encouraging them to continue in that 
life style we should be trying to send a clear message that this practice is wrong and 
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AIDS is a direct result of such promiscuity.  Any change in the law will not assist the 
question of greater access to health care for homosexuals – they have full access to 
health care right now. 
 
There is much discussion of various activities that homosexuals, and, in the 
view of the CHP, homosexuals alone, practice: oral sex, anal sex, mutual 
masturbation, and various fetishes.  In regards to a possible exemption to the 
Act for the Police and Armed Forces, the CHP (1993:8) claimed: 
Such behaviour is inappropriate in the Armed Forces and the police, where, because 
of the authority structure, a more senior ranking officer could impose such 
behaviour on a lower ranking officer.  Trust and respect is essential in these 
institutions and this ban will undermine such standards. 
 
One could also object to this move on the ground of consistency.  Just six years ago 
the police could prosecute a person for this behaviour.  Now they will have to 
tolerate them in their own ranks.  So much for the absolute standards of the law! 
 
They were also concerned about the rights and privileges of church leaders, 
that churches would not be allowed to discriminate against employees, and 
implied, but did not overtly state, a link between homosexuality and 
paedophilia: 
Whilst clause 42 gives a number of exceptions for the purpose of religion, it is not at 
all clear whether it covers meetings outside church buildings.  Neither is it clear to 
me whether this section would allow a church to refuse to employ a homosexual or 
bi-sexual organist or grounds-person, if they so desire. 
 
Active homosexuals cannot be refused employment as teachers in State Schools, 
Colleges, any kindergarten, child day care centre, or employment as a school care-
taker, school counsellor, sports coach, Boy Scout leader, Boys Brigade leader, hostel 
supervisor, or a myriad of other clubs that most New Zealanders would not wish to 
see lead by homosexuals.  Any job a homosexual applies for and is refused, entitles 
him/her to lay a complaint of sexual discrimination with the Human Rights Complaint 
Division.  If this division cannot resolve the matter it is referred to the Human Rights 
Tribunal who can impose penalties of up to $5,000. (See Clause 127 – Enforcement). 
 
Church leaders and responsible, 'normal' persons, with religious beliefs condemning 
sodomy, the homosexual behaviour or de facto relationships, could be accused, 
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under clause 100, for causing '(c) Humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the 
feelings of the aggrieved person.' Under this Act, 'religious belief' is also protected.  
Whose rights will prevail?  
(CHP, 1993: 8-9). 
 
They, like the Coalition of Concerned Citizens are making claims that LGBT 
people are immoral and therefore evil, and are diseased – though not in a 
psychological sense – because they have chosen to be lesbian or gay, and it is 
thus an alternative lifestyle.  They also claim that homosexuality destroys 
family life – but do not say how it does so – as if merely making the claim is 
sufficient.  For some MPs, it was.  Yet they forget that if discrimination against 
people on grounds that were “chosen” was not prohibited, it would be perfectly 
acceptable to discriminate against Christians and others who hold religious 
beliefs simply because they choose to hold those beliefs.  They cannot claim 
that to allow discrimination on the basis of choice is acceptable when it comes 
to one ground – sexual orientation – but not on another ground: religion. 
 
The Lion of Judah, a  
non-profit charitable group that offers counselling to homosexuals who wish to 
change their sexual orientation  
(1993: 4),  
made a 215 page submission, dedicated to  
All those who have overcome their broken sexuality  
(1993, cover).   
They were assisted by Neil and Briar Whitehead, also long time campaigners 
against equal rights for people based on their sexual orientation.  The 
submission was split into nine chapters, with a separate introduction, 
appendices and bibliography. 
 
In their introduction, they confused homosexuality with bisexuality, claiming  
that most gays (70%) are married and secretly practising their homosexuality...  
(1993: 6).   
They do not provide any reference as to where they obtained this figure.  
Again, without referencing it, they claim (1996: 6) that  
80% to 90% of gays practice anal sex. 
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There is no reliable way of checking their assertions.  They make other claims 
throughout their introduction but provide no proof.  While this may concern 
those who question material that is not referenced effectively, it appears to be 
sufficient proof for those who wish to believe it. 
 
Although the introduction (1993: 6) claims that  
80% to 90% of gays practice anal sex,  
in chapter one (1993: 30) this becomes 
80% to 95% of gays have had anal sex (Saghir & Robins, 1973; Connell et al, 1990) 
compared with 25% of heterosexual men reporting anal/oral sex (Cameron, Procter 
& Forde, 1985). 
Besides their use of an article by Paul Cameron, and one study that was 20 
years old by the time they made their submission, there is also an obvious flaw 
in comparing anal sex to anal/oral sex.  The percentages they claim still 
indicates more heterosexual men have anal and oral sex than the total number 
of gay men.  Claiming the Kinsey’s (1948: 651) data of 10% is wrong, the 
highest estimate they come up with for gay men is 5% (1993: 53-60).  For 
example, if we say that all that 5% practice anal and oral sex, out of 100 men, 
it would mean that five are gay and have had anal and oral sex.  Yet of that 
same number, 25% of the 95 remaining presumably heterosexual men, a total 
of around 24 have had anal and oral sex.  Although the rate may be higher, the 
actual numbers are far lower.  Nevertheless, they misread the Kinsey data 
which indicates that only 4% of  
white males are exclusively homosexual throughout their lives, after the onset of 
adolescence  
(1948: 651, emphasis in original). 
 
The Lion of Judah (1993: 32) describes gay men as a reservoir of disease that 
is a threat to others by stating: 
Heterosexual HIV incidence is growing (Anderson & Ray, 1992), largely through 
infection of female partners through homosexual men, and through IV drug use. 
 
Yet the AIDS Epidemiology Unit (1993: 3) at Otago University indicated that 
in the twelve months from January to December 1992, two women and four 
men were infected with HIV through sharing needles, and two men and four 
83 
 
women were infected with HIV through heterosexual sex.  However, it was not 
until 2007 that the place of infection was identified.  It was reported in 
February 2008 that  
In 2007 a total of 60 people (31 men and 29 women) were diagnosed with 
heterosexually acquired infection. ... There has, however, been a small but steady 
rise in the number of people infected heterosexually in New Zealand – 16 in 2007 
compared with 11 in 2006 and 8 in 2005.  Of these 16 people (5 men and 11 women) 
infected in New Zealand, almost half were infected by a partner who had been 
heterosexually infected overseas. The remainder were infected by a partner who 
had been infected through homosexual contact, injecting drug use or the means of 
infection of the partner was not reported or unclear  
(AIDS Epidemiology Unit, 2008: 2-3).   
Thus the inaccuracy of the Lion of Judah claims can be seen. 
 
They also claim (1993: 53) that since the numbers of gay men in New Zealand 
is negligible, anti-discrimination measures are not necessary: 
About four per cent of the New Zealand male population are active homosexuals.  
About 70% of these men are married.  The number of men who are exclusively 
homosexual is probably about 0.7%.  In principle it is they who are pressing for this 
legislation; married homosexuals are not. 
They do not reference this claim, making it only an assertion, and as 70% of 
4% is 2.8%, leaving 1.2%, how, and from where, do they get 0.7%? 
 
Ignoring the reality that affects LGBT people, and how society enforces a 
compulsory heterosexuality (Rich, 1982), in making a point about the claimed 
percentages of gay men marrying, Lion of Judah claim: 
Gays have traditionally argued that they are forced into [marriage] by society’s 
attitudes towards homosexuals and that if there were no discrimination they would 
not marry.  This does not accord with the facts (1993: 62). 
And later: 
... homosexual men perceived stigma where there was not necessarily any  
(1993: 64). 
Yet the Lion of Judah itself promotes the idea of heterosexual marriage 
(normal, moral, healthy, good) as a way to overcome homosexuality (broken 
sexuality, evil, immoral, diseased, bad).  As such, I would argue they are 
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adding to that societal stigma and compulsory heterosexuality. They then 
claim: 
What homosexuals do to their wives is a far worse discrimination than anything 
inflicted on homosexuals.  As we have mentioned, such a woman is usually 
traumatised by the discovery that her husband has been secretly homosexually 
active for years.  She has been seriously wronged (1993: 69). 
 
Throughout their submission, they make this error: confounding same sex 
sexual activity with homosexual men, rather than admit that these men may be 
bisexual.  Even though the case studies they provide are from an article called 
A study of the married bisexual male (Brownfain, 1985), they continually refer 
to them as homosexual or gay.  They paint this person as being evil, 
purposefully deluding those around them, as a reservoir of disease, and 
therefore as a person who cannot be trusted or allowed to participate equally in 
society. 
 
They also deliberately conflate homosexuality and paedophilia, by erroneously 
calling paedophilia a sexual orientation (1993: 87): 
Yaffe (1981) described attempted treatment of paedophilia.  By paedophilia we 
mean a sexual orientation or preference towards young children.  Since this is illegal 
in most countries, paedophiles try to change their orientation.  Yaffe quotes one 
case in which the preference of a man for young boys was changed by therapy to a 
homosexual preference for adult men, and comments that small groups seem to be 
reasonably successful in changing preference.  This is not merely creating people 
with suppressed desires, but changing the object of their desire. 
 
Yet the gender to which the person was attracted remains the same.  It is not 
sexual orientation – the gender to which a person is attracted – that has 
changed, but the object preference.  The subject was attracted to young 
children in the same way that a gerontophile is attracted to the elderly.  
Paedophiles, are, on the whole attracted to the youth of the object preference, 
with studies having shown that men who sexually molest children who are not 
related to them are sexually aroused by images of naked children, while men 
who sexually molest children within their families are aroused by images of 
heterosexual sex (Davison & Neale, 1996: 341-342).  Furthermore, Both 
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Davison and Neale (1996: 342) and Rosenhan and Seligman (1989: 435) 
indicate that paedophiles have a high degree of religiousity and moralism, with 
Rosenhan and Seligman (1989: 435-436) also adding that paedophiles are  
‘highly Victorian and rigid in their own sexual attitudes’ [and] ‘they generally believe 
in the double standard’.  They also ‘see themselves as devout, read the bible 
regularly and they pray often for cure of their pedophilia’. 
 
The American Psychiatric Association’s (APA, 2000: 571) DSM 4 revised 
classifies Paedophilia as a paraphilia.  This Manual defines a paraphilia as 
recurrent, intense, sexual urges, fantasies, or behaviours involving unusual 
objects, activities, or situations, which cause clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.   
Along with paedophilia, paraphilias include exhibitionism, fetishism, 
frotteurism, sexual masochism, sexual sadism, transvestic fetishism, 
voyeurism, and a catch all, paraphilia “not otherwise specified” (APA, 2000: 
569).  Paedophilia is defined by the APA (APA, 2000: 571) as: 
sexual activity with a prepubescent child (generally age 13 years or younger). 
 
The individual with Pedophilia must be age 16 years or older and at least 5 years 
older than the child. For individuals in late adolescence with Pedophilia, no precise 
age difference is specified, and clinical judgment must be used; both the sexual 
maturity of the child and the age difference must be taken into account. 
 
The World Health Organisation (WHO, 2006), in its International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th version has a 
similar, though more concise, definition.  It is therefore quite clear that adults 
having consensual sex with each other do not fit this definition, regardless of 
whether they are having sex with the same, or opposite, gender. 
 
Much of the Lion of Judah’s argument is also developed around biblical verse, 
what I term a Vox Deus argument – using the “voice of god” to bolster 
argument – a form of an appeal to an authority. 
 
In chapter four Lion of Judah cite various studies that claim that gay men can 
change their sexual orientation (1993: 86-111).  Of the studies or reports 
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purporting to indicate a change in sexual orientation, ten are from the period 
1956-1979, and a further eleven are from 1980 to 1992.  Yet only four of these 
were written in the five years from 1987 to 1992, two of which are articles in 
the newsletter of Exodus International, the Exodus Standard.  Exodus is  
a world-wide Christian organization helping people affected by homosexuality and 
promoting the message that ‘Change from homosexuality is possible through the 
power of Jesus Christ’ 
(Exodus International, 2008).   
 
One of the remaining studies from between 1980 and 1992, is a study 
completed by E.M Pattison and M.L Pattison (1980), which looks at “11 white 
men who claimed to have changed sexual orientation from exclusive 
homosexuality to exclusive heterosexuality through participation in a 
Pentecostal church fellowship” (Pattison & Pattison, 1980: 1533).  All of the 
subjects were taken from referrals by Exodus International.  One of the 
subjects – Gary Cooper – later said, 
of all the thousands they had available to them, they could only find eleven whom 
they thought were successful enough to be included  
(Maniaci & Rzeznik, 1993). 
Pattison and Pattison (1980) also claim that of the eleven, eight became 
detached from homosexuality, while three had succeeded in functioning 
heterosexually, with two reaching a Kinsey Scale of 1.  However, these two 
men, Gary Cooper and Michael Bussee, dispute that.  They subsequently left 
the ex-gay movement after the study was completed, but prior to publication, 
and eventually began living with each other (Maniaci & Rzeznik, 1993).   
 
This tends to indicate their studies are very selective, biased towards their own 
point of view, may be based on invalid data, and are often dated, ignoring 
more recent, contrary, studies.  I believe this invalidates the Lion of Judah’s 
claims. 
 
In chapter five, Lion of Judah (1993: 113-127) posit the theory that appears in 
the video, that in order to qualify for rights, a group must meet five criteria 
(1993: 113; Jeremiah Productions, 1989).  These five criteria are, supposedly a 
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result of a US Supreme Court Ruling cited by Roger Magnuson (1990, in Lion 
of Judah, 1993: 113-115): 
a) A demonstrable pattern of discrimination (must show that the group has poorer 
housing, jobs, income, and education); 
b) The discrimination causing substantial injury (should not be trivial); 
c) The discrimination is based on criteria that are arbitrary and irrational; 
d) The discrimination is directed at a class of people with an unchangeable or 
immutable status (such as skin colour, disability, etc., and with no access to 
other legal remedies); 
e) The class being discriminated against is without moral fault. 
 
However, DeLapp (1993: appendix 3, p2) states that US statutes and court 
rulings indicate that to be a minority, a group should  
represent an ‘insular and discrete minority’ and that it is subject to ‘arbitrary and 
capricious’ treatment,  
and that  
Civil rights statutes don't require that a group possess any immutable characteristics 
like race or sex; don't require that the group is economically disadvantaged; and, 
don't require that the group is politically powerless.   
Furthermore, she states:  
Civil rights legislation is simply protection against discrimination. ... Extending civil 
rights protections to lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals will not nullify the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964  
(1993: appendix 3, p2).   
It would therefore appear that the “list” is as invalid in America as it is in New 
Zealand.   
 
In chapter 5 Lion of Judah claim that there is no evidence of discrimination 
against lesbian and gays, yet in chapters seven and eight (1993: 129-144; 146-
148) they specifically give cases where gay men and lesbians have been 
discriminated against, and have won the case, allowing them either 
recompense or equality before the law. 
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The rest of chapter five is a defence of their position that it is acceptable to 
discriminate against people on the basis of their (homo)sexual orientation, and 
after citing part of the Genesis story, they claim (1993: 121): 
We submit that deeply and genuinely held religious or ethical belief is not an 
arbitrary or irrational ground on which to make a distinction between homosexual 
and heterosexual. 
Yet some would hold that believing in any such creation story is irrational, as 
is believing in a virgin birth, that someone can walk on water, or that bats are 
birds and insects have four legs (Leviticus 11: 13-25). Dawkins (206: 163-207) 
points out numerous examples of why belief in a religion may be classed as 
irrational, drawing examples not only from Christianity or Judaism, but also 
from Islam, Cargo cults, and other religions. 
 
Their remaining chapters compound the errors they have already demonstrated, 
continually use outdated research, and magnify on their Vox Deus arguments.  
Furthermore, as part of the appendices, they include Michael Swift’s “Gay 
Revolutionary”, but giving it the title “The Homosexual Agenda” (Lion of 
Judah, 1993: 215).  Ironically they leave in the first sentence that shows the 
essay is a fantasy, perhaps in the hope that the words  
We shall sodomize your sons, emblems of your feeble masculinity, of your shallow 
dreams and vulgar lies  
(Swift, 1987) 
will be more memorable and stick in the mind than the sentence that states this 
is an outré fantasy. 
 
Surprisingly, the New Zealand Police Association (1993), at paragraph 7.3 in 
their submission stated:  
The Police Association has no interest in the sexual orientation of its members nor 
potential recruits if their sexual orientation does not interfere with their ability to 
effectively perform the duties of a sworn member of the Police,  
but at paragraph 7.4 they noted that the Commissioner of Police should have  
the discretion to refuse an applicant on the grounds they are behaviourally 
unacceptable for the job.   
They also state that this would therefore see applicants with  
intense homophobia or transvestism as extreme examples ... refused  
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entry to the Police.  This seems at odds with the submission of the New 
Zealand Police (1993), written by the Commissioner of Police, John Jamieson, 
who opposed O’Regan’s Supplementary Order Paper.  Jamieson claimed 
concerns with maintaining public acceptance and credibility, and the 
recruitment  
of people who are openly homosexual will impact on levels of public trust and 
support 
Furthermore, to allow openly homosexual police officers would threaten 
discipline and morale in the ranks, would present difficulties where officers 
have to search members of the public, and that it would mean that police 
officers would be open to public allegations about their conduct (1993: 1-2).  
The Select Committee felt that this was a personal submission from 
Commissioner Jamieson rather than a submission from a government body, 
such as the Police (Personal discussion with Lianne Dalziel, 1999). 
 
Brett Ravelich (1993) provides an interesting counterpoint to the Police 
submission.  Ravelich was a Police Officer inducted in September 1985 at the 
Auckland Police Station, then realised he was gay.  After training at the Police 
College he was posted to Gisborne, but had met, and started a relationship 
with, someone in Wellington while at the College.  He asked to be transferred 
to Wellington as he felt his work, and his relationship, would suffer if he did 
not do so, stating in his report in explanation of request for transfer that: 
My stress was compounded by the fact that I felt unable to confide in either my 
superiors or my colleagues.  All members of my Section were married men.  As well, I 
was aware that many would have been hostile to my predicament.  I felt unable to 
confide in my superiors because I felt they would also be unsympathetic and I feared 
that there would be a real likelihood of my being discharged from the Police, one 
way or another  
(1993, attachment 1 p1). 
Ravelich requested a transfer, which was  
accurate in every respect except that the gender is different and my commitment to 
my lover and relationship would not generally be called an engagement  
(1993, attachment 1 p2).   
This was written on 6 August 1986, less than a month after the passage of the 
Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986. 
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An investigation began, and a hearing was held on 17 September and 17 
October 1986, before Judge Willis, (retired).  Constable Ravelich was charged 
with knowingly making a false report (that he mis-stated the gender of his 
partner).  He originally pled not guilty, but on the day of the hearing changed 
that to guilty.  Willis J in his judgement stated: 
When I was approached to sit at the tribunal I was informed that a member of the 
Police had been charged with making a false report.  No other information was given 
to me and I assumed that a Constable had made a false report in respect of some 
enquiry in which he had been engaged.  My attention was drawn to the nature of 
the complaint by a colleague who had read of it in the newspaper.  At that time I had 
not seen the morning's edition.  A great deal has been made of this report which 
quite clearly is accurate and so accurate it must have come from official papers.  The 
Police service is concerned that this particular matter should have received so much 
publicity.  The defendant is concerned and so am I.  Submissions made on behalf of 
the Police seem to imply it was the defendant who leaked the information.  In view 
of the nature of the offence I would regard it as being remarkable that one charged 
as he was should seek publicity.  So far as I am concerned, the press somehow or 
other obtained information and made it public  
(1993, attachment 2, p2). 
 
I have spoken with Ravelich several times, and he assures me that he had not 
that leaked the information to the media.  Doing so would have made his 
position even more precarious.  Furthermore, there was information in the 
newspaper reports that he was unaware of at the time - information only held 
by the Police prosecution team.  The prosecution suggested during the hearing 
that  
by his deception of his superiors the defendant had shown himself capable of 
mendacity in achieving his own end  
and that  
he could not be regarded as a trustworthy member of the Police and had sacrificed 
his right to remain in the service.   
 
Willis J continues: 
The fact is that the member is charged with making a false report.  He has pleaded 
guilty.  The charge relates to a personal matter and does not affect any member of 
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the public.  It is true that if the authorities had been aware of the true reason for the 
transfer it would not have been granted and it is true that others who had a prior 
right to transfer may have lost that right.  The fact remains that the false statement 
was related to a personal matter and not to any member of the public.  The 
background to this particular matter has been detailed in the summary presented to 
me and I have no doubt it is of concern to the authorities.  It is however not my 
concern.  I am dealing solely with a charge of making a false report and it is on that 
basis, and that basis alone, that I must make a decision  
(1993, attachment 2 p3-4). 
 
The officer investigating, Inspector Gillman, stated he had found Ravelich to 
be frank, forthright, and honest, but he would have been unable to obtain a 
transfer had he told the truth on his original requests.  Gillman stated that 
Ravelich was in a catch 22 situation, and otherwise seemed sympathetic to 
Ravelich (1993, attachment 3 p1-2). 
 
The SPCS (1993), made a submission of 17 points over 38 pages, with a 
further 24 appendices forming a total of over 108 pages.  The introduction is 
an executive summary of the contents of the submission.  They point out that 
the UK had not, at that time, passed any  
'gay' rights or anti-discrimination law  
and that  
Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 (U.K.) forbids local authorities to 
promote homosexuality.   
They also point out that  
In the following places in the U.S.A., anti-discrimination legislation or city ordinances 
relating to sexual orientation have recently been repealed: 
State of Colorado, 1992 
City of Portland, Maine, 1992 
City of Tampa, Florida, 1992 
City of Springfield, Oregon, 1992 
City of Concord, California, 1992  
(SPCS, 1993: 2). 
They indicate that it is a good thing these places had their anti-discrimination 
statutes overturned, because, in their eyes, homosexuality is a choice, is 
immoral and therefore evil.  One wonders what their attitude would be to 
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overturning anti-discrimination statutes that provided other groups with 
protection against discrimination where those groups have a choice, such as 
religious or ethical belief. 
 
The Society claims the Bill  
favours minority groups at the expense of the rights of the rest of the community.  
The law is warranted in doing so only in cases of clear injustice, and where there are 
no competing rights.  The Bill appears to aim for liberality but could be an engine for 
tyranny by a minority against the rest of society: Appendix 1 records the outcome of 
a complaint by a lesbian against her two non-lesbian flatmates (it amounted to 
'reverse discrimination').  Under the New Zealand Human Rights Bill we can expect 
similar cases, with the possibility of a similar settlement under Clauses 92 and 93 
[now sections 80 and 81 of the Act] of the Bill.  A defendant will be put to great 
anxiety, difficulty, and expense to defend a claim of discrimination, and could easily 
feel coerced into agreeing to such a settlement as were the two young women in 
Wisconsin.  That some of the grounds of Clause 34 [now section 21] overlap will 
make the complainants position stronger and compound the difficulties for the 
defendant  
(SPCS, 1993: 2).   
Like Lion of Judah (1993), they state that the Commission is too powerful, for 
the same reasons as Lion of Judah, but also that 
Clause11 [now section 7] of the Bill is inadequate to ensure that only appropriate 
persons are appointed as Human Rights Commissioners  
(SPCS, 1993: 2, emphasis in original). 
 
The SPCS (1994: 13) state the definition of “sexual orientation” in the 
proposed amendment will include paedophilia,  
in whatever form it may take – heterosexual, homosexual, or bi-sexual orientation: 
moreover, the criminal law does not provide protection against the risk they pose 
because it punishes only proved acts of paedophilia.  Many homosexuals are 
paedophilic, i.e. have a sexual interest in young children: see Appendix 1A, ‘Sheffield 
Morning Telegraph, 21.8.75, news report re child sex’ (p4).   
Furthermore they claim that  
even though the O'Regan amendment purports to limit itself to 'orientation', in 
practice it will be difficult to distinguish between discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation  and that on the ground of sexual behaviour.  It is generally 
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behaviour which manifests orientation, and it will be difficult for a defendant to 
show what he was objecting to  
(SPCS, 1993: 4). 
 
From pages 10 to 18 they have a diatribe against homosexuality, then follow 
this from pages 19 to 21 with statements about how unnatural homosexual 
behaviour is.  They suggest the ideas that the proposed amendment would 
allow a greater flood of pornography into New Zealand (SPCS, 1993: 22), how 
it would have other negative effects on young people not already covered 
(SPCS, 1993: 22-23), how it would allow children to “come out” at school 
(SPCS, 1993: 23), how separate public toilets for 'gays' would be required to 
be set up by local bodies (SPCS, 1993: 24), how it would allow same-sex 
marriages (SPCS, 1993: 24-25), how homosexuals could not be refused 
employment as public toilet attendants or kitchen hands preparing food (SPCS, 
1993: 25), and how it would be bad for morale in the Armed Forces if 
homosexuals were allowed entry (SPCS, 1993: 26).  They also cover the 
“effects on health” citing material by Dr George Rekers (1982) and how 
deleterious to public health the “promiscuous” homosexual is.  They also point 
out that by removing the legal restraint, groups such as the Lion of Judah will 
no longer be able to operate (SPCS, 1993:  27), how dangerous this would be 
on youth who may be “tempted” to become homosexual when they would 
otherwise be heterosexual (SPCS, 1993: p 27-28), and claim that 
homosexuality is against family values (SPCS, 1993: p 28-29).  They do not 
explain how homosexuality is against family values.  They also try to claim the 
discredited 1985 petition against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill as evidence 
of general society’s negative attitudes towards homosexuality (SPCS, 1993:  
30).   
 
Paul Adams (1993: 1) opposed the addition of sexual orientation to the Bill 
and states that people with HIV  
need to be quarantined not let to run loose.  Medical Science let alone plain 
common sense tells us that.   
He expresses concern about dentists with HIV passing on the virus.  He also 
states  
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Again I strongly protest at the clause on sexual orientation.  To have a male dressed 
as a female teaching children in class is beyond my conception.   
He also states – as do others identifying as Christian – that this amendment  
will lead to a further decline in our nation.   
 
In 1999, Adams was elected to Parliament as a list MP for United Future, a 
Christian based, family oriented, political party that gained support through its 
“It’s only common sense” slogan.  Upon his election, he denied he wrote this 
submission, which is on his company letterhead, until confronted with a copy 
of it.  At the time, I was asked questions about the case and provided the copy 
of his submission.  The case was widely reported on broadcast and in print 
media. 
 
Nevertheless, some churches, religious leaders, or Christian groups supported 
the addition of sexual orientation to the Bill: Ascent, Christchurch (1993); 
Auckland Community Church (1993); Right Reverend David Coles, Bishop of 
Christchurch (1993); St Andrews on the Terrace (1993); Wellington Sophia 
Catholic Women’s Network (1993); YWCA (1993); and many others. 
 
Elwin Cunningham (1993, p 1) recommended the addition of sexual 
orientation to the Bill, stating that  
There is no good reason to discriminate against peoples 'sexual orientation' except 
to be unpleasant to others. 
 
Paul Rishworth (1993: 1), who would later represent LWD, submitted that he 
is predominantly concerned about, and opposed to, clauses 75 and 139 (now 
ss63 and 131 HRA regarding racial harassment and racial disharmony), and 
how it would be possible for a person to offend a person of another race, 
colour or ethnic background while telling the truth, and the apparent clash 
between these two sections and s14, freedom of expression, in BORA.  He did 
not, however, mention the Supplementary Order Paper or make any comment 
on sexual orientation.  Similarly, the Auckland Council for Civil Liberties Inc. 
(1993: 2), while supporting the inclusion of sexual orientation into the Bill, 
stated that the Council  
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remains committed to the principle of freedom of speech and therefore opposed to 
any unwarranted encroachment on this freedom.  Although we have some 
reservation about this section [clause 75] we recognise its necessity in order to 
provide protection to minorities. 
 
It can therefore be seen that the arguments against the addition of sexual 
orientation to the HRB appear to be centred on: 
1. An appeal to authority, which can be split into two sections: 
a)  An appeal to scientific material, which is: 
i. often outdated and has been surpassed by more 
recent developments, or 
ii. is written from a conservative Christian perspective 
opposed to the rights of lesbian and gay people. 
b)  An appeal to the authority of the Bible and scripture, which 
can be termed a Vox Deus appeal, an appeal to the voice of 
God. 
2. That homosexuals are a reservoir of disease ready to infect the rest 
of society; 
3. That homosexuals do not deserve rights because they have chosen 
to be homosexual, and that this choice is immoral and evil (and is 
often closely associated with 1(b)); 
4. Homosexuals are a threat to 
a) Children, and then attempts are made to link gay men with 
paedophilia, either implicitly or explicitly, and/or 
b) Society and/or the family, yet there is no explanation of how 
this is so. 
5. “Oh, Ick! A belief that because homosexual sex is so disgusting and 
dirty that no one could, or should, choose to do so” (Carol Queen, 
in Chapkis, 1997: 51-52), and therefore they don’t deserve rights. 
 
The Select Committee reported back to Parliament on 22 July 1993.  Graeme 
Reeves, the Chairman, noted  
In respect of sexual orientation and having organisms in the body capable of causing 
disease, the committee received 640 submissions that expressed a view on the 
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inclusion of those matters as prohibited grounds of discrimination. Of those, 497 
were in support of the proposal and 142 opposed it. As those grounds will be the 
subject of a conscience vote and further debate, the committee makes no 
recommendation to the House  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16742).   
John Robertson, the Labour MP for Papatoetoe, a Christian and member of the 
Select Committee, taking a stance against the inclusion of sexual orientation 
added  
Legislation such as this does not change attitudes; education changes attitudes. 
Many of the groups that presented submissions to the subcommittee have a 
responsibility in that education process, and many carry that responsibility through  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16745). 
 
Echoing the thoughts of those who did support the inclusion of sexual 
orientation, Steve Maharey, member of the Committee and Labour Party MP 
for Palmerston North, said  
The principle that we work on is one that I guess we would call citizenship – that is, if 
one belongs to New Zealand society, a series of rights ought to be available that 
would allow one to go where one wants, if it is legal to go there. One should have 
available the rights to have a job, to rent a house, and to have access to public 
places, and one should be able to do that because one is a citizen of this nation. ... I 
believe that New Zealanders now regard it as quite wrong, absolutely wrong, to 
discriminate against people on the grounds of their sexual orientation  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16746-47). 
 
Graeme Lee kept up his attack:  
The part about sexual orientation was also offered as an issue that pertained to 
health. ... The arguments are fallacious. It is clearly, unequivocally, and categorically 
a political matter. ... It is not surprising that a large number of submissions were 
received about sexual orientation. The homosexual community is committed to 
ensuring that there is change. It is part of an international commitment that has 
been going on for some time, and, yes, overseas jurisdictions have changed  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16747-48).   
This raised a “homosexual conspiracy” spectre, a theme taken up by other MPs 
against the inclusion of sexual orientation.  However, Chris Laidlaw, MP for 
Wellington Central, replied saying  
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The Minister appears to be putting it around the other way by claiming that 
somehow this Bill will provide for a conspiracy against the majority by the minority. 
That is not the case, and it is important that people remember that  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16748). 
 
Meanwhile, in an apparent attack against members of the Select Committee, 
John Banks, Minister of Police and National Party MP for Whangarei said  
I wonder whether the responsible people – the member for Miramar, the member 
for Christchurch Central, the member for Papakura, and the member for Palmerston 
North – who came to the Select Committee, are the same people who have been 
sending me hypodermic syringes full of blood, threatening to kill me, and sending me 
explosives. I wonder if they are the same people  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16749).   
Steve Maharey interjected, and Hansard (1993a: 16749-50) records it as 
follows:  
I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. I take exception to the implication that people 
on the Select Committee have been sending the Minister hypodermic needles, and 
ask that he withdraw those comments. 
Mr SPEAKER: ‘I say to the Minister on his feet that normally the debate on the 
reporting back of a Bill discusses what happened at the Select Committee and how 
the Bill has come back from the committee.’ 
Hon. JOHN BANKS: ‘I will say more about that in the second reading debate’.  
Banks continued the conspiracy theory:  
The highly organised global movement of so-called gay activists is here in New 
Zealand, alive, well-funded, and well in 1993, and it has got to the Select Committee. 
With regard to the matter of sexual orientation, gay activists say that it is about their 
civil rights. It is about unnatural sexual behaviour; that is what it is about. It is about 
health risks, not rights. What will be rubber-stamped by Parliament next – bestiality? 
... If society does not condemn what is wrong, how can we teach our kids what is 
right?  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16750). 
 
Sonja Davies, Labour Party MP for Pencarrow said of Mr Banks’ speech  
That was one of the saddest speeches that I have ever heard made in the House  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16750). 
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Copying a tactic used by the Living Word videos Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, 
Labour Party MP for Southern Maori, said  
The United States Supreme Court judged that five requirements should be met 
before new anti-discrimination protections were granted for a class of people. The 
first one was a demonstrable pattern of discrimination; second, that the 
discrimination is causing substantial injury; third, that the discrimination is based on 
criteria that are arbitrary and irrational; fourth, that the discrimination is directed at 
a class of people with an unchangeable or immutable status; and, fifth, that the class 
that is being discriminated against is without moral fault  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16751-52).  
Christian newspapers also repeated these assertions during June 1993 
(LAGANZ manuscripts, Sawyers papers ).  These are the same issues that 
DeLapp (1993) argues have been shown to be incorrect.   
 
During the second reading of the bill on 27 July 1993, Banks made further 
accusations  
Those people [homosexuals] have their own society, their own values, and their own 
literature – most of it obscene. I was recently sent unsolicited a copy of a publication 
called Fire: Freedom of Interpersonal Relationships and Expression – a catchy title 
with a frightening message. The authors want to legalise, among other things, 
sodomy with very young children, incest, and, would one believe, sex with animals. 
They also want to curtail the power of the censor. It is no wonder. I would be very 
happy to table the document after I have finished speaking.  Is that what we mean 
when we talk about the decent society? The homosexual lobby is highly vocal, well 
organised, powerful, and sinister. ... That garbage is not important. It does not deter 
me. The lobby's most significant single victory was to shift the debate from 
behaviour to identity. They label anyone who does not agree with them as an 
opponent of their civil rights. That is just a clever and dangerous smokescreen  
and repeated accusations about being sent offensive material (Hansard, 1993b: 
16916-17).  A Police reply to an Official Information request (21 September 
1999) about this sending of illegal material by mail said  
files relating to breaches of the Postal Services Act 1987 were retained for two years 
and were then destroyed.  Any files relating to such complaints made in 1992 or 
1993 would have been routinely destroyed in 1994 or 1995  
(personal communication with the Police 23 September 1999).   
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Also noted is that when asked by the Hon Mike Moore if he had laid 
complaints about this with the Police, Mr Banks evaded the answering the 
question (Hansard, 1993a: 16848-49). 
 
While Lianne Dalziel later told me that the accusation by Mr Banks was not 
taken by her to be an accusation against members of the Select Committee 
(personal  discussion, 1999), she said at the time  
The Minister directed that accusation at committee members and that is absolutely 
unacceptable and is rejected by all members  
(Hansard, 1993b: 16911).   
Neither Dalziel nor O’Regan were present in the chamber when Banks 
produced the FIRE magazine, an illegal publication in New Zealand (personal 
discussion with the OFLC, September 1999), but O’Regan said that incidents 
like these are “grist to his mill” (personal discussion, 1999).   
 
The debate was not without humour.  The Hon Peter Tapsell, Labour MP for 
Eastern Maori, said  
Sodomy is not seen in cattle, not seen in sheep, and not even seen in pigs. It is a 
perversion peculiar to man. 
The Hon. John Falloon interjected  
Yes, it is,  
with Tapsell replying,  
No, it is not,  
and followed this with a reference to his perceived public attitudes to gay men: 
This law will not change one bit the public attitude in regard to the homosexual. 
Men will despise them and women will patronise them (Hansard, 1993b:16923).   
Later, Ian Peters, MP for Tongariro said  
My firm suspicion is that homosexuality in other than the specific group that I 
mentioned initially is a conditioned behaviour. Those who may have come through a 
boarding-school environment, who have served in the Navy, or in prisons, have been 
conditioned to adopt an unnatural behaviour. 
Hansard records the reply of:  
Hon. Members: ‘Ha, ha!’  
(1993b:16925).   
 
100 
 
In the third reading, recorded in Hansard as being on 27 July, Mr Peters 
followed this up with a reference to what Mr Tapsell had said:  
Not even the animals do what we, by the passage of this legislation, are saying is 
acceptable behaviour [interruption]  
(Hansard, 1993b: 16967).   
The unreported interruption, from the Minister of Agriculture: 
Obviously you haven’t been down the back paddock for a while  
was audible from the gallery causing a ripple of laughter (Radio New Zealand, 
28 July 1993).  Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the MPs who said 
such things were serious in their beliefs. 
 
To accusations that gay men make unfit teachers, the Hon Michael Cullen, MP 
for St Kilda replied  
as the heterosexual father of two daughters I have never felt the slightest threat 
from male homosexuals in my entire life. The only threat, in terms of any threat at 
school, that could possibly come to those who are the fathers of daughters, by 
definition comes by and large from male heterosexuals. However, I shall be generous 
and not suggest that the House pass legislation discriminating against male 
heterosexuals being employed in girls' schools – which, after all, is the logic of much 
of what we have heard yesterday evening and this morning 
Noting the sky had not fallen down as predicted by some during the 
Homosexual Law Reform debate, he continued: 
We have heard the argument that homosexuality may be a learned behaviour. At 
the present time the developing research evidence is the reverse of that. But even 
so, it is an irrelevancy. Being Presbyterian is a learned behaviour as well – which is 
probably rather easier to unlearn, as history has demonstrated in large numbers of 
cases. But we do not thereby argue that one should discriminate against 
Presbyterians, or, indeed, people of any other set of views because the behaviour 
can be unlearned. It is an irrelevant argument; it is an argument about how some 
people feel uncomfortable about other people; how the fact that certain people are 
different makes them feel uncomfortable  
(Hansard, 1993b: 16937-39). 
 
Some MPs, such as Cam Campion of Wanganui, held referenda in their 
electorates on the subject of inclusion of sexual orientation in the Bill.  Clem 
Simich, MP for Tamaki, pointed out that relying on such referenda  
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would be the wrong way to go. I doubt whether this would be the result, but on an 
issue such as this once again we could end up with the tyranny of the majority being 
imposed on the minority in this country and around the world, 
and also that  
There is extreme intolerance, mainly by young, heterosexual males, against 
homosexuals. They are oppressed, and because intolerance and oppression exist it is 
the duty of the House to pass legislation to lift that oppression, to help ease the 
intolerance, and to allow homosexual and lesbian people to feel better about 
themselves; to make them feel as though they are part of the community  
(Hansard, 1993b: 16943). 
 
Prior to the Second Reading, the House had gone into urgency, then rose at 
11.15pm, reconvening on the 28th of July at 9.30am.  Around 11am on the 
28th, the House went into the Committee stages of the Bill.  O’Regan 
introduced her SOP as number 238.  Banks, as Minister of Police, moved SOP 
239 to permit  
persons to be refused employment or to be dismissed as members of the armed 
forces or the police on the grounds that they have a homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual 
orientation,  
Lee, as Minister of Internal Affairs, moved SOP 243  
to insert a new clause 40A permitting a health professional or person charged with 
the care of children to be refused employment or to be dismissed if the person has a 
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation.   
O’Regan’s SOP passed by 48-26 votes (Hansard, 1993b: 16955-56).  I 
remember the feeling of relief that swept through me as I sat in the gallery 
above the Clerk of the Committee while he counted the votes and realised, 
before the announcement of the exact figures, the SOP was passed. 
 
Dalziel noted most of the mail she received about the entire debate came after 
the passage of the Bill when she had appeared on TV1’s Fraser programme on 
the evening of the 28 July with Graham Capill, leader of the CHP.  The 
overwhelming majority of the mail she received was positive, and 
congratulatory, though some was negative, citing parts of the Bible (personal 
discussion, 1999). 
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Wellington’s Evening Post ran a report on 29 July “More teeth to rights 
legislation”, and a cartoon by Tom Scott with an MP addressing Parliament  
Mr Speaker, on behalf of my Colleague, I move an amendment outlawing 
discrimination against any individual on the grounds of rabid mouth-foaming 
prejudice  
(Evening Post, 29 July 1993: 2, 4). 
Yet it may have been this “rabid mouth-foaming prejudice” that swung the 
vote in our favour, as Dalziel notes: the extreme views of some MPs did not 
persuade the majority of Members to vote against the inclusion of sexual 
orientation, but rather had the opposite effect (personal discussion, 1999). 
 
Adams (1996: 13) notes the inclusion of sexual orientation is a  
symbolic and necessary victory for lesbians and gays, it does not mean that this legal 
visibility is not problematic.   
Equality within the law is problematic, a complex issue, and is often not 
considered to be enough as the former  
legal structure and framework is retained  
(Adams, 1996: 13, citing Smart, 1991).   
Noting that  
feminist and lesbian critiques of discourse highlight some of the implications of 
inclusion in anti discrimination legislation,  
Adams (1996: 71) states  
Rights are thought to create the space and opportunity for addressing issues, 
providing groups with a ‘linguistic currency’. 
 
Adams also notes Judith Butler argues that  
when subjects are included in a discourse they are ‘formed defined and reproduced 
in accordance with the requirements of those structures’  
(Adams, 1996: 72, citing Butler, 1991: 2),  
The HRA could therefore provide the framework for this discourse, delineating 
the conditions and subjectivity of the individual,  
defining the parameters or normality and normalising that which lies outside  
(Adams, 1996: 72). 
 
Adams (1996: 72, citing Didi Herman, 1994: 250) argues that  
rights discourse ‘regulates, contains, and constitutes the subjects it represents’.   
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While the HRA may affirm lesbian and gay identity, it does so from a liberal 
standpoint of a minority deserving tolerance and protection (Adams 1996: 73).  
As evidence of this liberal standpoint, Adams cites O’Regan saying  
Human rights demands of us tolerance and reasoned argument based on fact  
(Hansard, 1993a: 16949). 
 
The passage of the Human Rights Act 1993 can also be seen as fulfilling the 
aims of Gay Liberation by providing a way to end all discrimination against 
lesbian and gay people, and providing a climate where attitudes to 
homosexuality can be changed to allow us to live in freedom (points one and 
two of the demands); allowing lesbians and gays the right to be lesbian or gay, 
according to their own free will, (point 3), and allows a way to ensure that  
the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (point 4).   
The only point contained within the Auckland Gay Liberation Front Manifesto 
(1972) not met is point 5, which requires the formation of various lesbian and 
gay groups to provide those services – some of which are already met. 
 
However, Gay Liberation is  
concerned with the assertion and creation of a new sense of identity, one based on 
pride in being gay  
(Altman, 1972: 109, cited in Jagose, 1996: 32).   
It was through the use of identity politics, clearly identifying LGBT people as 
people who were being discriminated against, and showing that discrimination 
as unfair, that Parliament was convinced to add sexual orientation to the HRA.  
Without a clear identity of who was being discriminated against, and why, it 
would never have been possible to do this.  Queer theory deligitimises  
liberal, liberationist, ethnic and even separatist notions of identity ... its non-
specificity guarantees it against recent criticisms made of the exclusionist tendencies 
of ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ as identity categories  
(Jagose, 1996: 76).   
Yet, if non-specific categories had been used, the term ‘sexual orientation’ 
would have been meaningless in defining who should get protection from 
discrimination.  In this way, queer theory and the civil and political rights of 
lesbians, gay men and bisexuals are mutually exclusive.  It may be necessary 
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therefore to continue with identity politics in order to gain the same rights that 
everyone else has been able to take for granted. 
 
This chapter has examined some of the discourse around LGBT people used 
during the passage of the HRA 1993.  The next discusses how that discourse 
developed until the debate on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2001. 
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Chapter 7: Hate crimes and the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2001 
 
Having examined how the discourse around homosexuality in New Zealand 
developed, and what the legislative changes meant to that discourse, it is also 
necessary to examine some of the effects of that discourse. 
 
In 2001, the Labour Government introduced the Sentencing and Parole Bill 
(SAPB).  Clause 9 of the Bill allowed actions that happened during the 
commission of the crime to be taken into consideration when sentencing was 
passed.  At the time, I believed the Bill had some significant omissions in 
relation to hate crimes, that these should be addressed by the Select Committee 
considering the Bill, and by Parliament as a whole.  Therefore I submitted to 
Parliament specifically addressing issues of hate crimes against the LGBT 
communities.  Nevertheless, it must be remembered that similar actions occur 
against other groups of people simply because they belong to a specific or 
identifiable group.  As a result of my submission, a new subsection was added 
to the Bill.  This became subsection 9(1)(h) (New Zealand Government, 2002) 
after the Bill was passed: 
9(1) In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court must take into 
account the following aggravating factors to the extent that they are applicable in 
the case: ... 
(h) that the offender committed the offence partly or wholly because of hostility 
towards a group of persons who have an enduring common characteristic such as 
race, colour, nationality, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, or 
disability; and 
i. the hostility is because of the common characteristic; and 
ii. the offender believed that the victim has that characteristic: 
 
In my submission on the SAPB, I noted that  
while many people around the world heard of Matthew Sheppard’s death by pistol 
whipping and tying to a wooden fence in Wyoming in 1998 through various news 
media articles in newspapers, and on television and radio, New Zealand also has its 
own share of hate crimes directed at the LGBT communities.  On 10 July 2001, Jason 
Johnson was killed at Whakamaru in the Waikato.  Police suspected that the killing 
was a homophobic hate crime, and that there was no other motive.  On 19 April 
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2001, Peter Kitchen was fatally assaulted in the Hawkes Bay and died in hospital on 
23 April.  His friend Jeff Pinfold was also assaulted in the attack.  The people arrested 
for Kitchen’s murder and the assault on Pinfold were heard by a witness immediately 
before the assault: ‘Lets fuck these gay guys up’  
(Bennachie, 2001b: 2-3).   
This is only a sample of the violence that has occurred, and was only part of 
the greater amount of violence that affects LGBT people every day.  Several 
other murders and assaults had happened over a number of years, and in each 
case a degree of homophobia, informed by the discourse of those opposed to 
homosexuality, was present. 
 
Attacks on gay men in particular are often said to have been “spur of the 
moment” actions occurring after some form of “provocation” on the part of the 
victim.  Yet these “spur of the moment” attacks have led to the death of gay 
men.  In 1995, it resulted in the return of the attacker to the scene of the crime 
to continue an assault against an already unconscious and mortally wounded 
victim (R v Campbell, [1997]).  In the case of Stephen Byrne attacker’s in 
2000, this “provocation” occurred and a “spur of the moment” decision was 
made, involving luring the drunken Byrne into an alleyway where the assault 
took place.  According to the attackers, no premeditation took place, yet the 
sequence of events indicates that at least some premeditation existed (Queen v 
Poki and Taylor, [2000]). 
 
While hate crimes affect many different people in many different ways, I am 
more aware of how crimes of hate affect the LGBT communities than other 
groups in society.  That does not mean that hate crimes are not directed against 
other groups in society, just that I am unaware of the full extent of those hate 
crimes. 
 
Many scholars have written about the effects of hate crimes on LGBT people.  
Lawyers have also made comment on these.  Gregory Herek and Kevin Berrill 
(1992) have written extensively on how hate crimes, ranging from the slur, 
through victimisation, to violent attack resulting in death, affect lesbians and 
gay men.  Berrill (1992: 19-45) compares various studies and finds that 
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between 79% and 91% of lesbians and gay men have been subjected to “low 
level” violence – verbal abuse, threats, etc. – and between 7% and 24% 
reported they had been assaulted in some way, solely because of their sexual 
orientation.  
 
Even among some American Universities – Yale, Rutgers, Pennsylvania and 
Oberlin – between 40% and 65% of LGBT students responding to the surveys 
reported verbal attacks on them, between 84% and 98% had overheard anti-
LGBT remarks, and between 1% and 5% had been victims of physical 
violence.  Among this group of university students, between 88% and 94% of 
LGBT students who responded to the survey and who had been victims of 
some form of violence based on their sexual orientation had not reported the 
incident to any authority (Berrill, 1992: 33). 
 
Berrill (1992: 26-27) also notes that on the whole, in relation to violence, gay 
men are predominantly the victims; and in the case of sexual assault, are about 
twice as likely as lesbians to have been victims.  On the other hand, lesbians 
are more prone to fear for their own safety, have a higher expectation of 
violence, and are more likely to have modified their behaviour.  Lesbians are 
also more likely to have suffered more verbal abuse from their families than 
gay men. 
 
In America at least, race also has some factor in these attacks, with lesbians 
and gay men of colour being almost one and a half times as likely to report 
being followed, and up to twice as likely to have objects thrown at them than 
their white counterparts (Berrill, 1992).  In these cases, racial epithets were 
combined with anti-gay or anti-lesbians slurs. 
 
Berrill (1992: 30) also reports that the average perpetrator of anti-LGBT 
violence is a young (54% were identified as being under 21), white (40%, as 
against 30% black, 23% Latino, and 7% other), and male (92%).  Most attacks 
(57%) are by groups of people. 
 
Herek (1999: 945-51) reported in one of the largest studies completed in 
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America, approximately 25% of the 1089 male respondents and approximately 
20% of the 1170 female respondents had been victims of serious criminal 
victimisation because of their sexual orientation, and approximately 40% of 
men and 50% of women had experienced other crimes not related to their 
sexual orientation.  Lesbians reported only 36% of the hate crimes against 
them, while gay men reported 45.6% of hate crimes committed against them.  
Most respondents identified statements made by their attackers, or other 
perceptual clues, to identify if the crime was a hate crime or another sort of 
crime.  Most attacks based on sexual orientation were preceded by verbal 
attacks.  More than half of the respondents reported verbal harassment. 
 
A series of studies completed by the Sydney based Lesbian and Gay Anti-
Violence Project indicated that 29.8% of LGBT people in Sydney had been 
subjected to verbal abuse, 51.1% to physical abuse, 2.1% to sexual assault, and 
4.3% to abuse by police in the 12 months to June 1993.  Over three of the 
studies, from 1991 to 1993, between 42.6% and 73.1% of victims had been 
physically injured because of attacks against them (Cox, 1994: 17). 
 
As a result of these community surveys, The NSW Police also completed a 
study into violence against the LGBT communities in 1994.  Working with a 
randomly selected larger sample base, they found that in the 12 months 
preceding the survey, 14% of gay male respondents, and 12% of lesbians, were 
victims of physical violence.  They compared this data to figures produced by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, which indicated that only 3.3% of 
Australian men are subject to actual or threatened assault, and 1.9% of 
Australian women are subject to actual or threatened assault, 50% of which 
were domestic violence related.  The data from the NSW Police study does not 
include domestic violence.  The NSW Police also noted there was consistency 
between studies relating to violence against the LGBT communities (NSW 
Police, 1995: 2-3). 
 
The NSW Police report also found that only 18% of LGBT victims of violence 
reported the case to the police.  Of those who did not report it to the police, 
15% had a negative belief about police willingness to help, and 8% had 
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previously had a bad experience with the police.  They also reported that over 
the five year period 1990 to the end of 1994, 22 murders had been committed 
in NSW that were gay hate related (NSW Police, 1995: 33; 3). 
 
There are very few comparative studies in New Zealand.  One study was 
undertaken before and during the initial debates on the Homosexual Law 
Reform Bill, when verbal abuse was likely to have been high.  Completed by 
the Wellington Gay Task Force (1984), it indicated that 71% of respondents 
had been verbally abused, 42% had been physically threatened, 5% had been 
physically wounded, and about 28% had experienced other forms of violence 
because of their sexual orientation.  The New Zealand University Students 
Association (1994) noted that anti-LGBT violence occurred on New Zealand 
University Campuses, with 55% of respondents experiencing some form of 
verbal harassment, 38% fearing harassment, and 12% experiencing physical 
assault.  The period covered by this study included the debate on the HRB. 
 
Herek (1999) noted that the psychological effects of violence against members 
of the LGBT communities resulted in higher scores on psychological distress 
measures, indicating that the victims of hate crimes against LGBT people had 
a strong and distinct negative effect on both the victims and members of those 
communities. 
 
Johnston (1996, cited in Forde, 1998: 7) states  
there is growing evidence that [gay men and lesbians] experience disproportionately 
high levels of violence, much in the form of hate crimes – attacks motivated by a 
deep animosity towards their group identity.   
However, it must be remembered that much homophobic violence goes 
unreported because  
discrimination often has very traumatic personal consequences that may limit the 
willingness of respondents to provide personal details that they may prefer to forget  
(NZAF, 1991: 18). 
 
The Homosexual Advances Defence (HAD), also known as the Homosexual 
Panic Defence, is where an  
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accused person alleges that he or she acted in self defence or under provocation in 
response to a homosexual advance made by another person, 
and is based on the theory that  
a person with latent homosexual tendencies will have an excessive and 
uncontrollably violent response when confronted with a homosexual advance, 
and that the 
theory is based upon ‘homosexual panic’ as some form of insanity or diminished 
capacity defence  
(Criminal Law Review Division, 1998).   
In New Zealand, HAD fell within the bounds set by section 169 of the Crimes 
Act 1961, dealing with provocation, and presumably applies only to cases of  
culpable homicide that would otherwise be murder  
(Forde, 1998: 16).   
However, because of the Court of Appeal ruling in R v Campbell [1996] this 
presumption had been considerably widened, and proportionality of the attack 
can no longer be taken into account. 
 
Dale Jerome Marlon Campbell was accused of the murder of Ronald Anthony 
Anderson after it was claimed Anderson put his hand on Campbell’s knee and 
smiled at him, whereupon Campbell hit Anderson twice across the face and 
head with a poker, then repeatedly punched him.  Campbell picked up a nearby 
axe and repeatedly hit Anderson with it.  He went outside, then returned and 
hit Anderson again with the axe.  Anderson’s skull had been extensively 
fractured and pushed in, and there were also extensive injuries to his face.  The 
pathologist stated that at least 6 blows were delivered with severe force.  The 
jury found Campbell guilty, and he was sentenced to mandatory life 
imprisonment.  Campbell appealed against both conviction and sentence.  The 
appeal was heard in 1996.  The Court of Appeal quashed the case, declaring it 
a mistrial as  
the Judge’s misdirection about proportionality was likely to have misled the jury into 
believing that proportionality was crucial to the provocation defence   
(R v Campbell C.A. [1996], Forde, 1998: 9).   
At the second trial, during which Campbell broke down and was reassured by 
Justice McGechan, no instruction as to proportionality was made, and 
Campbell was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter, and 
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sentenced to five years imprisonment (R v Campbell [1997]) 
 
It therefore appears that the New Zealand Judiciary, from the Court of Appeal 
down, are willing to accept that a claimed small touch from another man can 
drive a man so insane that he not only violently assaults the man who touched 
him, but returns to the unconscious man and hits him round the head with an 
axe. 
 
Prior to the Court of Appeal ruling in R v Campbell [1996], R v Marsters 
[1996] was also heard at the High Court in Napier.  Tai Tahi Marsters attacked 
Jim Curtis with a glass decanter, causing haemorrhaging in the brain, claiming 
the victim had made sexual advances.  Curtis was found unconscious two days 
after the attack, with at least three blows to his head.  Hospitalised, he was 
given reconstructive surgery and remained in a coma for three weeks.  He was 
unable to appear at the trial because of the injuries received.  Marsters was 
found not guilty by the jury and released (R v Marsters, [1996]).  Curtis later 
wrote to express, explaining that those who died from injuries following anti-
gay attacks were the lucky ones (Curtis, 2001).  When I discussed his case with 
him in 2002, Curtis stated that he is still unable to lead a normal life and is 
dependent on others for many of his daily activities.  He cannot remember the 
night of the attack.  People who know Curtis have said it would have been out 
of character for him to have made any advances on any person. 
 
These are just a few of the many attacks in which HAD has been used 
successfully to reduce the penalty the accused would otherwise have received.  
 
Feminist scholars have claimed the provocation defence reflects the inherent 
patriarchal values of society.  Critics of HAD state that it not only reflects this, 
but also reflects a heterosexual and homophobic male perspective, allowing 
male “aggression” to overcome normal rules of society when he feels his 
heterosexuality has been called into question.  It provides an indirect 
sanctioning of homophobic violence, and, together with the Court of Appeal 
ruling, justifies violence directed against gay men.  Wertheimer (cited in 
Forde, (1998: 14) states that  
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if every heterosexual woman who had a sexual advance made to her by a male had a 
right to murder the man, the streets ... would be littered with the bodies of 
heterosexual men. 
 
Amnesty International deplores the sanctioning, in any form, of violence 
towards the LGBT communities.  This includes hate crimes, and would 
include, by the definition they use, the use of HAD (Amnesty International, 
2000: 1-6). 
 
Following the recent cases R v Weatherston [2009] and R v Ambach [2009] the 
Government has announced it will repeal the provocation defence (New 
Zealand Herald, 2009).  This was done 8 December 2009, with the passage of 
the Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Act 2009. 
 
In an oral submission before the Government Administration Select 
Committee on the Inquiry into the FVPCA, the Proceedings Commissioner for 
the HRC pointed out to that Committee that hate speech consists of several 
elements, fitting into three different boxes, or levels of legislation, and that 
there is a level of progression that operates.  The three boxes identified by the 
Commissioner are: 
i. Section 3(3)(e) FVPCA, which was intended to allow the OFLC to classify 
publications that treated people as inherently inferior because of their 
membership of a group protected under section 21(1) HRA. 
ii. Sections 61 and 131 HRA, dealing with racial disharmony and incitement to 
racial disharmony, which protect people on the basis of their colour, race, 
ethnicity and national origins. 
iii. Sections 62 and 63 HRA, dealing with sexual harassment and racial harassment, 
which protect people on the basis of their sex, race, colour, and ethnic and 
national origins  
(personal discussion after the hearing, 2001). 
 
In my submission on the Human Rights Amendment Bill (2001c), and on the 
Inquiry into the FVPCA (2001a), I recommended that sections 61, 63, and 131 
HRA be amended to include all groups included in section 21(1) HRA.  The 
HRC also supported the broadening of these sections to include other groups 
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protected by the HRA (HRC, 2001a), while the CCS (2001) supported the 
broadening of these grounds to include harassment and disharmony against 
people with a disability. 
 
I believe that there is also a fourth and fifth box that can be brought into play.  
Both the Crimes Act 1961 and the Sentencing Act 2002 can be used to send a 
message to those who act on hate speech, and direct acts of violence towards 
people because of hatred of their group membership, that such actions are not 
permissible in a free and democratic society. 
 
Nevertheless, some people believe that violence against gay men is justified.  
In a letter to the YWCA, Mrs Barbara Faithfull (2001) of the Credo Society, 
stated, that Jason Johnson deserved his fate because of his reported 
promiscuity: 
After all, ... anyone so conducting himself and then meeting such a fate as that 
would surely have been the author of his own destiny.   
This sort of attitude, that gay men are the victims of their own deeds, is 
antiquated and is the same sort of attitude that says that women who are raped 
were ‘asking for it’. 
 
Faithfull, writing on behalf of the Credo Society, had submitted on the HRB, 
using language similar to that used in the submissions of the CHP (1993), the 
Coalition of Concerned Citizens (1993), the SPCS (1993), and the Lion of 
Judah (1993).   
 
In that submission, gay men – for the submission focuses on male to male 
sexual behaviour spreading disease – are seen as undermining the nation’s 
integrity through a conspiracy of their own devising to form an ideologically 
driven left wing revolutionary political lobby, purposefully disseminating 
misinformation to the detriment of the society that it keeps “bamboozled” in a 
state of ignorance.  It can thus be seen that those who accept the discourse that 
dehumanises gay men by treating as them as immoral, as evil beings, as sick, 
and as reservoirs of disease, can lead a person to accept that it is normal for 
violence to be directed at gay men (Credo Society, 1993: 1-2). 
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In the debate on the second reading of the Films, Videos and Publications 
Classifications Bill 1992, Graeme Lee, the Minister for Internal Affairs, and 
National MP for Hauraki, stated, near the conclusion of his speech: 
The causal link between pornography and violence is now well established.  It is 
correct that many people see violence against women as a reflection of the attitude 
towards women that is portrayed in pornography  
(Hansard, 1993c: 17063). 
 
The link between pornography and violence against women has been argued to 
be established (Dworkin, 1981, 1987; MacKinnon, 1989, 1993, 2005).  Such a 
link may therefore also be true with other groups in society.  When messages 
of the type are sent that a particular group is worthless, immoral, guilty, evil, 
sick and deserve what they get, then violence is an easy step for those who are 
disposed towards it (Mookas, 1998: 354-355).   
 
It can thus be seen that discourse which attacks LGBT people can have 
negative effects on them, and may lead to violent attacks resulting in their 
death.  This chapter has examined the development of discourse surrounding 
the LGBT communities from the passage of the HRA 1993 to the SAPB 2001.  
The next chapter examines the first attempt to control anti-gay discourse in 
New Zealand. 
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Chapter 8: History of the control of anti gay speech in New Zealand 
 
There are many opinions on the control of speech and expression.  Some claim 
all people should be free to make any utterances they want.  Others feel that 
certain types of utterances, such as the old analogy of “yelling ‘fire’ in a 
crowded theatre” should be the only types of speech that are limited.  A third 
group of people claim that while freedom of expression is a noble notion, 
certain types of speech that have negative effects on society as a whole, should 
be limited (Rudman, 2005).  Some would place a fourth group in here as well: 
those who believe that any mention of sex should be prohibited, unless it is in a 
biblical quote, and that the only untrammelled speech should be that dealing 
with the promotion of, and supporting the beliefs of, a specific religion – 
anything that does not agree with their viewpoint should be controlled. 
 
Some would probably place me in the third group, but that group also contains 
groups that advocate greater censorship, including all things that are related to 
sex or “obscenity” – whatever definition that is given.  The first two groups are 
those who classify themselves as liberals, and often use the writings of J.S. 
Mill to validate their opinions.  Yet they often forget that Mill did not support 
an untrammelled freedom of expression. 
No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions.  On the contrary, even 
opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed 
are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous 
act.  An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is 
robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may 
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before 
the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed out among the same mob in the form of 
a placard.  Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause do harm to 
others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled 
by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of 
mankind.  The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make 
himself a nuisance to other people  
(Mill, 1946: 49). 
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In 1985, the Homosexual Law Reform Bill was introduced into Parliament.  
The debate that followed was marred by opponents’ claims that were informed 
by little else other than the “politics of ick”, which Carol Queen (in Chapkis, 
1997: 51-52) describes as: 
The assumption is that because I find something icky no one else could ever consent 
to doing it. The question I always ask is whether ‘oh ick!’ is really the basis for a 
politics. For a lot of years, heterosexual people said ‘oh, I could never have sex with 
people of the same sex, so therefore it must be sick, it must be immoral, it must be 
criminalized.’ Well, some of us really can do this. 
 
Claims were made about what gay men – for lesbians were hardly mentioned – 
were supposed to do with each other, conveniently forgetting that these same 
acts are also indulged in by heterosexuals.  Tracts were written to cause an 
upsurge of antipathy towards gay men, and therefore against the Homosexual 
Law Reform Bill.  Others were written that were called on the higher authority 
of the bible, to point out that homosexuality was against god’s will.  These 
were countered by pamphlets by NZHLRS (1985) and by material produced by 
Veritas (1985) addressing the theological comments against homosexuality. 
 
The NZHLRS (1985) sought to shed light on opponents claims and some 
aspects of homosexuality by answering questions like “What are 
homosexuals?’\”, “But what of the view that homosexuality is a threat to 
society, and especially the family?”, and ‘What about the danger to children?” 
 
Despite this, verbal and written attacks on the LGBT communities continued.  
Each attack appearing to be reasonable and appearing to contain elements of 
truth, when in reality, they contained a collection of misinformed myths, and 
suppositions.  Yet there was little the LGBT communities could do to retaliate 
except point out the misinformation.  There is no doubt some people actually 
believed what the opponents said.  At the time I remember people partially 
agreeing with such statements as “there’s no smoke without fire” and “they 
wouldn’t be saying it if there wasn’t some shred of truth about it, would they?”  
This was particularly effective if the statements were made by a person who 
was seen by society as having a position of respectability, such as a church 
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minister, priest, or other person of religion, because “priests can’t lie, can 
they?” 
 
Despite the use of ‘the politics of ick’, the misinformation, and myths 
propagated, the Homosexual Law Reform Bill did pass, becoming an Act of 
Parliament on 11 July 1986. 
 
Nevertheless, the same sentiments, comments and exhortations appeared 
during the debate on the addition of sexual orientation – defined as 
heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual or lesbian – to the HRB 1992.  During that 
debate, much use of articles written by Paul Cameron was made by the 
opponents to the addition of sexual orientations to the Bill. 
 
Paul Cameron published Exposing the AIDS Scandal (1988).  It starts with: 
If your hometown is anything like mine, things look about the same as they did six 
years ago.  Oh, a few changes have taken place.  The old library building has been 
torn down and replaced by one of those glass-covered saltine boxes.  There’s a new 
shopping center just outside the city limits where once you saw the beginnings of 
woods and farmland.  And the streets are a little more crowded, particularly around 
5 o’clock in the afternoon when you’re tired and anxious to be home.  But otherwise, 
the old place seems normal and benign.  Just to walk down Main Street you’d never 
guess that something dangerous and sinister is at work here, that many of the 
people passing by may be killers, that some day soon one of them may even kill you 
or somebody you love. 
 
If you think this is the beginning of an episode from the Twilight Zone, then think 
again.  What I’m describing us not a fictional world suddenly invaded by alien 
monsters who have cleverly assumed human form.  This is a very accurate 
description of Anytown, USA in the late 1980s.  It is a portrait of the street where 
you live.  It is America under the threat of AIDS  
(Cameron, 1988: 1-2). 
 
Cameron also claims (1988: 10) that  
Columbus and his crew brought syphilis back from the new world  
in the 15th century, despite the evidence that syphilis had been in Europe for 
centuries before then, and since the at least the 1300s to the mid 1800s, 
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cinnabar, a mercury ore, had been used as a treatment for various sexually 
transmissible infections, including syphilis (WebSand, 2002).  There is skeletal 
evidence that indicates syphilis was known to the western world – although 
perhaps viewed as another form of leprosy – well before Columbus made his 
voyage to what later became known as the Americas.  But despite this, there is 
a continuing myth that syphilis was brought back by Columbus from the areas 
he visited (Educational Broadcasting Corporation, 2002). 
 
Cameron’s book is filled with half-truths and outright misinformation.  He 
blames the spread of AIDS on  
wilfully promiscuous homosexuals and our timid government;  
how the Surgeon General  
misled the public about how AIDS is transmitted  
and other equally false premises (Cameron, 1988: back cover).  He states that 
the “homosexual community” – and he includes lesbians in that statement – is  
one of the most difficult elements in society  
to deal with (1988: 25). He claims that  
the biggest slice of the AIDS-blame goes to homosexuals.  Without them the AIDS 
virus would barely exist in the west (1988: 29).   
He claims that prior to the “AIDS epidemic” it was the “received wisdom” that 
condoms were the poorest method of contraception available,  
with the possible exception of what was then called the ‘rhythm method’ (1988: 82).   
But he does not say who that “received wisdom” was from, or, indeed, where 
he even obtained that information.  Mis-citing several studies on the efficacy of 
condoms, Cameron (1988: 82-96) then contends that using condoms to prevent 
the transmission of AIDS does not work – he never mentions HIV as the virus 
that causes AIDS and only refers to the transmission of AIDS.  Cameron 
(1988: 96) finishes that chapter with the comment: 
Safe sex isn’t just a slogan.  It’s a way to die. 
 
Using a “telephone discussion” with a woman claiming to be a 15 year old girl 
and a person called “Sam” from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
AIDS information hotline, Cameron (1988: 119-121) claims that “Sam” was 
trying to “recruit” the caller and that the Task Force  
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acts as a pimp for homosexuals. 
 
He claims that all people should be tested and if the result is positive, or if they 
refuse testing, they should be put into a “soft quarantine” so that, while  
they do not enclose people behind walls and barbed wire fences 
 they are excluded 
from certain places and performing certain tasks (1988: 132-136). 
For  
anyone who deliberately or maliciously puts an innocent human being at risk  
he proposes ‘hard quarantine’ in jail (1988: 136-138). 
 
As an appendix, he includes a chapter on  
What do homosexuals do?  Are they born that way?  And how ought we to respond?  
(1988: 148-160).   
In this, he examines the sexual acts that only homosexuals are supposed to do.  
Like opponents of the Homosexual Law Reform Bill, he omits these same 
sexual practices are performed by heterosexuals as well. 
 
Paul Cameron 
 
Perhaps, at this point, some comment about Paul Cameron and his “research” 
needs to be made.  Cameron obtained his PhD in psychology from the 
University of Colorado in 1966 (Williams, 1994) and for a while was a 
member of the American Psychological Association, and the Nebraska 
Psychological Association. He also became a member of the American 
Sociological Association.  Until 1980, he had been an Associate Professor of 
human development and the family in the psychology department at the 
University of Nebraska (Family Research Institute, 2002).  He had also taught 
at Stout State University in Menomonie, Wisconsin ; Wayne State University; 
the University of Evansville, Indiana; the University of Louisville; St. Mary's 
College in Maryland; and Fuller Theological Seminary in Pasadena, California 
(Williams, 1994). 
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When his teaching contract was not renewed, Cameron founded his own 
organisation, the Institute for the Scientific Investigation of Sexuality (ISIS), 
which later became the Family Research Institute.  The directors of the 
Institute are Paul Cameron and his son Kirk.  Cameron has published a series 
of articles and pamphlets (Herek, 1997-2008).  Most are from the early 1990s, 
and were used in Cameron’s campaigns against equal rights for LGBT people 
during that period, and much of the information in them stems from his earlier 
“research” into, and articles on, homosexuality.  In reality, they are merely 
extensions of his earlier pamphlets published by ISIS (Herek, 1997-2008). 
 
Publishing under the auspices of ISIS, Cameron published nine pamphlets 
related to homosexuality: 
Medical Aspects of Homosexuality (1985). 
Child Molestation and Homosexuality (1985). 
Murder, Violence and Homosexuality (1985). 
AIDS, The Blood Supply, and Homosexuality (1985). 
What Homosexuals Do (Its [sic] More Than Disgusting) (1986). 
The Psychology of Homosexuality (1984). 
What Causes Homosexuality And Can It Be Cured? (1984). 
Homosexuality:  Everybody's Problem (1985). 
Criminality, Social Disruption and Homosexuality (1984). 
Much of the information was taken from his own study completed in 1983 that 
was filled with methodological flaws (Williams, 1994). 
 
Cameron successfully campaigned against a proposed local statute in Lincoln, 
Nebraska, that would have allowed LGBT people to be treated equally in a 
variety of local laws.  He also campaigned for Colorado’s Amendment 2, 
which removed equality of rights for LGBT people (Herek, 1997-2008; 
Geiersbach, 1994; Williams, 1994). 
 
In a very real sense, Cameron’s research is not research, but a collection of 
myths and personal biases that Cameron has tried to pass off as “research”.  
Cameron’s membership of the American Psychological Association (APA) 
dropped in December 1983 (Williams, 1994), though Cameron says he was not 
dropped as he had earlier resigned (Family Research Institute, 2002).  
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Nevertheless, according to the APA rules a person cannot resign while they are 
under investigation.  Due to a complaint lodged on January 11 1982 by Natalie 
Porter, James Cole, Karen Kelly, Tim North-Shea, Daniel Bernstein, and 
Katherine Brzezinski-Stein to the Nebraska Psychological Association and the 
APA (Williams, 1994), Cameron was being investigated, and therefore could 
not have resigned (Herek, 1997-2008).  Nevertheless, because the APA is 
prohibited under its own rules from admitting someone has been dropped from 
membership, Cameron can happily, albeit falsely, continue to claim he 
resigned (Herek, 1997-2008; Williams, 1994; personal communication with 
the APA, 1997) 
 
Furthermore, one of the authors cited by Cameron in his pamphlets, (A.) 
Nicholas Groth, then Director of the Sex Offender Program at the Connecticut 
Department of Correction, heard how Cameron was using his studies in the 
pamphlet Child Molestation and Homosexuality.  As a result, Groth laid a 
complaint with the Nebraska Board of Examiners of Psychologists stating that 
Cameron  
... misrepresents my findings and distorts them to advance his homophobic views.  I 
make a very clear distinction in my writing between pedophilia and homosexuality, 
noting that adult males who sexually victimize young boys are either pedophilic or 
heterosexual, and that in my research I have not found homosexual men turning 
away from adult partners to children.  I consider this totally unprofessional behavior 
on the part of Dr. Cameron and I want to bring this to your attention.  He disgraces 
his profession  
(Williams, 1994). 
 
As Geiersbach (1994) states: 
Perhaps the most disturbing statement made by Cameron, however, occurred at the 
University of Nebraska Lutheran Chapel on May 3, 1982.  In a tape recording 
obtained by the Lincoln Star newspaper, Dr. Cameron is quoted as saying: ‘Right now 
here in Lincoln there is a 4-year-old boy who has had his genitals almost severed 
from his body at Gateway in a restroom with a homosexual act.’ A Lincoln Star article 
(8 May 1982), was titled ‘Cameron Used False Report’. This article and articles in the 
Star and Lincoln Journal (6 May 1982), pointed out that checks with the Lincoln 
police indicated that this and similar rumors about a 7-year-old boy and a 14-year-
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old son of a prominent Lincoln family have no factual basis. Police were reported as 
‘baffled as to the origin of the story’.  The following editorial statement later 
appeared in the Lincoln Star (10 May 1982):  ‘A leading opponent of the proposed Lincoln Human Rights Amendment spreads rumors of an alleged vicious incident calculated to damage the proposal's chances at the polls. When asked about it, he admits the rumor was without foundation. He refused to say from whom he heard the rumor. He says he will not use the rumor again unless he finds it to be true. Nonetheless, he still insists it ‘could be true’, even though responsible authorities in the city say there is not a shred of evidence that such an incident ever took place. The seed is planted, recantation to the contrary.’ 
 
It would therefore appear Cameron, who refused to name his “sources”, 
probably invented a case that did not exist to win sympathy for his position.  
Scott Stebelman, co-chair of Lincoln's Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Civil 
Rights during that campaign, and present when Cameron made this claim, later 
recalled that 
Everybody in the audience was outraged, and we were caught off guard because we 
had never heard anything like this.  We knew he was wacko but never expected him 
to invent facts that could be challenged  
(cited in Williams, 1994). 
 
The Nebraska Psychological Association disassociated itself from Cameron 
and his ideas in 1984, stating: 
The science and profession of psychology in Nebraska as represented by the 
Nebraska Psychological Association, formally dissociates itself from the 
representations and interpretations of scientific literature offered by Dr. Paul 
Cameron in his writings and public statements on sexuality. Further, the Nebraska 
Psychological Association would like it known that Dr. Cameron is not a member of 
the Association. Dr. Cameron was recently dropped from membership in the 
American Psychological Association for a violation of the Preamble to the Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists  
(Herek, 1997-2008). 
 
The American Sociological Association also repudiated Cameron in 1985, and 
passed the following resolution:  
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Dr. Paul Cameron has consistently misinterpreted and misrepresented sociological 
research on sexuality, homosexuality, and lesbianism 
and noted that 
Dr. Paul Cameron has repeatedly campaigned for the abrogation of the civil rights of 
lesbians and gay men, substantiating his call on the basis of his distorted 
interpretation of this research  
(Herek, 1997-2008). 
 
At the time of the debate surrounding the addition of sexual orientation to the 
list of prohibited grounds of discrimination, many were unaware of what 
Cameron had done, and how the opponents to the addition of sexual 
orientation had used his material.  This, however, soon came to light when the 
submissions and other material were examined. 
 
Parkinson and the IPT 
 
As a result of the use of Cameron’s material, and its ever-increasing 
availability in New Zealand, Phil Parkinson laid a complaint about Cameron’s 
book with the IPT on 15 May 1993.  Parkinson argued that the IPT should 
examine Cameron’s book Exposing the AIDS scandal (1988) as  
it undermined confidence in public health strategies; and second, that it vilifies HIV 
infected segments of society, particularly men who have sex with men  
and  
that for these reasons, the book was injurious to the public good  
(IPT, 1993: 2). 
 
At that time, hate literature was not defined in New Zealand law.  As a result, 
the IPT sought guidance from Crown Council, asking: 
i. Can this book be characterised as ‘hate literature’ as alleged by Mr 
Parkinson, and if so, is hate literature protected by the freedom of 
expression in s.14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990? 
ii. Does this book present information in a neutral manner, or does it condone 
or incite behaviour or activity that is injurious to the public good?  In this 
respect, how might the Tribunal apply the matters set out in s.11(1) and (2) 
of the Act? 
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iii. Does this book sufficiently misrepresent statistical, epidemiological and 
sociological information about HIV/AIDS that it undermines public health 
measures taken to control the spread of the virus? 
iv. Does the book represent a moral view of any segment of New Zealand 
society, and if so, how should that view be taken into account by the 
Tribunal when considering this publication? 
v. Can the Tribunal elect to determine the character of this book under s.10(a) 
of the Act without classifying it under s.10(b)?  
(IPT, 1993: 1-2). 
 
The IPT also heard evidence from Warren Lindberg, the then Director of the 
NZAF, and Dr James Robb, Dr Richard Meech, and from Nigel Dickson (IPT, 
1993: 2).  Mr Parkinson was represented by Charles Chauvel, who later 
represented HRAG before the High Court in the Living Word case in 1999. 
 
Mr Parkinson submitted to the Tribunal on 28 September 1993 that hate 
literature could be given the following definition: 
i. It would express views about a minority group which is identified by one or 
more characteristics to which stigma is attached; 
ii. It would express those views with malice or hatred or opprobrium; 
iii. It would attempt to persuade others to adopt those views thereby inciting 
prejudice, discrimination or violence against the minority; and 
iv. Its manner of expression would be emotive, hyperbolic or offensive to the 
minority  
(IPT, 1993: 2). 
 
However, Crown Counsel, examining Canadian precedents in R v Keegstra 
[1990] 3 SCR 697 (cited in IPT, 1993: 3), gave the same definition of “hatred” 
in that judgement, being an 
emotion of an intense and extreme nature that is clearly associated with vilification 
and detestation. … Hatred in this sense, is a most extreme emotion that belies 
reason; and emotion that, if exercised against members of an identifiable group, 
implies that those individuals are to be despised, scorned, denied respect and made 
subject to ill treatment on the basis of group affiliation (at 777). 
 
This was in terms of s319 of the Canadian Criminal Code, which reads: 
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319. (1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites 
hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a 
breach of the peace is guilty of 
an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
two years; or 
an offence punishable on summary conviction 
(2)  Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private 
conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty 
of 
an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
two years; or 
an offence punishable on summary conviction 
(3)  No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2)  
if he establishes that the statements communicated were true; 
if, in good faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by an 
argument an opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on a belief 
in a religious text; 
if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the 
discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds 
he believed them to be true; or 
if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, 
matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an 
identifiable group in Canada. 
(4)  Where a person is convicted of an offence under section 318 or subsection (1) 
or (2) of this section, anything by means of or in relation to which the offence 
was committed, on such conviction, may, in addition to any other punishment 
imposed, be ordered by the presiding provincial court judge or judge to be 
forfeited to Her Majesty in right of the province in which that person is 
convicted, for disposal as the Attorney General may direct. 
(5) Subsections 199(6) and (7) apply with such modifications as the circumstances 
require to section 318 or subsection (1) or (2) of this section 
(6)  No proceeding for an offence under subsection (2) shall be instituted without 
the consent of the Attorney General. 
(7) In this section, 
‘communicating’ includes communicating by telephone, broadcasting or 
other audible or visible means; 
‘identifiable group’ has the same meaning as in section 318; 
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‘public place’ includes any place to which the public have access as of right 
or by invitation, express or implied; 
‘statements’ includes words spoken or written or recorded electronically or 
electro-magnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible 
representations  
(Government of Canada, 1985, emphasis added). 
 
The paragraph of interest, both to Crown Counsel and the Keegstra case was 
subsection 2, highlighted above.  If should also be noted that “identifiable 
group” in s318 is defined as: 
 (4) In this section, ‘identifiable group’ means any section of the public distinguished 
by colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or sexual orientation  
(Government of Canada, 1985, 2004, emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, the term “sexual orientation” was not added until 2003, several 
years after the Keegstra decision (Religious Tolerance.org, 2004). 
 
In Keegstra, the Canadian Supreme Court defined subsection (2) to mean: 
… an expression intended or likely to create or circulate extreme feelings of 
opprobrium and enmity against a racial or religious group … (at 722)  
(cited in IPT, 1993: 3). 
The IPT believed that although there was no similar provision in the Indecent 
Publications Act,  
elements of these definitions which if found to exist in this publication could 
arguably signpost injury to the public good.  These elements would be the likelihood 
of creating extreme feelings of hatred or opprobrium towards a minority amongst a 
publications [sic] readership.  This is rather similar to the reasoning used to identify 
likelihood of corruption under s. 11(1)(e) of the Act  
(IPT, 1993: 3).   
Furthermore, they stated that  
such incitement of hatred could indeed be said to be a kind of corruption of readers.  
The effective undermining of public health measures could also be said to be a 
corrupting influence if it encourages people not to practice safer sex … .  These 
elements, if present in this publication, therefore provide an argument that the book 
upsets the social harmony, or equality and mutual respect for others, or the sanctity 
of life, or physical or mental freedom or health, and thereby injures the public good  
(IPT, 1993: 3). 
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The IPT also stated that with the passage of the HRA, which prohibited 
discrimination based on the presence in the body of organisms capable of 
causing illness and on sexual orientation (subsections 21(1)(h)(vii0 and 
21(1)(m) respectively of that Act), the publication in question “advocates an 
illegal act” if it “advocates such discrimination” (IPT, 1993: 3).  As such, it 
would be “another factor” that would have to be considered when examining 
the way the book describes “matters of sex”, and whether or not those 
descriptions would be “injurious to the public good” (IPT, 1993: 3). 
 
In the course of examining the book under question, the IPT also had to take 
into consideration BORA, in particular, s14, and, if applicable, s5.   
Despite differences in wording, s14 BORA is equivalent to both Article 19 of 
the UDHR and to Article 19 ICCPR.  Just as the latter article is limited 
for respect of the rights or reputations of others 
and 
for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals  
(United Nations, 1966a), 
so s14 of BORA is limited by s5 of that Act: 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this 
Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Nevertheless, this restriction on s14 is not, I believe, as wide a restriction as 
that allowed on Article 19 ICCPR, despite the preamble of BORA stating it 
gives effect to the ICCPR in New Zealand. 
 
The IPT were left with three possibilities:  
that the freedom of expression as set out in s. 14 of the Bill of Rights Act does not 
cover hate literature. … that hate literature is protected by s. 14, but that restrictions 
on its availability is justifiedly limited under s. 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  … that hate 
literature is protected and that no restriction on its availability can be justified under 
s. 5  
(IPT, 1993: 3).   
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The IPT, however, noted that the latter choice was  
more theoretical than actual.  If limitations are justifiable on relatively milder 
publications, then restrictions on hate literature are certainly justifiable  
(IPT, 1993: 3).   
They were therefore left with only the first two as practical solutions. 
 
In discussing the first, the IPT referred to Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-General 
for Quebec (58 DLR (4th) 577, [1989] 1 SCR 927), and the test that case sets 
out to examine what may be allowable under the rubric of freedom of 
expression.  The Supreme Court of Canada in that decision stated that: 
Activity which (1) does not convey or attempt to convey a meaning, and thus has no 
content of expression or (2) which conveys a meaning but through a violent form of 
expression, is not within the protected sphere of conduct  
(cited in IPT, 1993: 4). 
 
Thus the expression “X is a Y on society that deserves to be eliminated” may 
be protected speech if X is some sort of cancer causing object, such as 
cigarettes, and Y is cancer; but not if X is a group of people, defined by some 
aspect, including sexual orientation, and Y is either an “abomination to” or 
“cancer on”.  By calling for the elimination of that group of people, it is 
outside the bounds set by Irwin Toy Ltd, and is thus not protected speech.  
That would concur with both the limitations on Article 19 ICCPR. 
 
Yet such language has been used within the last 5 years to describe groups of 
people.  In its submission on the Prostitution Reform Bill, the SPCS stated: 
The 'profession' of prostitution is a cancer on society and women ‘sex workers’ are 
among the many victims. The Reform Bill issues a season of ‘open slather’ in 
prostitution and opens up a Pandora's box. Prostitutes are predators and their trade 
is morally repugnant  
(2001a: part 5). 
Yet, when questioned, the secretary of the SPCS did not see how that 
statement was denigrating to women (as the majority of sex workers are 
women) in the same way that the Society claimed that sex work was 
denigrating to women.  He stated that if it was denigrating sex workers, that 
was all the better as it would discourage them from entering the “trade”.  
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Present at this Select Committee hearing, I was astounded at his attitude, and 
his vehement condemnation of an entire group of people, regardless of their 
reasons for entering sex work.  This however, only shows the first element “X 
is a Y on society”, though it is certainly intended to demean a group of people 
based on their occupation.  
 
The quote at the beginning of this thesis was made in 2003 by Reverend Äke 
Green (2003) in a sermon against homosexuality who stated: 
The Bible clearly teaches about these abnormalities. Sexual abnormalities are a deep 
cancerous tumor in the entire society. … ‘We know God's righteous decree that 
those who live that way deserve death’.   
Here can be seen both elements – “X is a Y on society”, as well as the “that 
deserves to be eliminated”.  Thus it would appear that Äke Green’s comments 
about homosexuality would indeed breach the allowable limitation on freedom 
of expression.  Not only conveying a meaning, it also incites violence.  
Although tried in the Swedish courts and initially found guilty, Green was later 
acquitted at a higher court, because of the “trump” card he played – he was 
citing God’s words, an appeal to a higher authority, in this case, a Vox Deus 
argument.  As PlanetOut (2005a) reported: 
The Goeta Appeals Court said that while Äke Green's views of gays can be ‘strongly 
questioned,’ it was not illegal to offer a personal interpretation of the Bible and urge 
others to follow it. 
 
During the case, PlanetOut (2005b) reported that when asked if he understood 
gays would be insulted by his comments: 
A defiant Green answered he understood that gays could be insulted by his sermon, 
but insisted the purpose was to encourage homosexuals to change their ‘ungodly’ 
behavior.  ‘I want to warn young people about the consequences,’ he said. ‘When 
you tell the truth to a person, it can hurt’. 
 
Although the State prosecutor appealed against the acquittal, the Supreme 
Court in Stockholm dismissed this in November 2005 (The Local, 2005), on 
the grounds that the sermon was protected by the freedom-of-expression 
provision of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  Freedom of 
130 
 
Expression is allowed under Article 10 of that convention, but is limited under 
section 2 of that article:  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary  
(Council of Europe, 1950, emphasis added). 
This allows for greater restriction than those allowable under the ICCPR, yet 
appears to have been given a narrower reading by the Swedish Supreme Court.  
Furthermore, allowable limitations not only protect the reputation of others, 
such as laws against defamation, etc., but also to protect the rights of others.  I 
believe this means to protect the rights of others from discrimination, violence, 
etc., and as such, could be used to prevent hate speech being spread. 
 
The IPT also considered the decision in Solicitor-General v Radio New 
Zealand (Unreported, Wellington Registry, CP 531/92, 13 July 1993).  At 
paragraph 19, that court stated: 
What is guaranteed in freedom of expression is the right to everyone to express their 
thoughts, opinions and beliefs however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the 
general opinion or to the opinion of others in the community.  But some forms of 
expression are not within that guarantee  
(cited in IPT, 1993: 4). 
As examples of that which the court decided were not covered by s14 BORA, 
the IPT cited threats and violence, as well as comments made by the juror 
reported on Radio New Zealand in contempt of court that were at the heart of 
the case.  They therefore went on to say that the Radio New Zealand case was 
the  
authority for the proposition that not all forms of expression will be protected, 
and that the 
forms of expression not protected [under s14 BORA] are physically violent forms of 
expression, and expression that violates a constitutional principle more fundamental 
than freedom of expression itself. 
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The IPT went on to claim that 
the only possible constitutional principle as, or more, fundamental than the freedom 
of expression in this case is the right to be free from discrimination  
(IPT, 1993: 4).   
It can also be seen that by preventing protection for statements made that are in 
contempt of court, this ruling is also in line with the allowable restrictions 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary 
contained within the ECHR. 
 
In the Radio New Zealand case, the IPT found that there was a  
collision of a form of expression and a competing constitutional principle.   
However, in the case before them, the IPT went on to say  
There is no collision here between freedom of expression and the right to be free of 
discrimination now contained within s. 19 of the Bill of Rights Act (as amended by 
the Human Rights Commission [sic] Act 1993).  Instead of a collision, the two careen 
past each other.  A publication may incite discrimination, or it may condemn it, but 
unlike the ability of a broadcast to undermine the jury system, the publication itself 
cannot discriminate.  Without diminishing in any way the fundamental importance of 
creating a society in which there is no discrimination, we find that the expression of 
opinion and the right not to be discriminated against are two very different 
concepts, both of which merit protection  
(IPT, 1993: 4). 
 
Referring to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Zundel ([1992] 2 
SCR 731) emphasising freedom of speech where that speech incites 
discrimination (in this case white supremacist, anti-Semitic material denying 
the Holocaust), the IPT (1993: 4-5) quoted: 
… the guarantee of freedom of expression serves to protect the right of the minority 
to express its view, no matter how unpopular it may be; adapted to this context, it 
serves to preclude the majority’s perception of ‘truth’ of ‘public interest’ from 
smothering the minority’s perception.  The view of the majority has no need of 
constitutional protection; it is tolerated in any event. … 
 
… This court has repeatedly affirmed that all communications which convey or 
attempt to convey meaning are protected by s.2(b) unless the physical form by 
which the communication is made (for example, by a violent act) excludes 
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protection: … In determining whether a communication falls under s.2(b), this Court 
has consistently refused to take into account  the content of the communication, 
adhering to the precept that it is often the unpopular statement which is most at 
need of protection under the guarantee of free speech …. 
 
While it is known that material denying the Holocaust is false, the IPT then 
went on to claim that people would also consider what is written in Exposing 
the AIDS Scandal is false.   
 
To me, this appears to be a rather wide jump to make.  Without examining the 
context in which the material in Exposing the AIDS Scandal in produced, or 
examining the underlying beliefs of the people whose fundamental belief is 
that anything that seeks to prevent equal treatment for gays and lesbians must 
be true, I believe the IPT would not be in a position to make the above claim.  
The people to whom it is targeted – the religious right who seek to denigrate 
lesbians and gays – believe it to be true.  I believe the IPT made an error here. 
 
Although claiming during its assessment of the publication,  
It is difficult to know for whom the book is intended,  
the IPT does, nevertheless, state that  
It is unlikely to appeal to people who do not share the authors view.  Those who do 
share his moral view are no doubt convinced of the ideas the book attempts to 
convey  
(IPT, 1993: 10).   
In making this statement later in the decision, admitting it is likely only to 
appeal to people of the same moral view of the author, admitting that these 
people are already convinced the fallacies portrayed are true, I find it even 
harder to believe the IPT truly meant that people reading the book would 
consider it to be false. 
 
The IPT then examines the relationship between BORA and Article 20 ICCPR.  
While section 1 of that Article prohibits propaganda for war, section 2 states 
that: 
Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. 
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Noting that, in their opinion, this does not immediately appear limit freedom of 
expression, or whether it is better interpreted as a “justifiable limitation” under 
s5 BORA, the IPT claims that it may have been felt by the government that  
New Zealand law already complied, either through s. 61 of the Human Rights 
Commission [sic] Act 1993, or through censorship of such material under the 
Indecent publications Act  
(IPT, 1993: 5). 
 
Section 61 HRA prohibits racial disharmony by preventing the publication or 
broadcast in a public place of material that is threatening, abusive, or insulting, 
which is  
likely to excite hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons in or 
who may be coming to New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or 
national origins of that group of persons. 
 
The IPT also cite material from the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC) in cases where it has considered Article 20(2) and the limitations 
allowed under that Article on freedom of expression.   
In Taylor v Canada (1983) 4 HRLJ 193, Taylor complained that his freedom of 
expression had been violated when he was prohibited from transmitting anti-Semitic 
statements over his telephone.  The Committee ruled the complaint inadmissible as 
it was directly incompatible with Article 20(2) of the Covenant.  Although only 
procedural, this indicates that the Human Rights Committee is of the view that the 
freedom of expression does not protect anything specifically excluded by Article 
20(2)  
(IPT, 1993: 5). 
 
This appears to draw on the same material – anti-Semitic ideas – that the 
Canadian Supreme Court had ruled allowable, yet draws the opposite 
conclusion.  Sexual orientation is not mentioned in Article 20 – or even the 
entire Covenant – although “national, racial, or religious hatred” is.  Yet the 
very wording of Article 20(2) could, I believe, mean two things.  Firstly, that 
advocacy of material that incites discrimination, etc., against people on the 
basis of their nationality, race or religion ought to be prohibited; or secondly, 
that advocacy of hatred on national, racial, or religious grounds that incites 
134 
 
discrimination, etc., against any person or group of people, ought to be 
prohibited.  The former reading would narrow the groups to which protection 
would be offered under Article 20(2); the latter reading would narrow the 
grounds from which hatred may be incited. 
 
Under the first reading, material that urged discrimination against people 
because of their nationality, race, or religion would be prohibited, so using the 
formula “X is a Y on society that deserves to be eliminated, because Z”, X 
would be a persons race – Australian for example, while Y or Z could be 
anything.  Under the second reading, it would be material that urged particular 
types of hatred against any particular group.  In this case, X and Y would be 
anything, but Z could be “because it’s against our culture/race”, or “because 
<deity of choice> says so”.  Certain types of material, such as anti-Semitic 
material, could be read in both ways as that incites hatred against a group of 
people because of that group’s religion and because some people believe being 
Jewish “is an affront to decent white folk”. 
 
The IPT cited a 1986 case from Sweden, that went to the European 
Commission on Human Rights, Felderer v Sweden ([1986] 8 EHRR 91), 
where that Commission  
interpreting the freedom of expression provision in the European Convention, held 
that a term of imprisonment for publishing an ‘extremely’ anti-Semitic document 
was a violation of the freedom of expression, but that it was a justified limitation in a 
free and democratic society because the restriction on freedom of expression 
protected the democratic rights, including the reputation, of others ( 
IPT, 1993: 5). 
 
As a result of this, the IPT decided that  
any challenge to hate literature is better dealt with in terms of whether its 
restriction can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (s. 5 of the 
Bill of Rights Act) rather than whether or not it should be protected by the freedom 
of expression (s. 14 of the Bill of Rights Act).  Our view is reinforced by the fact that 
Article 20(2) was not specifically incorporated into the Bill of Rights Act, but left as 
an interpretive aid  
(IPT, 1993: 5). 
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In previous cases in considering whether or not to ban something as indecent, 
the IPT had adopted the test in R v Oakes ([1986] 26 DLR (4th) 200), which 
establishes when any limit is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free 
and democratic society, as per s5 BORA.  The IPT (1993: 5) defined this test 
as: 
i. In adversarial proceedings, the onus of proof to justify the application of 
section 5 BORA is on the Crown. 
ii. The civil standard of proof by a preponderance of probabilities applies. 
iii. These requirements should be applied vigorously and will generally but not 
always require supportive evidence that should be cogent and persuasive. 
iv. The objective sought to be achieved by the proposed classification must 
relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and 
democratic society. 
v. The means utilised must be proportional or appropriate to the objective.  In 
this connection, there are three aspects: 
vi. The limiting measures must be carefully designed or rationally connected to 
the objective; 
vii. They must impair freedom of expression as little as possible; 
viii. Their effects must not so severely trench on individual or group rights that 
the legislative objective, albeit important, is nevertheless outweighed by 
the restriction of freedom of expression. 
 
Accepting that due to Parkinson’s complaint, issues surrounding hate literature 
were of a “pressing and substantial concern”, the IPT believed that  
hate literature is at least potentially subject to reasonable limits  
(IPT, 1993: 6).   
However, because they claimed there was no specific statute that dealt with 
hate literature (despite their earlier citation of s61 HRA as such an example), 
the IPT stated that they must apply the Indecent Publications Act under the 
assessment of s5 BORA, and its reasonable limitations in a free and 
democratic society. 
 
At this point, the IPT noted that they had already done this type of assessment 
in the Penthouse decision, where they adopted the Irwin Toy Ltd [1989] test.  
Then they noted that as well as Article 20(2) ICCPR, the IPT cited the 
136 
 
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (United Nations, 1965), to which New Zealand is a party, 
which states at Article 4: 
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on 
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or 
ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination 
in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to 
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due 
regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; 
Sections (b) and (c) of that Article prohibit organisations which incite such 
discrimination, and prohibit public authorities from promoting racial 
discrimination (United Nations, 1965).  Unlike Article 20(2) ICCPR, this can 
only be read to restrict freedom of expression where that expression promotes 
hatred against a group of people on the basis of their race, colour, etc. 
 
Whilst noting that Parliament had international obligations to prohibit such 
hate literature, the IPT stated 
it has done so only in a very limited fashion in s.61 of the Human Rights Commission 
[sic] Act 1993  
(IPT, 1993: 6).   
However, the IPT omit reference to s63 HRA which states  
It shall be unlawful for any person to use language (whether written or spoken), or 
visual material, or physical behaviour that: 
i. Expresses hostility against, or brings into contempt or ridicule, any 
other person on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national 
origins of that person; and 
ii. Is hurtful or offensive to that other person (whether or not that is 
conveyed to the first-mentioned person); and 
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iii. Is either repeated, or of such a significant nature, that it has a 
detrimental effect on that other person in respect of any of the areas to 
which this subsection is applied by subsection (2) of this section. 
Subsection 2 then lists the prohibited areas of discrimination, such as 
employment, etc.  Again, this is a clear limitation on the freedom of 
expression, albeit only on the grounds of a persons race, colour, ethnicity and 
nationality, and appears to have been omitted by the IPT in their deliberations.  
It is also worded more strongly, and more explicitly than s61, as it is not 
limited to the printed or broadcast word, but also includes spoken words and 
physical behaviour. 
 
The IPT also appears to have omitted s131 HRA from its deliberations.  This 
section deals specifically with incitement to racial disharmony: 
Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or to a fine not exceeding $7,000 
who, with intent to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or 
ridicule, any group of persons in New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or 
ethnic or national origins of that group of persons, –  
i. Publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abusive, or 
insulting, or broadcasts by means of radio or television words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting; or 
ii. Uses in any public place (as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary 
Offences Act 1981), or within the hearing of persons in any such public 
place, or at any meeting to which the public are invited or have access, 
words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting 
iii. Being matter or words likely to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring 
into contempt or ridicule, any such group of persons in New Zealand on 
the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that 
group of persons. 
For the purposes of this section, ‘publishes’ or ‘distributes’ and ‘written matter’ have 
the meaning given to them in section 61 of this Act. 
This section is, however, limited by s132, which requires prosecutions under 
s131 to have the consent of the Attorney-General.  Again, however, this is only 
concerns incitement on the basis of race, ethnicity, colour or nationality. 
 
The IPT did, however, acknowledge that they had a duty to  
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interpret the indecent Publications Act in a manner consistent with New Zealand’s 
international obligations in appropriate cases.  In light of these treaties, it is certainly 
possible to interpret ‘injury to the public good’ as including injury caused by hate 
literature  
(IPT, 1993: 6).   
However, the IPT does not appear to have examined how hate speech causes 
injury. 
 
Observing that Parkinson submitted that the book is hate literature directed 
against men who have sex with men and people living with HIV, the IPT 
recognised that the international instruments discussed dealt only with hate 
literature in terms of race, etc., not sexual orientation (IPT, 1993: 6). 
 
It should, however, be noted that it was not until 21 December 1999 in the case 
Salgueiro v Portugal that the ECHR read “sexual orientation” to be covered 
under “other grounds” in Article 14 ECHR, freedom from discrimination 
(ECHR, 1999).  Nevertheless, the term “other grounds” in the ECHR had, 
since at least 1976 (ECHR, 1976), been expanded to more than just the listed 
grounds of 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, [or] birth 
contained within Article 14 of the European Convention (Council of Europe, 
1950). 
 
Furthermore, the UNHRC (1994), in paragraph 8.7 of Toonen v Australia 
stated  
The State party has sought the Committee's guidance as to whether sexual 
orientation may be considered an ‘other status’ for the purposes of article 26. The 
same issue could arise under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. The Committee 
confines itself to noting, however, that in its view the reference to ‘sex’ in articles 2, 
paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual orientation. 
 
Crown Counsel assisting the IPT,  
argued that the reason definitions of hate literature have only made reference to 
race and religion is that these were the particular social evils legislatures were 
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attempting to remedy at the time. …  Further, the remedies themselves are based on 
fundamental principles for human dignity and equality, and the elimination of 
discrimination, both of which are relevant to discrimination on grounds of disease 
status and sexual orientation  
(IPT, 1993: 6). 
I would agree with Crown Counsel here.  The original ECHR was drafted and 
approved in 1950 (Council of Europe, 1950), and the grounds contained in 
Article 14 have remained unchanged.  Furthermore, as shown above, the 
extension of the phrase “other grounds” to include grounds other than the 
original twelve, such as rank within the armed services (ECHR, 1976) and 
sexual orientation (ECHR, 1999), as well as the result of the Toonen case 
before the UNHRC (1994), shows a continual development and expansion of 
the ideas of human rights protections. 
 
Accepting that these principles were now in legislation, and that discrimination 
wider that that against race or religion was no longer to be tolerated, the IPT 
noted that the phrase “injury to the public good” is not defined under their 
enacting legislation, the Indecent Publications Act 1963, nor was there any 
listing of grounds of prohibited discrimination contained within that Act, 
unlike its successor, the FVPCA.  In seeking to relate the phrase “injury to the 
public good” to the Indecent Publications Act, the IPT stated that  
it is the underlying principles of equality and non-discrimination that are important 
to a finding of injury to the public good.  In the context of censorship law and injury 
to the public good, we have no difficulty in defining hate literature in terms 
extending beyond race and religion to all the grounds covered in s.21 of the Human 
Rights Commission [sic] Act 1993, and indeed any other grounds, provided that 
injury to the public good is demonstrated  
(IPT, 1993: 6-7). 
 
As a result of this discussion and reasoning, the IPT found in principle that  
hate literature is included in the freedom of expression contained within s.14 of the 
Bill of Rights Act.  Its restriction or ban under the Indecent Publications Act is 
however a reasonable limitation on the freedom of expression justified by law in a 
free and democratic society and in light of New Zealand’s international obligations  
(IPT, 1993: 7). 
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However, before the IPT could advance on this, it had to consider whether or 
not the book was admissible – did the book in question deal with “matters of 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence” as prescribed by the Act?  Acting for 
Parkinson, Chauvel argued that as the book dealt with matters relating to 
sexual health, it did indeed deal with matters of sex.  The IPT agreed this was 
enough to render the book as being within that gateway as the definition 
provided by the Act was intended to be inclusive, and thus  
does not exclude consideration of other matters  
(IPT, 1993: 7). 
 
Furthermore, the Tribunal also had to follow the ruling which defined 
indecency even further.  In  
Howley v Lawrence Publishing Company Ltd ([1986] 1 NZLR 404), Woodhouse P 
stated at 410 that the definition of indecency includes things other than matters of 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty and violence, but that those things must be injurious to 
the public good in order to be banned: … it would be extraordinary I think if such a further category could be banned by the Act as being indecent without meeting the test of being injurious to the public good. 
In other words, regardless of whether or not this book deals with matters of sex, 
horror, crime, cruelty, or violence, it can be brought into the definition of indecent 
and made subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction  by the word ‘includes’  
(IPT, 1993: 7). 
 
Under section 10(a) of the Indecent Publications Act, the IPT was entitled to 
‘determine the character of any book’, while section 10(b) of that Act allowed 
the IPT to classify such books.  Nevertheless,  
the Tribunal was at first tempted to merely determine this book’s character without 
classifying it.  However, the closing words of s.10(a), ‘submitted for classification’ 
seem to preclude this option  
(IPT, 1993: 7).   
The IPT then went on to classify the publication, taking into account such 
things as the contents of the publication, the dominant effect of the book, its 
literary merit, medical, social or scientific character or importance, and 
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whether or not the book displays an honest purpose and an honest thread of 
thought. 
 
When it was pointed out to the IPT by Parkinson that the American 
Sociological Association  
censured Cameron for undermining the ‘civil rights of lesbians and gay men through 
the distortion of sociological concepts and the falsifying of sociological research’  
(IPT, 1993: 7, emphasis added),  
and this was repeated by Dr Nigel Dickson of the AIDS Epidemiology Unit at 
Otago University, the IPT came to the  
opinion that the author’s personal bias against homosexuality has destroyed his 
credibility as an expert on HIV and AIDS  
(IPT, 1993: 7). 
 
In describing the book, the IPT stated  
The book itself is best described as a confused mess of factual statements, irrational 
extrapolations, shoddy research, overstatement, omission and a barely concealed 
personal bias  
(IPT, 1993: 7).   
The IPT then gave some examples from the book, ending with  
There are a great many people in New Zealand who would strongly agree with the 
author’s moral stance.  There are a great many others who would strongly disagree 
that his moral stance has anything to do with the regulation or resolution of the 
epidemic.  Our assessment of the book will be in terms of the criteria in section 11(1) 
of the [Indecent Publications] Act  
(IPT, 1993: 7-8). 
 
Assessing the dominant feature of the book, the IPT said that 
the book is a strident condemnation of not only homosexuality, but the medical 
profession, the government, and the ‘generally apathetic public’ (p.29) on moral 
grounds.  Although gay people attract most of the author’s ire, no one escapes it.  
The tone of the book is highly moralistic and its manner of presentation is simplistic 
and often misleading  
(IPT, 1993: 7-8).   
However, the IPT notes that unlike the pamphlets written by Cameron,  
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the book is a more diluted attack on homosexuality.  The pamphlets concentrate his 
vitriol, but in the book it is dissipated and attaches to more people.  If the pamphlets 
were brought before us, we would have no difficulty in finding them to be hate 
literature and consequently injurious to the public good because they concentrate 
the author’s hate.  The book is however much less concentrated.  It is better viewed 
as a moral tract, or an attempt to demonstrate that the author’s morality is a 
solution to the epidemic, than as hate literature  
(IPT, 1993: 8). 
 
Thus, in assessing the book, the IPT found that hate literature could be 
classified as restricted in some way, and such classification was a justifiable 
limitation on freedom of expression as allowable in a free and democratic 
society in terms of s5 BORA, but they found that the book did not meet the 
requirements of the test for hate literature, however faulty or false its reasoning 
or claims. 
 
The IPT agreed with the definition of hate literature as provided by Parkinson, 
with an added rider:  
i. It would express views about a minority group which is identified by one or 
more characteristics to which stigma is attached; 
ii. It would express those views with malice or hatred or opprobrium; 
iii. It would attempt to persuade others to adopt those views thereby inciting 
prejudice, discrimination or violence against the minority; and 
iv. Its manner of expression would be emotive, hyperbolic or offensive to the 
minority  
(IPT, 1993: 2). 
The added rider was that  
v. the vitriol be concentrated  
(IPT, 1993: 11). 
 
The IPT, in finishing its consideration of Exposing the AIDS Scandal, stated 
that  
Censorship cannot be carried out on the grounds of taste or bad research however.  
If censorship was to be done on this basis, there would be very little left to read in 
New Zealand  
(IPT, 1993: 11).   
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However, although I agree with the intent behind this, I also believe that the 
amount of fallacious material within a book or publication, and the intent 
behind that book, as well as how that material affects the people it is targeted 
at should be considered.  There is one other test I would apply.  If it is believed 
that it is acceptable to make these claims about lesbians and/or gay men, is it 
also acceptable to say them about a group of people on the basis of their race 
or religion?  I believe that if the IPT had substituted “blacks” or “Jews” in 
place of “gay” or “homosexual”, they would have had at least a small idea of 
how offensive, and hurtful, such literature can be. 
 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of submissions against the Civil Union Bill 
(2004) contained elements of what Cameron teaches, and those submitters 
believed it to be the truth.  One member of the Select Committee, the 
committee representative for United Future, also accepted those fallacies as the 
truth.  Another member, the committee representative for ACT, also appeared 
to accept many of these fallacies as accurate (personal attendance at the 
hearings in Wellington). 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how the IPT assessed the only case regarding 
anti-gay speech brought before them.  In 1993, the law changed, and the 
FVPCA came into force.  This included, at subsection 3(3)(e), a certain 
protection for people covered by the Human Rights Act 1993.  The next 
chapter examines how that law was applied by the OFLC to the videos at the 
heart of the Living Word case. 
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Chapter 9: The Initial Complaint to the Office of Film and Literature 
Classification 
 
On Thursday 2nd of February 1995, two days before the Devotion Parade and 
subsequent Party, a relatively unheard of Christian sect, Potters House 
Christian Fellowship, started handing out pamphlets in Manners and Cuba 
Malls: 
 
Illustration 2: First Wellington Pamphlet.  They got the title wrong: AIDS: What they didn’t 
tell you, instead of the correct title of AIDS: What you haven’t been told 
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At that time I was unable to go to the showings of the video in question, 
although I saw it a couple of days later.  Various friends had been to see the 
video, and reported they were shocked that such a video filled with fallacies 
could be shown, and treated as accurate.  
 
Those who attended the viewings also reported the pastor in charge refused to 
let any alternative viewpoint known.  He would not let any person speak who 
would not further the propaganda and myths promoted in the video.  If any 
person spoke against it, he launched into a tirade of abuse, including accusing 
lesbians of performing fellatio on each other.  Those present reported that 
much of the abuse related to sexual acts, and that they would all die of disease 
brought on by sexual depravity.  Among the diseases he said that gay men in 
particular would die from was Gardnerella.  Men cannot get Gardnerella, 
properly known as bacterial vaginosis.  It is not fatal. 
 
Despite this, several of his congregation nodded, or said “amen” in agreement.  
There was no freedom of expression allowed at the apparently public meeting.  
They were only interested in their mistruths and myths. 
 
Given the tone and content of the pastor’s sermon, together with the content 
and timing of the video, those present believed that the showings of AWYHBT  
at the time of both the Devotion and Hero Parades, could only have been 
designed to: 
a) spread distrust of the lesbian and gay communities,  
b) degrade and demean people living with HIV, and 
c) promote discrimination against members of the lesbian and gay 
communities and people living with HIV. 
 
In light of this, a group of us who were members of HRAG, concluded that 
something needed to be done about these videos.  We discussed what the 
videos contained, how that was presented, and what that presentation could 
result in.  One suggestion was that we lay a complaint with the censorship 
authorities – the OFLC.  The meeting broke up and we began looking for 
information that could inform our complaint. 
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Submissions on AIDS: What you haven’t been told 
 
The video itself is written in a documentary style, but the misinformation and 
myths that it tells and perpetuates are insidious, and incite hatred towards 
LGBT people and people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA).  The video makes 
false claims in regard to the effectiveness of condoms in protecting people 
from HIV infection, encouraging a sense of helplessness:  
 ‘nothing works, so why should I bother’ (HRAG, 1995a: 1). 
 
In that submission, we noted that  
A vulnerable young man, going through a particularly difficult coming out process, 
who saw the video, was severely disturbed and frightened by its messages of hate, 
hopelessness and supposedly biblical overtones.  This has been a serious blow to his 
self esteem as a person, and drastically disrupted his coming to terms with his sexual 
orientation due to its malicious propaganda  
(HRAG, 1995a: 2).   
HRAG believed that this in itself was sufficient for it to be injurious to the 
public good as it may have a similar effect on other young people who were, 
for whatever reason, vulnerable.  The young man in question was 16 at the 
time he saw the video with others, had recently been thrown out of home by 
his mother and stepfather due to his sexuality, and his faithfully religious 
father and stepmother would not allow him to stay with them unless he was 
“cured”.   
 
The video also exploits and capitalises on the vulnerability of people living 
with HIV, using their own words out of context in such a way as to indicate 
that they are pariahs who prey on the young for sexual gratification, and to 
infect “innocent” mothers and children.  Thus, HRAG believed the video 
degraded, demeaned, and dehumanised people living with HIV in terms of 
s3(3)(c) FVPCA.  The video also sensationalised aspects of the LGBT 
communities in a disparaging manner, representing them as inherently inferior 
to others simply because of their sexual orientation, covered by s3(3)(e) 
FVPCA (HRAG, 1995a: 3). 
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Then the FVPCA specifically stated: 
3(3) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not a publication (other 
than a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) is 
objectionable, particular weight shall be given to the extent and degree to 
which, and the manner in which, the publication- 
… 
(c) Degrades or dehumanises or demeans any person: 
… 
(e) Represents (whether directly or by implication) that members of any 
particular class of people as inherently inferior to other members of the 
public by reason of any characteristic of members of that class, being a 
characteristic that is a prohibited ground of discrimination specified in 
section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
 
People who attended a showing of this video in Hamilton reported that the 
same pamphlet had been handed out, and the pastor who ran it used the same 
tactics as those in Wellington – closing down freedom of expression, allowing 
only agreement, and offering abuse heavily laced with sexual comments at 
those who tried to disagree with him. 
 
The companion video, GR/SR was not shown at this time, but was viewed by 
HRAG.  Noting that it, too, was a “pseudo-documentary”, we stated that this 
video also seeks to incite hatred and discrimination against LGBT people, and 
PLWHA, and would have a dangerous effect on young people. 
 
Starting with the “I have a dream” speech by Martin Luther King Jnr, this 
video seeks to set racial minorities against LGBT people and PLWHA.  It uses 
images of white, seemingly privileged, lesbians, gay men and PLWHA, and 
morphs into a speech by Larry Kramer, who paraphrased Martin Luther King 
Jnr’s speech, claiming he had “perverted” that speech.  Gay Rights/Special 
Rights ignores the fact that there are LGBT people of colour, and that HIV 
affects all people, regardless of their skin colour (HRAG, 1995b: 1). 
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Claiming no gay or lesbian had lost their job, or housing, or been denied other 
services due to their sexual orientation, GR/SR sought to reinforce these myths 
and falsehoods, making claims that sexual orientation was a ‘behavioural 
lifestyle’ and not an orientation.  Again, using their words out of context, the 
video quotes LGBT people and PLWHA, tries to link homosexuality with 
polygamy, adultery, satanism, paganism, and paedophilia.  It leads people to 
believe that such actions are never committed by heterosexuals, seeks to 
sensationalise aspects of the LGBT communities in a disparaging manner, and 
again seeks to demean, dehumanise, degrade and treat as inherently inferior to 
others, LGBT people, and PLWHA (HRAG, 1995b: 1-2). 
 
The video invents falsehoods, or at least repeats them.  It claims the ‘Gay 
Rights Movement’ – portrayed as monolithic and omnipotent with a singular 
voice and opinion – has made certain demands, and also claims that: 
homosexuality will bring about the collapse of small business;  
gays want the children of heterosexual parents by ‘twisting’ the educational system; 
gays are trying to destroy the family; 
homosexuality is compulsive – sexually and emotionally;  
all gays are into urolagnia, coprophilia, anilingus, fellatio and cunnilingus, anal 
penetration by objects, hands, and penii; 
23% of young gay men have colostomy bags; 
in the UK, gays are 18 times more likely than heterosexuals to break the age of 
consent laws; and 
it is part of the ‘gay agenda’ to have sex any way you please with anyone you please. 
The video ignores heterosexuals take part in the same sexual acts as LGBT people, 
ignores that the then age of consent in the UK was 16 for heterosexual sex and 21 
for homosexual sex, and sets aside any differences in the way the law negatively 
affects LGBT people in comparison to heterosexuals 
 (HRAG, 1995b: 3). 
 
In the submission (1995b:3) we noted that we believed both videos were  
objectionable under the definitions given in the [Films,] Videos [and Publications] 
Classification Act 1993, subsections 3(c) and 3(e), and that the videos can be 
classified as hate literature in terms of the Indecent Publications Tribunals Ruling 
160/93.  We therefore make complaint against this video in terms of those 
subsections, and that ruling, and seek that they be classified as objectionable. 
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On 26 July 1995, HRAG received a letter from the OFLC stating that leave 
had been granted to submit AWYHBT to the office, and required HRAG to 
contact Potters House, Wellington; Challenge Christian Video, Auckland; 
LWD, Auckland; Wellington Sexual Health Services, NZAF, Auckland, and 
the Film and Video Labelling Authority.  A similar letter was received on 4 
August 1995 in respect to GR/SR requiring us to contact those sae groups, 
except Wellington Sexual Health, but including the HRC, and the Lesbian and 
Gay Archives of New Zealand (LAGANZ).  This was in order that the named 
groups would have the opportunity to view the submissions made and provide 
them with the right of reply or to make submissions of their own. 
 
On 15 December 1995, the OFLC sent HRAG copies of the submissions 
received from those groups for comment.  The initial date for the return of 
comment was to be the 26th of January 1996, but was later extended to the 30th 
of January 1996. 
 
Submissions on Gay Rights/Special Rights 
 
Living Word Distributors (LWD) claimed that we had stated the video was a 
‘documentary’ saying that the  
Traditional Values Coalition states they produce ‘information motion pictures & 
videos’  
(LWD, 1995: 1).   
In reply, HRAG stated a dictionary definition of ‘documentary’, and noted it 
was clear the video was not a documentary, having referred to it in the original 
submission as a ‘pseudo-documentary’.  HRAG also noted that although LWD 
called it an ‘information motion picture & video’,  
it does not present facts, information, in a balanced manner, but does contain 
fabrications and misinformation in an unbalanced manner.  As such it is propaganda 
rather than an ‘information motion picture & video’  
(HRAG, 1996: 1, emphasis in original).  
 
LWD stated that the terms used by HRAG to describe the video are 
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exceptionally emotive.  The writer gives no evidential proof that the content is any of 
these things.  The Video clearly presents at the beginning a ‘Discretionary Warning’.  
As the theme of the subject is to ‘inform’, to claim that it would be ‘injurious to the 
public good’ seems to suggest the writer wishes to suppress the informative 
objective  
(LWD, 1995b: 1).   
HRAG noted in our submission that  
It must not be forgotten that senior members in the Traditional Values Coalition 
have publicly said ‘… all fags have AIDS and should be burnt at the stake’ (Pat 
Buchanan, US Senator and TVC member, 1984); ‘Hitler had it right, those fags should 
all be gassed to stop them spreading AIDS’ (Jesse Helms, US Senator and TVC 
member, 1986); ‘Homosexuals are sick.  If they won’t get treatment, they can’t be 
counted as real people and don’t deserve the rights that decent Christian people 
have’ (Billy Graham ,US Evangelist and senior TVC member, 1993); … ‘homosexuals 
are depraved.  … They want to convert our children.  They want us to believe they 
are not responsible for AIDS.  They want the same rights as decent people.  They 
want special rights … They don’t deserve any rights at all but should be kept under 
lock and key until they change their evil ways (Lou Sheldon, US Evangelist and 
founder of the TVC) 
(HRAG, 1996: 1-2). 
 
They tried to claim that King’s “I have a Dream” speech was  
included to demonstrate the deliberate misquote by Larry Kramer, … and to draw 
the contrast between the ‘1964 Civil Rights Act’ and the gay/lesbian platform  
(LWD, 1995b: 1).   
This ignores that Kramer’s speech actually begins with “To paraphrase Dr 
King …”.  Kramer was therefore deliberately putting his meaning into that 
speech, and it was not a deliberate misquote, but a deliberate paraphrase 
showing the continuing inequalities in American law in regards to LGBT 
people, 
to show the differences between what racial minorities in the USA have gained from 
the Equal Rights Act; and the oppression that lesbians and gays still suffer because of 
inadequate protection through various State and Federal laws in the USA.  Many 
States in America still treat homosexual acts as criminal behaviour  
(HRAG, 1996: 2-3). 
 
LWD (1995b: 1) tried to claim that  
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there are no ‘recent medical reports and findings’ that give clear evidence [sic], that 
homosexuality is an orientation rather than a behavioural lifestyle.  In fact, the 
weight of evidence would tend to support the latter. 
 
At that time, HRAG provided a list of eleven studies and articles on both sides 
of the argument, which indicated homosexuality was a natural phenomenon, 
and not caused by nurture (HRAG, 1996: 3-6). 
 
They also stated that  
the video does not in any way claim ‘that all gay men and lesbians are paedophiles’.  
The other comments could only be construed as the impressions of the writer and 
would not, I believe, be generally supported by most persons.  Statements such as 
those spoken by Michael Swift, Gay Community News, to the effect ‘We will 
sodomise your sons …, etc.,’ would certainly dumbfound many parents  
(LWD, 1995b: 1).   
Again this is incorrect, and the quote from Michael Swift is deliberately 
incomplete in the video.  Also, HRAG  
did not, in original submission, claim that the video says that ‘all gay men and 
lesbians are paedophiles’.  We stated that the video seeks to perpetuate that myth 
by implication  
(HRAG, 1996: 6-7).   
 
LWD claimed: 
It is interesting that the writer suggests that the content ‘sensationalises’ and 
presents ‘certain parts of the gay and lesbian communities in a disparaging manner’. 
Does the writer have concern that some behaviour is shown for the purpose of 
edification. Only a generalised personal view of the writer is given without any 
specific scene or event referenced.  Dennis, an AIDS patient and former homosexual 
speaks of having ‘partners that are without number’ and ‘one night at least 50 
partners’. This is not for the purpose of sensationalisation but to inform the viewer 
of behaviour which is not uncommon within the gay and lesbian lifestyle. It is for the 
viewer to establish their own adjudication  
(LWD, 1995b: 1-2).   
 
As the NZAF pointed out,  
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The video ‘Gay Rights Special Rights’ is propaganda of an extremely one-sided kind. 
It uses a variety of devices to present its makers' view of reality, such as sinister 
music under pictures of cheerful parades, a highly selective use of images, 
kaleidescoping-out [sic] of innocuous images (to make them seem more indecent), 
and biased juxtaposition of pictures (such as homeless black children against a gay 
pride parade) and words with pictures (such as a man carrying a baby, probably his 
own, while it speaks of paedophilia)  
(NZAF, 1995: 2). 
 
In reply to the comment about ‘Dennis’, above, HRAG stated:  
Regarding his statement about ‘Dennis’. This would be the exception rather than the 
rule. It is in fact probably physically impossible. If the night is taken as being from 6 
pm to 6 am, that is 720 minutes, divided by 50, that gives 14 minutes and 24 seconds 
on average per encounter. We seriously doubt this claim and its possibility.  There 
are many celibate lesbians and gay men, but this is not mentioned. The excerpt is 
therefore for the purpose of sensationalism as nothing else is offered to allow the 
viewer to form their own opinion  
(HRAG, 1996: 7, emphasis in original). 
 
LWD (1995b: 2) also disputed the fact that the video contained false 
information: 
To state that ‘certain demands’ as presented by the Gay Rights Movement ‘are false’ 
requires substantiation by the writer.   
The NZAF (1995: 2) had stated the video  
includes many factual errors, some of which must be deliberate: For example it is 
simply not true that gay men and lesbians in the US have never been denied access 
to businesses once their sexuality was known. The reference to the relative 
prevalence of underage sex in the UK omits the crucial fact that homosexual acts in 
the UK had an age of consent of 21 when this film was made, while the age of 
consent for heterosexual acts was 16 (thus equating sex between 20-year-olds with 
paedophilia), it quotes as serious the obvious and well-known parody, ‘We shall 
sodomise your sons....’ The most extreme and radical gay and lesbian positions and 
sexual practices are presented throughout the video as typical. 
 
The easiest part to show that the video contains false information is in its 
claims from the article by Michael Swift.  The original article begins  
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This essay is an outré, madness, a tragic, cruel fantasy, an eruption of inner rage, on 
how the oppressed desperately dream of being the oppressor  
(Swift, 1987).   
This line, omitted in the video and other conservative religious writings where 
Swift’s article has been quoted, shows that the article is intended to be a 
parody, yet the video expresses the idea that the lines  
We shall sodomize your sons, emblems of your feeble masculinity, of your shallow 
dreams and vulgar lies. We shall seduce them in your schools, in your dormitories, in 
your gymnasiums, in your locker rooms, in your sports arenas, in your seminaries, in 
your youth groups 
are intended to be what is desired, and is part of some sort of “Gay Agenda”.  
By taking an article out of context, the video manages to instil the idea that gay 
men are a threat to children – in particular boys – and are therefore to be 
feared.  Intentionally doing so is making a fiction of the original article. 
 
The video claimed that the 1993 March On Washington Demands contained  
seven broad demands encompassing fifty five sub-demands for gays, lesbians, 
bisexuals, and transgenders. 
By comparing the demands claimed in the video, with the actual demands 
made in the 1993 March on Washington, similarities initially exist between the 
two, however, these similarities decrease as the list goes on.  Placing these side 
by side, with the actual 1993 March on Washington Demands, provided by the 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, on the left, and the claims in GR/SR on 
the right, the fabrications can easily be seen:  
 
Demand/Claim One 
Actual demand made Claim in the video 
We demand passage of a Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender civil rights bill 
and an end to discrimination by state 
and federal governments. Including the 
military; repeal of all sodomy laws and 
other laws that criminalize private 
sexual expression between consenting 
adults 
repeals all sodomy laws and legalises 
any and all forms of sexual expression; 
age of consent laws would be changed 
to allow sex with youth; and dress code 
laws would be repealed to allow all 
forms of dress or non-dress 
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The claim to change  
age of consent laws would be changed to allow sex with youth 
 can therefore be seen to be a fabrication.  Although it may be claimed by those 
opposed to the rights of transgender people that providing transgender people 
with rights and ending discrimination against them would result in  
dress code laws would be repealed to allow all forms of dress or non-dress, 
this is not an accurate claim.  Transgender people would be living and dressing 
in the gender appropriate to them.  To make the claim such as that contained in 
the video is, I believe, to deliberately take the Demands out of context in a 
misleading and mischievous way. 
 
Demand/Claim 2 
Actual demand made Claim in the video 
We demand massive increase in funding 
for AIDS education, research, and patient 
care; universal access to health care, 
including alternative therapies; and an 
end to sexism in medical research and 
health core. 
diverts massive funds from the 
defence budget to cover AIDS patients 
medical expenses; calls for taxpayers 
to fund cosmetic sex change 
operations for transgenders; and 
supply IV needles to drug addicts 
 
There is no mention in the original demand about supplying needles to drug 
users, or of any form of needle exchange.  There is nothing “cosmetic” about 
sex reassignment surgery.  It is major surgery only undergone after lengthy 
assessment and consideration by both the person concerned and medical and 
psychological health professionals. 
 
Demand/Claim 3 
Actual demand made Claim in the video 
We demand legislation to prevent 
discrimination against Lesbians, Gays. 
Bisexuals and Transgendered people in 
the areas of family diversity, custody, 
adoption and foster care, and that the 
definition of family include the full 
diversity of all family structures. 
legalises marriage between members 
of the same sex; legal adoption, 
custody, and foster care would also be 
allowed within these new homosexual 
family structures. 
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The video is most accurate with this claim, yet attempts to make it appear as if 
is something wrong or distasteful.  The imagery shown at this point – two 
people in wedding dresses, a white child, a wedding certificate in the name of 
two women (without making it clear the certificate is not valid and made 
specifically for the mass commitment ceremony held while the march was on), 
is designed to repel those who hold negative views about same sex marriage, 
or oppose any recognition of same sex couples.  The background music can 
only be described as ‘sinister’. 
 
Demand/Claim 4 
Actual demand made Claim in the video 
We demand full and equal inclusion of 
Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and 
Transgendered people in the educational 
system, and inclusion of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender studies in 
multicultural curricula. 
requires full inclusion of lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals, and transgenders in 
education, child care, and school 
counselling programmes. 
 
Again, the video is moderately accurate with this, but plays to the prejudices of 
those who oppose equal rights for LGBT people.  The original demand is 
seeking to ensure that LGBT teachers are not arbitrarily fired from their 
teaching positions on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.  
The video again seeks to sensationalise this as if it is something bad.  Yet 
heterosexual people are not fired from their positions as teachers simply 
because they are heterosexual.  Together with the fiction the video introduces 
at demand one,  
age of consent laws would be changed to allow sex with youth,  
and the fallacy they claim at demand seven, as well as discussion about two 
books available in some school libraries, it is intended to imply that LGBT 
teachers are paedophiles seeking to prey upon children.  This implication is 
false. 
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Demand/Claim 5 
Actual demand made Claim in the video 
We demand the right to reproductive 
freedom and choice, to control our own 
bodies, and an end to sexist 
discrimination in all forms. 
requires that contraceptive and 
unrestricted abortion services be 
available to all people regardless of 
age. 
 
There is no mention in the original demand of such services being 
available to all people regardless of age 
as claimed by the video.  However, allowing such services to be available 
would be of great help to public health efforts.  Full and complete sexual 
health programmes offering a range of options promote better sexual health 
than abstinence only programmes.  As Gregory Paul (2005: 6-7) points out: 
… rates of adolescent gonorrhea infection remain six to three hundred times higher 
in the U.S. than in less theistic, pro-evolution secular developing democracies.  At all 
ages levels are higher in the U.S., albeit by less dramatic amounts.  The U.S. also 
suffers from uniquely high adolescent and adult syphilis infection rates, which are 
starting to rise again as the microbe’s resistance increases.  The two main curable 
STDs have been nearly eliminated in strongly secular Scandinavia.  Increasing 
adolescent abortion rates show positive correlation with increasing belief and 
worship of a creator, and negative correlation with increasing non-theism and 
acceptance of evolution; again rates are uniquely high in the U.S. (Figure 8). Claims 
that secular cultures aggravate abortion rates (John Paul II) are therefore 
contradicted by the quantitative data. Early adolescent pregnancy and birth have 
dropped in the developing democracies (Abma et al.; Singh and Darroch), but rates 
are two to dozens of times higher in the U.S. where the decline has been more 
modest (Figure 9). Broad correlations between decreasing theism and increasing 
pregnancy and birth are present, with Austria and especially Ireland being partial 
exceptions. Darroch et al. found that age of first intercourse, number of sexual 
partners and similar issues among teens do not exhibit wide disparity or a consistent 
pattern among the prosperous democracies they sampled, including the U.S. A 
detailed comparison of sexual practices in France and the U.S. observed little 
difference except that the French tend – contrary to common impression – to be 
somewhat more conservative. 
 
In completing an Internet search I found various private bodies, such as The 
Silver Ring Thing, provide abstinence only services in the other countries 
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included in Paul’s study, but I was only able to find that the US, at a 
government level, is the only country to actively promote abstinence only 
programmes. 
 
Paul (2005: 1) points out that the  
United States is the only prosperous nation where the majority absolutely believes in 
a creator and evolutionary science is unpopular,  
and is therefore a theistic nation.  Italy, Ireland and Spain were the only other 
countries that had over 40% of the population absolutely believe in God – yet 
even they had under 50% of their populations do so (while more than 50% of 
their populations believe in evolution).  Only the US had more than 50% of the 
population absolutely believe in God, with over 60% of the US population 
believing so and less than 45% accepting evolution.  These findings are again 
confirmed in his later, more comprehensive, 2009 article.  Paul (2009: 417) 
notes: 
Because highly secular democracies are significantly and regularly outperforming the 
more theistic ones, the moral-creator socioeconomic hypothesis is rejected in favor 
of the secular-democratic socioeconomic hypothesis (in agreement with Paul [2005] 
and Zuckerman [2006], as well as the results of Marks, Abdallah, Sims, and 
Thompson [2006] and Norris and Inglehart [2004]). A study to the contrary has yet to 
emerge despite the widespread promulgation of the moral-creator socioeconomic 
hypothesis. 
 
Paul’s 2005 and 2009 articles indicate that a higher rate of theism correlates 
with a higher rate of societal ills, such as a large incidence of sexually 
transmissible infections.  A full and inclusive sexual health programme, 
proposed by the March Demands is a better choice for society than faith based 
abstinence only programmes, espoused by the Traditional Values Coalition and 
other religious groups in America. 
 
Demand/Claim 6 
Actual demand made Claim in the video 
We demand an end to racial and ethnic 
discrimination in all forms. 
 
provides for taxpayer funding for 
artificial insemination of lesbians and 
bisexuals, and forbids religious based 
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concerns about homosexuality from 
being expressed. 
 
The claim made by the video regarding Demand 6 is a deliberate fabrication.  
There is no similarity in the claim to the original demand.  The voiceover in 
the video is accompanied by images of a heavily pregnant woman holding a 
sign pointing towards her belly that reads ‘Lesbian Love Child’.  This fades, as 
the second fictional claim is made, to a black man holding a sign which reads 
‘Keep your Church out of my Crotch’.  Both images are designed to create 
antipathy towards LGBT people. 
 
Demand/Claim 7 
Actual demand made Claim in the video 
We demand an end to discrimination and 
violent oppression based on actual or 
perceived sexual 
orientation/identification, race, religion, 
identity, sex and gender expression, 
disability, age, class, and/or AIDS/HIV 
infection. 
requires organisations such as the Boy 
Scouts of America to accept 
homosexual Scoutmasters. 
(Quotations from GR/SR, 1993). 
 
 
Again, there is no similarity between the actual demand made and the claim in 
GR/SR.  Another fiction invented by the video makers, specifically to imply, as 
at claim one and four, that gay men in particular are targeting youth, 
specifically boys.  The implication is that gay men are paedophiles.  It is 
specifically made to inflame prejudice against the LGBT communities. 
 
To state, as LWD do (1995b: 1), that the video does not  
‘sensationalise’ and present ‘certain parts of the gay and lesbian communities in a 
disparaging manner’, 
or that the video does not contain false information is either absolute fiction or 
a position grounded on wilful ignorance. 
 
Perhaps the makers of the video were taking the advice of Dr George Rekers, 
author of Growing Up Straight (1982) to heart: 
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… mixing a little truth with a ‘healthy’ dose of error is a strategy designed to implant 
fear and confusion  
(cited in SPCS, 1993). 
 
Subsequent events:  
Wellington 
 
On Thursday 8th February 1996, members of Wellington’s Potter’s House 
Christian Fellowship began handing out pamphlets advertising AWYHBT.  It 
clearly had R16 printed on the flyer, yet the person who handed it to me 
admitted she was 15.  She would be attending the showing of the movie as she 
said her “pastor told me to go”.  The video was to be shown at Newtown 
School Hall on 10th February, the same day as the Devotion parade was held in 
Wellington’s streets in the afternoon, and the dance party later that evening.   
 
The pamphlet makes the following claims: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 3: Second Wellington Pamphlet 
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The last claim (in the Western world ...) forgets that AIDS notifications lag 
behind HIV seroconversion, and to report it accurately, the flyer should have 
had the number of HIV diagnoses rather than AIDS notifications.  
Nevertheless, HIV diagnoses are not entirely accurate of the number of HIV 
positive people in a given population as many people are not tested, and may 
be carrying the virus for years, asymptomatically.  So long as they show no 
symptoms, they may never have an HIV test.  It may therefore be several years 
before a person, infected during any given time period, is tested for HIV. 
 
Furthermore, the first claim is inflammatory and incorrect.  The NZAF, in its 
submissions on AWYHBT, never asked the OFLC to ban the video.  They 
stated that such a decision would be up to the OFLC, and the NZAF (1995: 2) 
recommended an age restriction of 18, rather than the current R16.  A letter 
was sent to the Office of Film and Literature advising them of the showing. 
 
The custodian of the school hall seemed to be unaware of the problems caused 
by the showing of AWYHBT a year earlier when spoken to on the Friday, 9th 
February.  In a letter to her of that date, explaining our concerns, I mentioned 
the errors in the pamphlet in regard to the NZAF.  I also mentioned that the 
World Health Organisation estimates that, at that time, 17 million people had 
HIV, of which 79% were infected heterosexually, indicating the HIV is not 
solely a homosexual disease.  The latest statistics from AIDS New Zealand 
were also given – that 25.3% of positive tests results were among heterosexual 
women in the 12 months ending 30 September 1995 (AIDS Epidemiology 
Unit, 1995).  Information about the safety of condoms was also provided to 
counteract the claims made in the video. 
 
In a follow up call, the custodian stated that there had been a bomb scare in the 
Hall the night the video was shown.  However, she told me that the Pastor of 
Potter’s House did not call the police, and initiated a search of the building 
themselves after evacuating it.  Others who had been present that night had 
claimed they were surprised by the actions taken by Potters House leadership, 
although the Pastor had claimed that he had been in contact with the police 
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before starting the search.  I mentioned in the call that these actions were 
unusual, and that several people had told me they believed the bomb scare to 
be a hoax, perpetrated by Potters House.  I also offered to speak with the police 
in relation to this alleged bomb scare. 
 
I also mentioned that the Newtown Community Centre, where the video had 
been shown the previous year, had entered a clause into their hall hire 
agreement that restricted groups from denigrating other sectors of the 
community, suggested perhaps the school could look at this also, and reiterated 
this in a letter sent on 1 March 1996. 
 
During the Devotion Parade on the Afternoon of the 10th of February, members 
of Potters House marched in front of the parade in protest, making offensive 
comments through loud hailers.  From their position, it appeared that they were 
being provided by a police escort.  Other members also walked along the 
streets beside the parade making similarly offensive comments.  Someone 
watching the parade was seriously assaulted by one of the protesters, sufficient 
to cause blood to flow from their nose and mouth.  I was in the parade, and 
saw the person who had been assaulted after it happened, but did not see the 
assault take place, nor did I speak to the person assaulted after the parade.  
Police officers on duty did nothing to prevent the offensive comments, did not 
prevent members of Potters House marching in front of the parade, and claim 
not to have seen the person who was assaulted.  There is no record of that 
person making a complaint to the police in respect to the assault. 
 
The Wellington City Council (1994) bylaws at the time stated: 
17.10 MEETINGS AND PROCESSIONS ON ROADS 
17.10.1 No person shall without the prior written authority of the Council or 
the City Traffic Engineer: 
Take part, on any road, in any assembly or combine with other 
persons in such a way as to impede pedestrian or vehicular traffic 
thereon, or to prevent or hinder ready access to shops or premises 
facing on the road; or 
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Make any public address or organise or conduct any public 
meeting, gathering, or demonstration, or attempt to organise or 
gather together a  crowd, on any road; or 
Except with such consent as aforesaid, no person shall hold 
organise or take pan in any parade or procession whether in 
vehicles or on foot on any road. 
17.10.2 In determining whether to grant or withhold permission as 
aforesaid the Council or the City Traffic Engineer shall have regard: 
To conditions of Traffic movement, both vehicular and pedestrian, 
at the time of the proposed assembly or procession, but 
To the likelihood of danger to life or property, or the likelihood of 
undue public disorder being caused or attracted by the proposed 
activity. 
To whether the proposed activity will cause unreasonable 
annoyance or inconvenience to other road users or of people living 
and working in the vicinity. 
17.11   LOUDSPEAKERS 
17.11.1 No person shall operate a siren, loudspeaker or other voice or 
sound amplifier, be it on foot or from a moving or stationary vehicle, in 
pursuance of any right or permission exercised or granted under Clauses 
17.10 to 17.14 hereof, or otherwise, on any road without having first 
obtained the written permission of the City Traffic Engineer. (Wellington 
City Council, 1994) 
 
In a letter to David Pegram of Gays and Lesbians Everywhere in Education 
(GLEE), the Area Maintenance Officer of the Council noted that  
Approval was not given to the group of people who marched in front of your 
procession on 10 February,  
that to hold any march without the council’s authority was a breach of the 
bylaw above, and that  
Council bylaws are enforced by the New Zealand Police  
(Letter, 29 April 1996, Council to Pegram, on file, LAGANZ: Bennachie 
Collection). 
 
Accordingly, GLEE laid complaints with the Police, asking why they had 
allowed the members of Potter’s House to march in front of the parade, and 
distribute offensive pamphlets and be verbally abusive (Pegram to Police, 19 
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March 1996, on file, LAGANZ: Bennachie Collection).  Inspector Drew of the 
Police replied that: 
The grant or denial of a permit is a council matter which is of no concern to the 
police except as it affects road safety or maintenance of the peace. 
 
The police role on this occasion was to ensure the marchers’ safety by controlling 
traffic, and to intervene if necessary to deal with the actions of marchers or 
spectators which contravened criminal law.  I was satisfied after the march that we 
had fulfilled both obligations. 
 
Every group, including those aligned for and against homosexuality, has the right to 
free speech in New Zealand.  The police will not interfere lightly with that right  
(R Drew to Pegram, 28 March 1996, on file, LAGANZ: Bennachie 
Collection). 
 
Following the letter to the custodian of the Newtown School Hall (1 March 
1996), the principal of the school contacted me, and stated she had been told 
by the pastor of Potter’s House, Karl Dodunski, that the OFLC had said they 
had finished their work on the film, had not reclassified it, and it was no longer 
being considered for classification.  As a result, they had received their video 
back, and that was why they had shown it.  I informed her those claims were 
false, and that the OFLC had not completed its work on the videos, the 
classification was still being undertaken. 
 
The principal also expressed other concerns relayed to her from Pastor 
Dodunski, that HRAG and the gay community were trying to ban Potter’s 
House, that the custodian had checked with Newtown Community Hall about 
the good will of Potter’s House, and the bomb scare.  I stated the claims by 
Potter’s House were incorrect, and that we were only trying to get Potter’s 
House to be honest and to stop presenting misinformation as if it were fact, and 
were not interested in preventing them from going about their lawful business.  
I reminded her of the Ninth Commandment that Christians supposedly obey in 
accordance with the bible: 
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Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness  
(Exodus 20: 14, in Collins, 1958). 
 
I also stated several people were concerned about the claims regarding a bomb 
scare and how members of Potter’s House had reacted.  I offered to write to the 
police and request an investigation into this, and repeated the feeling by several 
that this was a hoax. 
 
Writing to her later (26 March 1996), I repeated much of the above, and that I 
would be in contact with the police.  I noted I had been in contact with the 
Newtown Community Hall, and none there could recall speaking to the 
custodian of the school hall.  However, given the stress the custodian was 
under during that time, she may have been defensive and confused about 
events.  I included the submission from the NZAF that clearly shows the 
allegations by Potter’s House were incorrect.  After discussions with others, I 
wrote to Senior Sergeant Ken McLeod of the Wellington Police regarding this 
issue (10 May 1996, LAGANZ, Bennachie Collection).  Discussions with 
McLeod indicated the Police had doubts about the veracity of the bomb scare 
as well, particularly as they did not receive any complaint or notification about 
it at the time it happened. 
 
Unhappy with the reply from the Police regarding the complaint about Potter’s 
House interfering with the parade, GLEE, wrote to the Police Complaints 
Authority, stating that policing of the Devotion Parade was unsatisfactory due 
to interference by Potter’s House through their breach of bylaws, a police 
matter not actioned, and the response from Drew, as they took: 
… objection to the tone of his reply and in particular his assertion that the protesters 
were only exercising their right of freedom of speech  
(Pegram to Police Complaints Authority, 28 April 1996, on file, LAGANZ: 
Bennachie Collection). 
 
While Potter’s House did have the right to protest from the pavement, Pegram 
believed  
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they had no right to march at the head of the parade apparently escorted by a police 
car  
(Pegram to Police Complaints Authority, 28 April 1996, on file, LAGANZ: 
Bennachie Collection). 
 
Christchurch 
 
In mid-April 1996, Pastor Kim Robertson of Potter’s House Christian 
Fellowship, Christchurch, showed AWYHBT.  He told Yvonne Moore in a 
radio interview on NewsTalk ZB that: 
… the point of showing it, as I mentioned on CTV [Canterbury Television] last night, 
[…] is suicide prevention.  If one person doesn’t get AIDS from our effort and 
expenditure, I […] I think that it’s totally well worth the effort  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b). 
When Moore asked if they had requested anyone from the NZAF to talk to 
people and answer questions after the film, Robertson replied: 
We’ve put up 350 posters Yvonne, […] and, and we’re putting out 4000 handbills.  
We’re inviting anyone who wants to come along  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b). 
When pressed, given the film deals with the subject of AIDS, and that 
Robertson had already admitted that some of it was dated, and specifically 
asked if he had invited someone from the NZAF to speak to the congregation, 
Robertson replied: 
No, I don’t, I don’t believe […] especially after viewing this video, the video speaks 
for itself, I don’t go along with some of the statistics that the AIDS Foundation is 
quoting.  For example, […], in, in, […] one, ah recent quote they made us, 79% of 
AIDS victims are heterosexual.  Well, that may be on a world wide scale, but are we 
talking third world or first world?  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b). 
 
Dan Knowles, of the NZAF’s Christchurch office, had been invited by Moore 
to take part, said that the figure was worldwide, and pointed out that: 
… contracting HIV, and being diagnosed with AIDS has got nothing to do with what 
people are.  It’s to do with what people do…  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b). 
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Robertson then tried to claim that a billion people would have AIDS by 2010, 
quoting Dr William Haseltine, who he claimed was from the French Academy 
of Sciences.   
 
I could not find original speech on the Internet, and it does not show up on a 
search of the French Academy of Sciences web page (http://www.academie-
sciences.fr/). 
 
Nevertheless, WHO and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS), provide statistics that indicate Haseltine overestimated, with 
approximately 33.2 million worldwide infected with HIV by mid 2007 
(UNAIDS/WHO, 2007:2). 
 
However, when challenged about his church, and asked if it is a mainstream 
church, Robertson replied: 
Well, it’s a fairly well recognised church in Australia, it’s, it’s a world, […] it’s an 
international um, […] fellowship of churches.  We have a number of, […] of, of 
churches in the fellowship, […] I think up near a thousand now around the world.  It’s 
very fundamental and, […] we are extreme.  We do believe the truth.  The truth is 
fundamental after all, and ah, we’re a […] we’re a church of concerned Christians.  
There […] you know there are a lot of concerned Christians out there.  We’re just 
one church of a lot of churches.  Our theology us in line biblically, is […] is straight 
down the bible.  If it’s in the Bible, I’m willing to talk it, if it’s not in the Bible, I’m not 
interested  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b, emphasis added to text to indicate emphasis in 
voice). 
 
Their ‘truth’ appears to be removed from fact, and they prefer to show fictional 
distortions.  It does not surprise me that many Christian groups who label 
themselves “fundamental” and hold anti-gay views seem to completely ignore 
the strictures of the Bible they claim to obey, forgetting the Ninth of the Ten 
Commandments:  
Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness  
(Exodus 20: 14, Collins, 1958).   
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Sadly, because they seem to be told what to say, what to think, what to read 
and what to do by others, they seem to be unable to discern the truth or accept 
facts as being real when they are presented to them because those facts 
contradict what they have been told to believe.   
 
When Knowles pointed out what the video claims – that it promotes a fear that 
HIV may become airborne or transmitted through insect bites – Robertson 
tried to claim that Knowles was “making statements that are not true”.  Yet the 
video does make these claims, and these methods of transmission are 
discussed, despite them not being possible.  Moore comments that the video 
therefore appears to be  
completely irresponsible in its portrayal of AIDS  
and that Pastor Robertson is 
going to misinform the public and this is a dangerous thing  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b). 
 
In reply, Robertson says: 
I […] I totally agree.  I one hundred per cent agree about misinformation.  As we’re 
awa, […] aware, when AIDS broke out there was a lot of misinformation.  But I would 
like to reinforce, that I have, […] I can get hold of more up to date information, 
probably as up to date as what Dan can.  There’s no problem with up to date 
information  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b). 
Yet when asked if he would continue to show an outdated film filled with 
misinformation, he replied: 
Of course I’m going to show the film.  People need to see, […] the truth never dates 
Yvonne.  The truth, the truth is relevant.  People can see the truth in the movie.  I’m, 
[…] I’m not saying there’s stuff in the movie that’s not relevant today  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b, emphasis added to indicate emphasis in voice). 
Even when Moore told him that airborne transmission, and other methods of 
transmission were ‘old myths’, and trying to pass them off as being accurate is 
‘just nonsensical’ and ‘absolutely wrong’, Robertson claimed: 
Well, all I can say Yvonne, is that the video speaks for itself.  I’m a pastor presenting 
a video.  We have lots of different presentation of different issues.  I’m not a health 
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expert, I’m a pastor of a church.  I’m pastor for five years now.  I think I understand 
the bible fairly well.  I present the truth of the bible, that’s my interest  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b, emphasis added to indicate emphasis in voice). 
 
Moore then asked Robertson: 
Can I just put one final question to you pastor Robertson?  We’ve heard from Dan, 
we’ve heard his concerns.  Would you be prepared to have a spokesperson from the 
AIDS Foundation there at the meeting after the showing, talking about the movie, 
and facts and fallacies? 
 (NewsTalk ZB, 1996b). 
Robertson replied with  
Absolutely not!  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996b, emphasis added to indicate emphasis in voice).  
 
On the Monday after the video was shown, 22 April 1996, John Dunne spoke 
to Kathleen Smitheram, also of NewsTalk ZB, who had been to see the video.  
Dunne asked Smitheram for her impression.  She said: 
I think, probably, the pastor is quite right, he had up to date information from the, 
the, um, centre in Otago, epidemiology centre in Otago, but I think it’s a selective 
truth that he’s dealing in here.  The movie, AIDS: What you haven’t been told, very 
cleverly put together video, plays on the fears and emotions of people.  It, um, it’s 
sanctimonious and insidious drivel quite frankly Johnny  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996a, emphasis added to indicate emphasis in voice). 
 
When asked if the movie was outdated, and agreeing that it was, Smitheram 
also mentioned that she did not think it was a video about AIDS, to which 
Dunne asked if it was homophobic in its presentation.  Smitheram replied with: 
It’s very homophobic.  I thought I was going to find out something that I didn’t know, 
you know, when I listened to the publicity on the Friday and thought, ‘I’ll go and 
have a look’.  But, it, probably for the first fifteen minutes deals with very basic facts 
about AIDS, then it slides, very cleverly and subtly, into this anti-homosexual feeling 
and fervour.  Um, they have this whole section on sado-masochism, which, which 
leads you to believe that’s all any of them ever do; um, it talks very subtly about the 
cost health wise in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, it will cost to keep these 
people alive, you know, over a year, I think one chap quoted a figure of $100,000.  
Um, then it goes on to homosexuals and children.  They show this wonderful shot of, 
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of, like a father with a, a three year old toddler on his shoulders and say 
‘homosexuals and children’.  Well, you’ve got no idea whether the man’s a 
homosexual or just a father down at the beach with his child  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996a, emphasis added to indicate emphasis in voice). 
 
Later Smitheram continued saying she felt the video was  
very anti-homosexual  
(NewsTalk ZB, 1996a, emphasis added to indicate emphasis in voice). 
 
Others attending the video showing noted the presence of children who 
appeared as young as twelve, (discussions with Dan Knowles, NZAF; and 
Chris Arneson of Christchurch).  Chris Arneson, writing in June, also told the 
OFLC what it was like to sit through a video presentation as a PLWHA, 
acquired from an infected blood transfusion in sub-Sahara Africa in the early 
1980s.  He pointed out the presence of people under 16 at the showing, and 
how the misinformation in the video deliberately incites discrimination against 
people who, like him, are living with HIV and/or AIDS.  Arneson discussed 
how disturbed he was that the video had not been classified, yet had been 
before the Office for over a year.  He sought to have the video banned 
immediately, due to the misinformation it contains and the myths it perpetuates 
as: 
The film does us great harm (and your bureaucratic dragging of feet compounds that 
harm) 
(Arneson to OFLC, 16 June 1996, emphasis in original, LAGANZ: Bennachie 
Collection). 
 
At around the same time, I began to receive threatening calls on the telephone.  
They left messages on the answer machine abusing me, and informing me I 
was “doomed to hell”.  I took the tape to the police, spoke with Senior 
Sergeant Ken McLeod, and discussed with him other issues in relation to 
Potter’s House and the videos.  He asked me to put these in writing, and 
supported an application to go onto the Unpublished Electoral Roll.  I 
delivered the letter on 10 May, the last abusive call was received on the 12th of 
May, I made the application to the Electoral Office on the 13th May, when 
McLeod rang and asked if the calls had stopped as they had spoken to 
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members of the church on the Sunday.  A week later, I let him know that I had 
received no calls since the 12th. 
 
Hamilton 
 
On 13 July 1996, Potter’s House showed the video GR/SR at their church in 
Hamilton, organised by Pastor Watson.  The events were covered in The New 
Zealand Herald (1996: 3), with two sentence article in a side bar: 
Gays fight screening 
Christians fought in Hamilton last night with gays trying to disrupt the screening of 
an anti-homosexuality film at the Potter’s House Christian Centre in London St.  The 
police were called and the gays left. 
 
In speaking with Hayden Fowler from NZAF in Hamilton on 16 July, he stated 
there had been a fight at the showing of the video.  While the protesters had 
attempted a peaceful protest, members from Potter’s House had become very 
abusive, and eventually violent.  Watson had made claims that all gay men are 
paedophiles, and “deserve to be dealt with” immediately before members of 
Potter’s House became violent.  The video also claims gay men are 
paedophiles and are “after the children”. 
 
An article appeared in the Waikato Times (1996: 3), stating: 
The US film claims to expose the ‘homosexual agenda’.  A flyer promoting the film 
says homosexuality is ‘targeting our youth.  The Gay Lesbian agenda wants your 
child’s mind and body!’  Pastor Watson, who says public interest in the film is high, 
accuses gay and lesbian people of ‘seducing the nation that theirs is a normal and 
innocent expression of human life’. 
 
Fowler recounted that on 19th of July, Watson claimed in a radio interview 
about the showing of the video that “two burly men” had approached his 
fourteen year old son the previous night and told him they would burn down 
the church or their home if his father showed the film again.  Fowler stated that 
the description given did not match any of the people present at the protest.  
The feeling was that this was a publicity stunt.  On the evening of the 19th, the 
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following flyer was distributed in Victoria St, the main shopping area of 
Hamilton: 
 
Illustration 4: Hamilton Pamphlet 
 
At that showing, 75 protesters showed up, along with television crews, and 
other media.  Some of the protesters formed a picket line, explaining how the 
contents harmed gays and lesbians, were offensive, and the video contained so 
much misinformation as to be totally untrue.  Some people did not cross the 
picket line, although members of Potter’s House did.  There was no disruption 
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inside, but the ushers provided by the church, patrolled the aisles like security 
guards.  Watson held a “question time” after the video had been shown, and 
offered the microphone to others – but only to members of his church – and all 
attempts by protesters to say anything were ridiculed, with comments about 
what they supposedly did sexually. 
 
It was therefore difficult for the protesters to get factual information out.  One 
person managed to provide information about the incidence of child sexual 
abuse that found no links between homosexual orientation and paedophilia, 
noting that it is not the sex of the victim that attracts the offender, but the youth 
of the victim, and that 21% of offenders came from a Christian fundamentalist 
background (Finkelhor, Williams, & Burns, 1988).  This “flustered” Watson, 
who then made the claim that either 64% or 68% of serial murderers are 
homosexual.  Due to the outrageous nature of this comment, several people, 
not just protesters, laughed at him, and the meeting broke up. 
 
A series of articles and letters to the editor appeared in the Waikato Times over 
the next few days, indicating a polarisation of opinion.  The gay newspaper, 
express, covered some of the debate (1996, pp1, 3): 
Gay Danger: We're molesters, murderers and creators of mayhem 
Two controversial anti-gay videos will screen in cities from Dunedin to Whangarei 
thanks to die country's 15 pentecostal Potter's House congregations. 
 
Screenings by the church in Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton have already 
prompted gay and lesbian protests. Now Hamilton Pastor Richard Watson says 
people in other centres where his organisation has churches will get an opportunity 
to view the American videos, Gay Rights Special Rights and AIDS — What You 
Haven’t Been Told. 
 
In Hamilton, the most recent scene of protest, the church has twice shown Gay 
Rights Special Rights. As express went to press last week, the pastor said he is likely 
to show the other video within a month, ‘perhaps this weekend. I was just waiting 
on what God wants me to do.’ Church members have promoted the screenings by 
handing out flyers in Hamilton's main street. Watson says the public has a right to 
know about ‘the homosexual agenda and their push to change the laws in schools 
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and in government.’ 
 
Asked if American talk of ‘the homosexual agenda’ is applicable here, he says it is. ‘I 
have evidence in New Zealand of exactly the same agenda.’ He cites material 
supporters have sent him — including the YWCA-produced booklet Sisters for 
teenaged girls — as an example of what he perceives as the greatest danger: 
infiltrating schools and children's minds with gay and lesbian propaganda. 
 
That such infiltration has taken place is a central claim of Gay Rights Special Rights. 
At the first Hamilton screening one gay man stood in front of the video when it 
showed children entering a park, supposedly to be preyed on by homosexuals. Other 
protesters then joined him, scuffles began and most of the group of about 35 was 
ejected. 
 
Quoting what he says is the gay ‘creed’, Watson says homosexuals believe anyone 
can have sex at any age, including children. Asked where the paper comes from, he 
names the National Committee of Gay Civil Rights. When pressed further, he says it 
was produced in America in 1984. ‘Homosexuality is targeting youth,’ he stresses. 
‘I've spoken personally to homosexuals who have come out of homosexuality. They 
said that homosexuals do go after children as part of their recruiting.... Homosexuals 
have sex with boys in a large degree.’ 
 
Watson also claims eight of the 10 worst mass murderers of all time were gay men, 
and he cites other figures relating homosexuality to murder statistics. ‘People have 
dropped off reams of information to me, just members of the public have come to 
me,’ he says of the public response to the Hamilton video screenings. ‘There's been a 
phenomenal response from around the country.’ Asked how many calls or visits he 
has had, he says: ‘it's just a continual flow really over the last week. I've had a 
continual flow of people ringing. I've had no negative feedback on the phone.’ 
 
But Watson claims his son was approached in the street by two gay men who 
threatened the pastor's life. ‘Two very muscular homosexual men came to my son. 
He said they looked like homosexual — people say you can't tell but I think you can, 
they're quite blatant these days.... They said “you're the pastor's son aren't you. Tell 
him not to show that video again or he'll go down.”’ 
 
Hamilton gays question Watson's intimidation claim. Some claim they felt in-
timidated themselves when they attended Gay Right; Special Rights screenings. Dan 
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Coomey says the Potter's House members left him feeling ‘quite threatened: they 
were ready to throw their weight around. There was no doubt about that.... Some of 
the women had their hands held behind their backs and someone was punched in 
the face.’ 
 
Says Hamilton gay man Bruce Hammington, who attended the first screening, ‘I 
didn't realise how crazy they were — however they're quite dangerous as well.’ 
 
Potter’s House in Hamilton showed AWYHBT on 31 July, which was only 
found out about afterwards.  They had not advertised it as they had the earlier 
showings of GR/SR, and it appeared that it was only church members who 
attended. 
 
It was not until 18 November 1996 that a decision was made by the Office of 
Film and Literature, making them  
objectionable except if the availability of the publication is restricted to persons who 
have attained the age of 18 years  
(OFLC, 1996a: 1; 1996b: 1).   
This was one year and nine months after the initial complaint had been laid. 
 
In this chapter, I have explained what happened during the period when the 
initial complaints were laid with the OFLC, the responses to the submissions 
made, and the events that occurred during this period.  In the next chapter, I 
examine the submissions made to the Board of Review, and the events 
occurring during that period. 
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Chapter 10: Board of Review 
 
After the OFLC had made its decision, it had to be published in the New 
Zealand Gazette as official notification of the decision by the tenth working 
day of the month following that in which the decision was made.  This duly 
happened in the issue of the Gazette published on 12 December 1996. 
 
Between the time the decision arrived in the mail and 12 December, 
discussions were being held among the HRAG membership, and other related 
groups and interested people in Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington and 
Christchurch.  The law allowed 20 working days from the notification of a 
decision for an application of review to be made.  With the Christmas and New 
Year break between 25 December and 15 January of the following year, we 
believed any application for review had to be in by 31 January 1997.  
However, a letter from the OFLC of 16 December indicated that we had until 
17 February. 
 
It was felt by many that the decision was adequate in many respects, and did, 
on the whole meet or exceed the expectations of HRAG.  Nevertheless, we 
believed that the following paragraphs in the decision on the video AWYHBT 
were not accurate: 
The discrimination in presenting homosexuals as the source and promoters of 
HIV/AIDS is framed in such a manner as to be condescending and sympathetic rather 
than hateful. The condemnation of homosexuality is not considered to present with 
such vitriol as to represent members of the homosexual community or people living 
with HIV/AIDS as being inherently inferior to other members of the public. Rather 
than to propagate fear and hatred, the obvious bias in the Fundamentalist Christian 
message is to proselytise the homosexual community and people living with 
HIV/AIDS. The discriminatory manner in which the video recording deals with 
information is considered under s3(3)(e) of the FVPC Act to be such that the general 
availability of the publication likely to cause harm to the public good because it 
propagates a morality intolerant of difference, as well as presenting a 
misinformative construct of disease contagion and safety in sexual activity. 
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The Classification Office has taken into account the views put forward in the 
submissions received from interested parties notified under sl9(a) and the response 
heard in the consultation held with the Human Rights Commission representatives 
whose expert assistance was requested under s21. The conclusion that the 
publication does not fit the definition of ‘hate literature’; as outlined in the IPT 
Decision No. 160/93 and advocated by the submitter and the representatives of the 
Human Rights Commission does not conclude that the publication is not harmful to 
the public good  
(OFLC, 1996b: 9-10). 
 
Members of HRAG, and other groups consulted, believed that AWYHBT was 
not merely condescending, but hateful, and that it was patronising of the OFLC 
to make that claim. 
 
Together with the following paragraphs in the decision on GR/SR it was felt 
the OFLC had not sufficiently taken the effects of homophobia into 
consideration, and that while the LGBT communities may be strong enough as 
a whole to withstand the onslaught of these videos, the individual lesbians, gay 
men, bisexual and transgender people who may be targeted by those who 
believed (as a result of these videos) it was acceptable to commit acts of 
violence against them, were not: 
In a similar fashion, rather than fitting the definition of 'hate literature' as used by 
the IPT, the video recording Gay Rights Special Rights Inside the Homosexual Agenda 
presents as discriminatory propaganda. Fundamentalist Christian values, moralities 
and concept of family are held up to acclaim and put on a pedestal. The 
fundamentalist position is strongly contrasted against the fight for Minority Class 
Status by lesbians, gays and bisexuals. The gay community's claims are derided with 
a clear intention to convert or preach the fundamentalist outlook to viewers. Thus 
the presentation is intolerant rather than hateful per se. 
 
... 
 
Having said that, the Classification Office recognises that New Zealand in the 1990's 
has safeguards within the Human Rights Act 1993 and the Bill of Rights Act 1990 to 
protect minority viewpoints as well as the freedom from discrimination. The 
Classification Office reiterates the IPT's assessment of the strength of the gay 
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community and believes that it is strong enough to withstand such a biased 
onslaught. (Decision No. 160/93 Ref. No IND 41/93). It is also felt that the wider 
adult community will be discerning enough to recognise the potential for injury to 
the public good in such a skewed and unbalanced presentation. However, the 
message might be misinterpreted by a less worldly younger audience. It is therefore 
considered that the discriminatory material contained within the video recording 
does require restriction to minimise the potential injury to the public good when 
making the video recording available  
(OFLC, 1996a: 4, 12). 
 
Realising any decision made by the Film and Literature Board of Review (the 
Board) may go against HRAG made the decision difficult, but not 
insurmountable.  HRAG knew that if it was left it unchallenged, the law would 
remain unclear, and the violence evident after each showing of the videos in 
Wellington, Christchurch, Nelson and Hamilton may continue.  The video 
showings in Wellington in February 1996, in Christchurch in April 1996, and 
in Hamilton in July 1996, indicated that the Christian groups in question had 
no qualms about showing the videos to people who were under the 
recommended age, and who we believed may be vulnerable.  As a result, 
HRAG decided to make application for a review of the decisions. 
 
On 17 January 1997, HRAG lodged applications for review of the two 
decisions.  In the application for review on GR/SR, HRAG noted that while the 
stance in the video was moralistic, 
It presents this so called ‘moral’ message by presenting misinformation, outright lies, 
and out of context quotes and misquotes as the truth. It also uses misrepresented 
selective statistical and scientific information and research, omits contextual 
information, and promotes a strict fundamentalist Christian religious based view-
point. 
 
The overall tone, and message, of the video, is one of open condemnation of the 
struggle for equal rights for lesbians, gay men, transgenders, and bisexuals in 
America, is contemptuous of them, degrades, dehumanises, and demeans them, 
promotes hatred against them, and represents them as being inherently inferior to 
heterosexuals and to ethnic minorities, not worthy of equal rights  
(HRAG, 1997a: 4). 
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Similarly, in the application for review of AWYHBT we noted that: 
The overall tone, and message, of the video, is one of open condemnation of the 
struggle of lesbians, gay men, transgenders, and bisexuals in America to obtain 
sufficient funding for all bodies, (heterosexual, gay, research bodies, or  public 
bodies), concerned to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic, (ignoring the lack of interest 
shown by the Regan and Bush Administrations), is contemptuous of them, degrades, 
dehumanises, and demeans them, promotes hatred against them, and represents 
them as being inherently inferior to  other groups  
(HRAG, 1997b: 5). 
 
In respect of GR/SR, citing DeLapp (1993: 2-3), we also noted that: 
It is helpful at the outset to remember that this video is built on lies, misinformation, 
and right wing rhetoric, a tactic raised to an art-form by the Christian Right, by taking 
a piece of the truth and recharacterize it to a point that it no longer resembles its 
original shape. So, while it is tempting to try to piece together the ‘facts’ offered in 
some understandable from, the reality is that the bulk of this video is based on self-
serving half-truths and outright lies. Whether it is their attempt to position 
themselves as the long-standing champions of Civil Rights (when their history has 
been one of antagonism to civil rights and association with the campaigns of George 
Wallace and David Duke [members of the KKK]) or their complete 
mischaracterization of the demands of the 1993 March on Washington for Lesbian, 
Gay and Bi Equal Rights and Liberation, they lie  
(HRAG, 1997a: 4-5). 
 
When submitting on AWYHBT we pointed out the same inaccuracies in the 
video that we had done before.  Similarly, we continued to do so in our 
submission on GR/SR.  In that video, Lou Sheldon makes the claim that gay 
men have never been denied access by law to business and restaurants.  Yet by 
citing Martin Duberman (1995), HRAG (1997b: 10) showed that  
in the State of New York, up until the end of the 1970's, it was illegal to serve 
convicted, identifiable, or self confessed homosexuals in a bar or restaurant. 
This, of course, showed more inaccuracies in the video than we had previously 
pointed out.  Again, it is a clear case of a religious leader falsifying the truth.  
Once more, it seems that people of faith are willing to disregard the 
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commandments of their own faith in order to try to deny rights to LGBT 
people. 
 
In GR/SR the definition of homosexuality is given as: 
the behaviour of active sex with members of the same sex.  
HRAG (1997b: 11-12), pointed out that  
this would be true only of homosexual sex itself.  One may be homosexual and 
display homosexual behaviour, yet remain celibate. Homosexuality is more properly 
defined as being sexually attracted to a person of the same sex, whither one acts on 
that attraction or not.  
 
Also in GR/SR the claim is made that  
male homosexuals in Britain are eighteen times more likely to break the age of 
consent laws than heterosexuals  
(HRAG, 1997b: 22).  
However, as we pointed out  
it must be remembered that at the time this video was made, the age of consent for 
homosexual sex in Britain was 21, and for heterosexuals was, and still is, 16. This 
meant that a young man who, on his twenty first birthday had sex with another 
young man four days younger than himself, was in effect breaking the law, and 
committing paedophilia. Similarly, two eighteen year old young men who went to 
bed with each other were also breaking the law, and therefore committing 
paedophilia. No mention is made in the film that the age of consent in Britain at the 
time was 21. The viewer is left to assume that the age of consent for homosexual sex 
was the same as that for heterosexual sex, or the same as in their own State or 
Country. This is again misleading, and is doubly so because of the [then recently 
made] change in the age of consent in Britain to 18  
(HRAG, 1997b: 22).   
 
In both videos, claims are made trying to link gay men with paedophilia, with 
Cathy Kay, in GR/SR, particularly trying to make this link.  HRAG pointed out 
the fallacy of this claim.  Furthermore, during the Human Rights debates of 
1993, members of HRAG had gone through the major newspapers – The New 
Zealand Herald, The Dominion, The Evening Post, the Christchurch Press, 
The Otago Daily Times, as well as the smaller regional newspapers between 1 
June 1992 and 15 July 1993, and had found 105 people convicted of sexually 
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abusing children.  Of that, only two were identified as gay or bisexual men, of 
which one was also “mentally deficient”, and two were women.  Of the 
remaining 101 convicted, there were two Pentecostal Pastors, one Anglican 
priest, one Catholic priest, and two leaders of Christian Communities, giving a 
total of six people who were religious leaders.  The remaining offenders were 
related to the children abused in some way – predominantly father or 
grandfather – but also some uncles or step-fathers, and all were identified as 
being married (HRAG, 1997a: 31; 1997b: 23). 
 
It would therefore appear that religious leaders are “three times” more likely 
than self identified gay and bisexual men to sexually abuse children.  There 
are, of course, numerous qualifiers that would have to be made about the 
limitation of that claim: that it only consists of reports that made it to the 
newspapers, that newspapers don’t report on the heterosexuality of the 
offender but do report on the homosexuality or bisexuality of the offender 
(Personal communication with Tony Hughes, research director, NZAF, 
November 1996), etc.  These limitations also exist for the claims made by the 
videos, which are either anecdotal or based on material sourced from Paul 
Cameron.  Nevertheless, the videos do not state any limitations on the studies 
they use, but state it as fact.  Nevertheless, citing Deborah Coddington (1996), 
we pointed out that  
in New Zealand ... children are in much more danger from their parents and their 
priests, pastors and ministers, than from homosexuals  
(HRAG, 1997a: 31-32; 1997b: 23).   
Ironically, the leader of the CHP, which had attempted to link gay men with 
the seduction of youth and children in its submission on the HRB in 1993 
(1993: 8), was later convicted of the sexual abuse of children, with offences 
going back as far as January 1990 and extending to February 1999 (Queen v 
Capill, Christchurch District Court, 14 July 2005). 
 
We also showed that where these videos had been shown around the country  
increased feelings of animosity, hatred, and vilification of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, 
and transgenders. This violence engendered by the showing of this video could be 
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said to meet the grounds covered under s3(3)(d) of the FVPC Act as it has been used 
to promote or encourage criminal acts, either intentionally or unintentionally  
(HRAG, 1997a: 39-40; 1997b: 28). 
 
Nevertheless, as suspected in November when we received the decision from 
the OFLC, and as several of those consulted in December 1996 suggested, 
Potters House Christian Fellowship did show GR/SR again.  On 8 March 1997, 
they started handing out the following pamphlet in Manners Mall, Wellington: 
 
Illustration 5: Third Wellington pamphlet 
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The pamphlet identifies the film as being R16, when it had been made R18 
following the decision publicised in the New Zealand Gazette, and reported in 
the Dominion, the Evening Post, and other newspapers.  The Dominion (1996: 
3) reported it under the headline “Film office restricts church videos”.  As a 
result of this, we presented the following statement, written by myself, as a 
supplementary submission from HRAG: 
On the 8th of March 1997, Potters House Christian Fellowship began handing out 
pamphlets regarding the video ‘Gay Rights/Special Rights: inside The Homosexual 
Agenda’ in Manners Mall, Wellington around 11.30 am. 
 
Around 12 noon they congregated outside the Chaffers Park side of Wellington City 
New World, and were warned by the Police regarding breaching the Wellington City 
by—laws by marching illegally in front of the Devotion Parade, as they had in 1995. 
 
They did, however, use a loud hailer and a sound amplifying system without 
permission from the Wellington City Council, thereby breaking some by-laws. The 
Police did not take any action in regard to this at the time. 
 
While using the loud hailer, Pastor Dodunski and others quoted parts of ‘Gay 
Rights/Special Rights: Inside The Homosexual Agenda’, making links between 
homosexuality and paedophilia. He was accusing all gay men of being paedophiles 
because ‘they want your children’, a line taken out of that video. This was 
defamatory and an all out attack of vilification and hatred against the lesbian and 
gay communities. 
 
This was further exacerbated by other people claiming to be ‘Christian’ who 
organised the printing of plain white T-shirts with the word ‘FAG’ on the upper left 
breast within the ‘banned’ symbol of a red circle and diagonal line. There was also 
writing on the right sleeve of the shirt, but I have been unable to make it out. These 
people also threw eggs at various floats. Some of those eggs hit people who were 
visiting Wellington specifically for Devotion, some hit young children who were with 
their mothers in the parade. Whether they were part of Potters House Christian 
Fellowship or not, I do not know, but their actions would fit in with the description of 
Potters House as ‘the guerrilla army of Christianity’ by their Hamilton Pastor, Richard 
Watson. It is believed that the T-shirts were printed by Muzzy Shirts in Petone. [This 
confirmed 14/4/97] 
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During the course of the Devotion Parade, members of Potters House Christian 
Fellowship handed out further copies of the pamphlet they had prepared in relation 
to the showing of Gay Rights/Special Rights: Inside the homosexual agenda to 
members of the public, some of whom were under 16 years of age. 
 
The pamphlet stated that the video was being shown free at 7.00pm that evening at 
the Thistle Hall in Cuba Street. The pamphlet further stated, incorrectly, that the 
video was rated ‘R16’ and that identification would be required. A copy of the 
pamphlet is attached. 
 
This latest pamphlet implies, by the use of the lines ‘Homosexuality is targeting our 
youth’ and ‘The Gay Lesbian agenda wants your childs [sic] mind and body’, that all 
gay men are paedophiles. These remarks are not only distasteful, defamatory, and 
personally offensive, but they degrade, demean and dehumanise gay men and 
lesbians. It is also suppositional, misrepresentative, and emotive. We believe that 
the pamphlets that have been used to advertise this video, and AIDS: What You 
Haven't Been Told, must also be taken into account along with the classification of 
the videos under sections 27(4) or 27(5) of the Act. 
 
I attended the showing of the video, and saw no indication or signage of any type 
indicating the classification of the video as either the old classification of ‘R16’ or its 
new classification of ‘R18’. There were several people present who appeared to be 
under the age of 18, including one who had admitted to me earlier in the day that 
she was only 17. 
 
At the end of the showing there was no opportunity given to rebut the false claims 
of the video, as one member stood up and started preaching while Pastor Karl 
Dodunski plugged in a guitar. The person preaching admitted that they were aware 
that the video had been reclassified by saying ‘This video has been rated R18, R16 or 
whatever, by the Classification Office. We don't care as we believe that this video 
should be seen by all people’ or words to that effect. Therefore they were aware of 
the higher classification, but wilfully chose to ignore it to further their own ends. 
 
During the preaching afterwards they made links to the increasing murders and mass 
murders in New Zealand to the prevalence of homosexual acts, and in particular to 
the passage of the Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986, which they state is the cause 
of the moral breakdown in society  
(HRAG, 1997c: 1-4, emphasis added). 
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Shortly afterwards, Colin Byford of the Traditional Values Coalition (New 
Zealand) sold a copy of GR/SR to a person who was 17 at the time.  The copy 
of the video did not have a classification label – either the old R16 or the 
newer R18 – and the young person was not asked their age.  As well as the 
complaint to the Board, a statement from the person who bought the copy of 
the video and a statement from me regarding the people who had thrown eggs 
at the Devotion Parade on 8 March, were given to the investigations section of 
the Censorship division at Internal Affairs (14 April 1997), and to the police 
(12 April 1997), for their action (on file, LAGANZ: Bennachie collection). 
 
On 22 April, Jon Peacock, Inspector of Publication at Internal Affairs replied, 
stating they had been in contact with the group who had shown the video, and 
that they had claimed  
they were unaware of the amended classification.   
Yet I, and others, had clearly heard Dodunski, when preaching, preaching 
stating  
This video has been rated R18, R16 or whatever, by the Classification Office. We 
don't care as we believe that this video should be seen by all people.   
As a result of the claims of Potters House, Peacock had  
advised the individuals concerned verbally and issued an official warning detailing 
the offences committed  
(personal communication, 22 April 1997). 
 
The complaint to the police was acknowledged on 17 April 1997 by Detective 
Inspector Brett Kane, who claimed that complaints in respect to bylaws were 
to be placed before Council (personal communication, 17 April 1997).  Yet the 
Council had assured us in 1996 that the Police dealt with the enforcement of 
bylaws, and complaints were to be made to the police (letter, Wellington City 
Council to Pegram, 29 April, 1996, on file, LAGANZ: Bennachie Collection).  
As a result, Kane closed the investigation, prompting a telephone call, (during 
which Kane denied eggs had been thrown at people in the parade), and a letter 
(22 April 1997).  It was pointed out he had adequate information to enable him 
to find the people who threw the eggs, and who wilfully breached the bylaws.  
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A copy of the letter was also sent to the Minister of Police, the New Zealand 
First MP Jack Elder, who in turn referred it to the Police Commissioner 
(Personal communication, 29 April 1997). 
 
In his reply of 1 May, Kane tried to claim that he had told me  
if any individual wished to make a complaint concerning violence against themselves 
and the offender for that specific incident was known or could be identified, then 
the police would investigate that specific complaint.  I have, since your initial 
correspondence was received, sought a report from the acting sergeant policing the 
parade and I am satisfied that every effort was made to apprehend the ‘egg 
throwers’ on the day, but that was not successful despite the fact that police officers 
pursued these people  
(Personal communication, 1 May 1997).   
 
In reply, I stated: 
You implied that throwing eggs at people with the intention of hitting them was not 
a serious offence, and was not assault, yet there are other cases where people have 
thrown eggs at people with the intention of hitting them and have been prosecuted.  
You also informed me that the people concerned would have to lay the complaints 
themselves, and that therefore you could not act without them or witnesses. 
 
I have attempted to get the people concerned to lay complaints with the police, and 
this attempt is still ongoing.  As I have said, because the police are not attempting to 
investigate hate crimes against gays and lesbians in the past, there is a very strong 
feeling within our communities of a lack of confidence in, and respect of, the Police 
to handle any complaint laid by gays and lesbians when hate crimes such as this 
occur.  Your lack of action in this respect confirms this feeling. 
 
As I said, I was asked by the person at the watch-house to supply the names and 
addresses of some of the people hit by the eggs thrown by those people wearing the 
t-shirts identified in the statement.  I was told the investigation unit in charge of this 
would then get in contact with the people whose names I supplied and get 
statements off them.  I have, as requested, supplied these names  
(Personal communication 2 May 1997). 
 
I also pointed out I was a witness, able to identify some of the people who 
threw eggs, particularly the one in the photograph supplied to the police.  I 
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made it clear the police would be able to get the necessary information about 
them by contacting Muzzy T-Shirts, who printed their t-shirts.  It was apparent 
to me, and I made it clear to Kane, that his inaction and lack of will to make 
even a phone call confirmed to many in the LGBT communities  
that it is not worth complaining about hate crimes against our communities as the 
police will do nothing about it  
(Personal communication, 2 May 1997). 
 
Copies of that letter again went to the Minister of Police, with requests that he 
answer the questions posed in the initial letter to him.  I again pointed out to 
him that during the Royal Visit of November 1995, the person who threw an 
egg at the queen had been arrested, charged, and convicted of assault, and that 
everyone, from the Monarch down, deserved the same level of protection 
(Personal communication, 2 May 1997).  Copies of these also went to George 
Hawkins, the Labour Party spokesperson for the Police, to Tim Barnett, 
Labour Party MP for Christchurch Central, and to Richard Prebble, ACT MP 
for Wellington Central. 
 
On 6 May 1997, I accompanied Adam Whitmarch and Neil Anderson to the 
police station to lay complaints.  The complaints were taken by Constable 
Catherine Campbell who interviewed Whitmarch in my presence, and 
Constable John Burton, who interviewed Anderson.  Although Burton took 
everything down accurately, Campbell omitted the part that when the eggs 
were being thrown from near the north east of the Willis St/Mercer St 
intersection, a police officer was in front of the person throwing the eggs, 
facing him, motioning him backwards.  The officer did not give chase or try to 
stop the person throwing eggs. 
 
As a result of the letters to Barnett and Hawkins, Annette King, Labour MP for 
Rongotai, then the only Labour Party MP based in Wellington city, asked 
written questions of the Minister of police, replies to which were received on 
15 May 1997: 
8810 Hon Annette King to the Minister of Police: 
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Was the person who threw an egg at the Prime Minister in Henderson on 18 
April 1997 arrested; if so, how long after the incident was he arrested, and what 
was he arrested for? 
 
Hon Jack Elder (Minister of Police) replies: 
A person was arrested for throwing an egg which struck a person (not the Prime 
Minister) at the opening of the West City Plaza on 18 April 1997.  He was 
arrested immediately after the incident and charged with disorderly behaviour 
and assault. 
 
8811 Hon Annette King to the Minister of Police: 
Where the people who threw eggs at the adults and children and who 
participated in Wellington’s Devotion Parade on 8 March 1997 arrested; if not, 
why not? 
 
8812 Hon Annette King to the Minister of Police: 
How many complaints have police received about people throwing eggs at 
adults and children participating in the Wellington’s [sic] 1997 Devotion Parade, 
and what action has been taken as a result? 
 
8814 Hon Annette King to the Minister of Police: 
Were the people who threw eggs at the adults and children who participated in 
Wellington’s 1996 Devotion parade arrested; if not, why not?  
 
Hon Jack Elder (Minister of Police) replied: 
I am advised that no arrests were made.  A general complaint was made to the 
police about how the parade was policed, and complaints from two persons 
alleging they had been struck by eggs.  The complaints about being struck with 
eggs were not received until 6 May – some two months after the event. 
 
Thousands of people watched the parade and, in some places, the crowd was 
8/10 deep.  There are no suspects and no real avenue of inquiry, given the size 
of the crowd watching the parade and the delay in the complaints being 
received. 
 
The incidents complained of were not witnessed by the Police, who did, 
however, see a group of punk rockers throw eggs and fruit at Christian Coalition 
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members [sic] who were peacefully protesting.  The punk rockers disappeared 
quickly into the crowd before they could be apprehended by the police. 
 
The reply to this question [8811] also applies to questions for written answer 
Nos 8812, 8814 and 8815. 
 
8813 Hon Annette King to the Minister of Police: 
How many police officers were on duty at Wellington’s 1997 Devotion Parade, 
where were they positioned during and after the parade, and what action, if 
any, did they take against people who were throwing eggs at adults and children 
participating in the parade? 
 
8816 Hon Annette King to the Minister of Police: 
How many police officers were on duty at Wellington’s 1996 Devotion Parade, 
where were they positioned during and after the parade, and what action, if 
any, did they take against people who were throwing eggs at adults and children 
participating in the parade? 
 
Hon Jack Elder (Minister of Police) replied: 
I am advised there were 13 police officers on duty.  These consisted of a parade 
control group of six officers who were responsible for crowd control.  Four 
officers walked alongside the parade on foot and two officers followed at the 
rear of the parade in a police van.  The traffic control group consisted of seven 
officers and these were responsible for controlling vehicle and pedestrian traffic 
at intersections. 
 
No action was taken because the police were unaware of the alleged incidents.  
This parade was watched by a crowd of thousands, some of whom were 8/10 
deep.  The parade generally passed without incident and was well handled by 
the police. 
 
The reply to this question [8813] also applies to questions for written answer No 
8816  
(Hansard, 1997: 5-6).  
 
The Minster omitted answering the questions relating to 1996, instead treating 
them as if they were for 1997, and sought to detract attention by claiming 
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another group was throwing eggs, and there was insufficient evidence to prove 
eggs were thrown, despite the photographs and video given to the police, and 
their lack of desire to take a statement from someone who, although witnessing 
the events, was not one of the victims.  Nevertheless, it did put the police on 
notice that their actions, or lack of actions, were being observed. 
 
During 1997 there were several instances of anti-gay violence throughout 
Wellington.  Few of these were reported to the police, and at least one person 
identified the people who assaulted him in mid June 1997 as members of a 
group of Christians who were preaching in Manners Mall.  However, as the 
police had done nothing when he had been severely assaulted in April 1996, 
and he knew the police were taking no action over the identified person who 
had thrown eggs at the Devotion Parade, he would not report the case to the 
police as 
they won’t do anything, they don’t even care  
(Personal communication, 28 June 1997).   
One gay venue close to the Manners Mall/Cuba Mall area of Wellington hired 
a doorman to provide security on Saturday nights, noting there had been six 
people in four weeks who had been assaulted because they were, or were 
suspected to be, gay.  Only the heterosexual man who was suspected to be gay 
as he was seen by his attackers leaving a gay bar laid charges against his 
attackers (Personal communications with Daniel Fielding, 9 December 1997; 
Bennie, 1997). 
 
It was not until 1 April 1998 that the egg thrower was convicted, and fined 
$500 plus court costs of $130 (R v Smith, Wellington District Court [1998]). 
 
While the problem with the police continued, the Board sat on 22 May 1997 to 
discuss the review of the videos.  After lodging the application for review, 
HRAG had been in contact with LGBT groups around the country, asking if 
they had received any reports of increased violence at the times the videos 
were shown in their centres.  Although we had telephone records, and accounts 
of discussions indicating there was an increase in violence against LGBT 
people when the videos were shown, we only had documentation of nine cases 
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in writing – seven of which were in Wellington – and one each in Nelson and 
Christchurch.  The Aotearoa Anti-Violence Project (AAVP) responded by 
stating that they had received six calls from people in February and March 
1997 following showings of the video GR/SR in Wellington and Manukau.  
Until then, we had been unaware the video had been shown in the Auckland 
area.  The AAVP reported the incidents had included comments such as 
“vicious AIDS spreader”, “murdering faggot”, and “hang the disease carriers”, 
etc.  They also reported they had received  
a number of comments from queer people within my community that they fear for 
their jobs and their credibility as they are aware workmates or family members saw 
or were told about the video and its message  
(Personal communication, Aotearoa Anti-Violence Project, 7 May 1997; 
personal communication, Amy Ross, 7 May 1997). 
 
At the hearing, Julian Batchelor, of Open Air Campaigners, claimed he had 
only been told about the R18 rating that morning, and was surprised about that.  
He felt the movie was balanced, true and accurate, and was a good resource to 
show to youth, having shown it to 10, 11 and 12 year olds.  Batchelor claimed 
he was concerned about truth and righteousness, and that young people should 
be shown the truth.  Karl Dodunski, appearing for Potters House, claimed they 
had ex-homosexuals in his church, and that he has no vendetta against gay 
people, being very friendly with the “lesbian lady at the Newtown Community 
Centre”.  Yet the person Dodunski claimed was still part of his church had 
spoken to me a week before the hearing, stating Dodunski had told him to 
leave in November 1996 after he admitted to still having sex with men.  He 
had since rejoined Icebreakers, a group for LGBT and questioning youth.  
Furthermore, both lesbians involved with the Newtown Community Centre at 
that time had told me they did not like Dodunski, merely tolerated him. 
 
Dodunski tried to back up his claims with biblical quotes, ignoring differing 
translations of those passages.  He claimed he was there to propagate truth, the 
videos showed the truth, and that factual material should not be banned.  When 
asked if non-factual material should be banned, he hesitated before replying 
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that “such material should not be banned either”.  He claimed he had a right to 
show these videos based on his religious beliefs. 
 
Although written submissions were made by those who supported the use of 
the videos, I was unable to obtain a copy for HRAG. 
 
Parkinson covered his experience with material before the IPT when he laid his 
earlier complaint (IPT 160/93).  He also covered the effects on Chinese 
immigrants of hate literature targeting them in the 1880s in New Zealand, and 
demonstrated how this had negative effects on their lives: the imposition of a 
poll tax, preventing the immigration of their wives, or of any Chinese women, 
and the second class treatment they received, encouraged by statements from 
politicians (Parkinson, 1997). 
 
Negative comments from politicians and others in authority towards Chinese 
immigrants resulted in the actions of Lionel Terry.  As Parkinson (1997: 12), 
recounts:  
The well known outcome of anti-Chinese prejudice was the action of Lionel Terry. In 
the preface to his inflammatory poem ‘The Shadow’ he argued that ‘the labouring 
classes constituting the British Empire must be composed wholly of British, or at 
least of white people’ because ‘the natural hatred existing between the various races 
of the world can never be eradicated by civilisation or any other means without the 
sacrifice of racial purity’; that ‘the morals, methods of living, religious beliefs and 
general customs of the black and coloured races are totally strange, and in many 
cases revolting, to the white race, and therefore alien immigration into British 
Possessions has a tendency to produce degenerate habits and to lower the moral 
standard amongst their white inhabitants’ and ‘that by the importation of alien races 
into the British Empire their diseases are also imported and leprosy, bubonic plague 
and cholera are a few of the terrible scourges that have been spread in many parts 
of the Empire in consequence thereof.’ He concludes ‘Nature has distinctly 
demonstrated that the strength of any race, whether white, black or yellow, 
depends upon its purity. The violation of the laws of Nature means death.’ 
 
This lead Terry to believe it was acceptable to murder Chinese immigrants and 
in September 1880 wrote to Governor Plunkett announcing: 
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Having spent several years in various portions of the British Empire enquiring into 
the subject of the results arising from alien immigration, and being convinced of the 
evil consequences arising therefrom, I have decided to bring the matter before the 
public eye in a manner which will compel the attention it demands. I will not under 
any consideration whatever allow my rights and those of my brother Britons to be 
jeopardised by alien invaders; and to make this decision perfectly plain, I have this 
evening (Sunday) put a Chinaman to death in the Chinese quarter of this city, known 
as Haining street. I remain, Lionel Terry, British subject  
(cited in Parkinson, 1997: 13). 
 
Parkinson (1997: 12) notes: 
Terry put his plan into action by shooting an aged Chinese to death. In this instance 
hate literature injured not only the well-being of the Chinese as a group but had fatal 
consequences for one chosen because he looked old and decrepit i.e. an easy victim. 
 
In referring to the “Big Lie” technique, propaganda distorting the truth so 
much that no person would believe it could possibly be invented, Parkinson 
(1997: 16) notes: 
The well known technique of the big lie has been taken to new lengths with the 
video industry, as exemplified by Gay Rights Special Rights, The Gay Agenda, AIDS: 
what you haven’t been told and the hilariously silly religious documentaries for the 
gullible, (usually narrated by Charlton Heston), about the search for Noah’s Ark, 
Volcanoes etc, all playing on images of the Last Days. Most of these are so self 
evidently fraudulent to any adult with half a brain that reasonable people will 
dismiss them out of hand. Unfortunately the viewers of TV3 seem to enjoy it. When 
you see the trailers to Gay Rights Special Rights you see the character of the work of 
Jeremiah Films and it is tempting to believe that this rubbish is unbelievable. But 
these documentaries have a sinister side; they are not just entertainment like the X 
Files. They are there to proselytise to audiences without the wit to see them as 
fictions. 
 
In conclusion, Parkinson (1997: 17-18), stated: 
The video Gay Rights/Special Rights is not an isolated curiosity. It is the most recent 
and probably the most insidious example of a well funded and long lasting campaign 
to denigrate gay people as deviates, unhealthy, evil, perverse and corrupting, to 
deny us the equal protection of the law through antidiscrimination legislation, to 
deny our legitimacy as a minority social group with particular characteristics (i.e. a 
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homosexual orientation – something which they deny even exists), to obstruct our 
effort to make a level playing field for our economic and social lives, to increase 
levels of public hostility towards us, and ultimately to reimpose the criminal 
sanctions on our sexual expression which were removed in New Zealand only a 
decade ago, and which remain still in half the states of the USA, from which this 
campaign is internationally organised. 
 
The production of Gay Rights/Special Rights was by Lewis Sheldon of the Anaheim 
based California Traditional Values Coalition. Sheldon was one of three American 
antigay campaigners brought to New Zealand by the Campaign to Oppose 
Homosexual Law Reform in 1985 at which time he distributed gratis copies of an 
antigay tabloid Midnight Alarm, a copy of which can be supplied as an exhibit if 
required. 
 
It is significant, as we examine hate literature, how much it draws out fears for public 
health and well-being by presenting images of contagion, of uncleanness and of 
moral corruption – traditional public health concerns – which are also the images by 
which minority cultures are traditionally stigmatised, as pointed out above with 
reference to the Chinese in New Zealand. Hate literature increasingly uses the 
terminology of public health to undermine the promotion of public health, and that 
is why the availability of hate literature is a public health problem that we should 
address. 
 
Submitting on behalf of HRAG, I noted that while biblical phrases may be 
acceptable to some, they are not acceptable to all.  I stated that there are several 
different translation of the bible – even in English (Collins, 1958; Bible 
Societies, 1972) – and many of these are quite different to each other, and 
when French, or German versions are also brought into consideration, then 
there are even more differences in translation, and in the number of ways 
certain phrases or words could be rendered in English.  I made it clear that 
while it may be acceptable to some to have a childlike acceptance and 
understanding of the bible, modern scholarship, based on historical 
understandings, showed vast differences between such an understanding and a 
greater, and deeper knowledge of what the bible said.  I said 
In effect, what I am saying is that is it alright to have a childlike understanding and 
acceptance of the bible, if you are a child, but not alright to express this type of 
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understanding when you are a mature adult, capable of reading more, and 
understanding deeper, than what you are taught in parrot-like fashion  
(HRAG, 1997d: 1-3). 
 
In order to put the prohibitions on homosexuality into perspective, I provided a 
chart of biblical prohibitions against certain actions (Gay Task Force, 1985: 
28).  Though not exhaustive, it allows comparisons to be made: 
 
It can therefore be seen the bible is less concerned about what some 
fundamentalist and evangelical Christians believe to be homosexuality, than it 
is about usury – lending money and charging any interest.  Yet lending money 
at interest, even low interest rates, is practiced by banks and other lending 
institutions on a daily basis in the modern world.  Similarly, there are 80 
references prohibiting adultery – ten times the number supposedly prohibiting 
homosexuality, and at Leviticus 20: 10, both parties are to suffer the same 
penalty as homosexuals are supposed to suffer at Leviticus 20: 13, condemned 
in the same way, with the same words (HRAG, 1997d: 4). 
 
I pointed out that the videos had been shown at least twice since the R18 rating 
had been placed upon them, yet people under 18 had been present during at 
least one of them.  I pointed out that if the word homosexual, or lesbian, was 
exchanged for a word relating to race or ethnicity, or even religion, the videos 
would read like right wing or white supremacist propaganda, and immediately 
be found unacceptable by all.  I indicated there were similarities in style 
between both GR/SR and AWYHBT and a film like Der Ewige Jude showing 
Activity 
Approximate number of times condemned in 
the Bible (conservative interpretations). 
Old Testament New Testament Total 
Adultery/Fornication 55 25 80 
Fornication 5 39 44 
Witchcraft/Sorcery 14 9 23 
Usury 20 0 20 
Idolatry 93 34 127 
Indifference to the poor and needy 100+ 100+ 200+ 
Supposed homosexuality 3 5 8 
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them the stills of that film from the Holocaust History website (Hørnshøj-
Moller, 1997). 
 
I noted that everywhere these videos were shown, during the week after they 
were shown, there was an increase in anti-gay violence.  The last time they had 
been shown, HRAG had received information about cases of violence in 
Hamilton (2), Auckland (6), Nelson (5), Christchurch (10), and Wellington 
(15).  By using D’Augelli and Garnets (1995), Herek and Berrill (1992) and 
Whillock and Sladen (1995), I was able to show the Board the effects of 
negative language on LGBT people.  In turn, I was able to show how this harm 
to LGBT people would be harmful as a whole to society, and thus be injurious 
to the public good (HRAG, 1997d: 7-10). 
 
Using the example of the Board’s (1997a: 11-13) decision on the Vegas Girl 
Billboard  regarding the definitions of degrading, demeaning, and 
dehumanising, and how the phrase “any person” must mean any reasonable 
person, not a particular individual, I attempted to show that LGBT people are 
reasonable people, from many areas of society and walks of life, representing 
every facet of the society of which they are part.  Being members of the greater 
society, a cross section of, and sharing the same values of, with wider society and 
found in nearly all levels of strata in that society, we believe the Board can only find 
that these groups are indeed reasonable persons  
(HRAG, 1997d: 12). 
 
In regard to issues affecting freedom of expression, I submitted that while 
proponents of the videos claimed that banning the videos would impinge on 
their freedom of expression, they were already preventing freedom of 
expression during the meetings these videos were shown.  I pointed out that 
there were several parts of each video that would classed as defamatory if said 
about one person, and questioned whether it is acceptable to defame a group of 
people in such a way as to subject them to an increase in violence.  I made the 
claim that there are therefore two considerations to be taken into account, the 
freedom of expression, or the freedom from discrimination, and the violence 
engendered by that discrimination.  I pointed out that ss61-63 and 131 HRA 
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already limited freedom of expression in New Zealand as it was not acceptable 
to defame groups of people on the basis for their race, colour, or ethnicity, and 
that it was not acceptable to sexually harass someone.  Given these precedents 
in New Zealand legislation, and the limitations on freedom of expression 
elsewhere in the world to protect people on the basis of a group identity, 
HRAG believed  
that a person’s right to live free from discrimination, harassment, and violence is 
paramount above the right to freedom of expression  
(HRAG, 1997d: 18). 
 
The Board made its decision and this was published on 19 December 1997, 
with little time to react before the Christmas break.  The decision included both 
videos in one, rather than two decisions.  In its summary, the Board (1997b: 
12-15) stated: 
... the videos argue that a homosexual orientation is responsible for the spread of 
HIV, and that sexual orientation should not be a legally prohibited ground of 
discrimination. The second opinion, one that is contained in Gay Rights/Special 
Rights Inside the Homosexual Agenda, is of course largely redundant in New Zealand 
where the rights condemned by the makers of that video are already enshrined in 
the Human Rights Act 1993. Advocacy of an opinion, no matter how offensive the 
opinion is, ought not to be the subject of censorship. These videos however go 
beyond mere advocacy of an opinion. They contain opinion based on misinformation 
of the nature described above, which is targeted by s. 3(3)(e) of the Act, and which 
by definition is of special importance to the Board in deciding whether or not the 
availability of these videos is likely to be injurious to the public good. 
 
The inclusion of s. 3(3)(e) into censorship legislation indicates that it was 
Parliament’s  intention that the representation of a group of people as inherently 
inferior could be injurious to the public good. We have found, in the words of s. 
3(3)(e) and 3(4)(a), that the dominant effect of these videos is to represent that 
those people who are living with HIV and those people of a homosexual orientation 
are inherently inferior to other members of the public by reason of those identified 
characteristics. Although the inclusion of s. 3(3)(e) indicates that such representation 
is sufficient to make the availability of a video recording likely to be injurious to the 
public good, the Board also finds that such representation creates consequential 
risks: that confidence in public health cautions could be undermined; that people 
197 
 
could be encouraged not to practise safer sex for fear of being identified as members 
of the groups portrayed as inherently inferior by the videos; and that people who do 
not identify as homosexual but who participate in risky sexual activity may not 
realise the danger to which they expose themselves. Such representation, as well, 
creates the risk that some people will develop or maintain attitudes, or will act in 
other ways, detrimental and discriminatory towards homosexuals and people living 
with HIV as a result of watching these videos. This is the reason why Parliament 
included reference to prohibited grounds of discrimination in both censorship 
legislation and the Bill of Rights Act. 
 
Such inclusion is also consistent with a significant amount of academic writing on 
whether or not to censor expression that treats people as inherently inferior or that 
incites hatred towards people by reason of characteristics they possess. The best 
exponent of such theory is probably Mari Matsuda of the University of Hawaii who 
argues in ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story’ (1989) 
87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 at 2323 that Tolerance of hate speech is not tolerance borne by the community at large. Rather, it is a psychic tax imposed on those least able to pay. 
 
She goes on to argue at 2375 that Laws against dissemination of child pornography and the law of defamation and privacy are examples of areas in which the law recognises that certain forms of expression are qualitatively different from the kind of speech deserving absolute protection. The legal imagination is able to contemplate what it feels like to hear lies spread about one's professional competency, to have one's likeness used for commercial gain without consent, or to hear unwanted obscenities on the radio.   When the legal mind understands that reputational interests, which are analogised to the preferred interest in property, must be balanced against first amendment [read s. 14 of the Bill of Rights Act in New Zealand] interests, it recognises the concrete reality of what happens to people who are defamed. Their lives are changed. Their standing in the community, their opportunities, their self—worth, their free enjoyment of life is limited. To see this, and yet to fail to see that the very same things happen to the victims of racist speech, is selective vision.  
 
The selective consideration of one victim's story and not another's results in the 
unequal application of the law.   When victims of racist speech are left to assuage 
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their own wounds, we burden a limited class: the traditional victims of 
discrimination.   The application of absolutist free speech principles to hate speech, 
then, is a choice to burden one group with a disproportionate share of the costs of 
speech promotion. 
 
It is no great stretch of a legal imagination to see that the principles underlying the 
regulation of racist speech are equally applicable to speech representing that 
homosexuals and people living with HIV are ‘inherently inferior’. Indeed, Mr 
Parkinson's submission indicates that the reason why legal definitions of hate 
literature have generally made reference to race and religion is that these were the 
particular social evils Parliament was trying to remedy at the time. The remedies 
themselves are based on fundamental principles of respect for human dignity and 
equality, and the elimination of discrimination, both of which are relevant to 
discrimination on grounds of disease status and sexual orientation, both of which 
have now been explicitly incorporated by Parliament into s. 3(3)(e). 
 
Although s. 3 of the Act is the provision most relevant to the classification of these 
videos, it cannot be read in isolation of both the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the 
Human Rights Act 1993. All of the submissions either explicitly or implicitly deal with 
the need to find a way to balance or reconcile what appear in this case as two 
apparently competing interests, that is, the freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and opinions of any kind in any form in s. 14 of the Bill of Rights Act 
1990; and the right to freedom from discrimination in s. 19 of the Bill of Rights Act 
1990. Although s. 6 of the Bill of Rights Act requires ambiguities in the Films, Videos, 
and Publications Classification Act 1993 to be given a meaning consistent with the 
rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights Act 1990, it offers no guidance on 
which of two apparently competing rights in the Bill of Rights Act should be chosen 
to resolve any such ambiguity. Further, both the freedom of expression and the right 
to be free from discrimination can be subject to reasonable limitations which are 
prescribed by law and which can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society in terms of s. 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. Both the freedom of expression 
and the right to be free from discrimination must also give way to a clearly 
contradictory statute in terms of s. 4 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. In this respect, it 
is significant that Parliament, after enacting the Bill of Rights Act 1990, has explicitly 
incorporated as criteria to be given ‘particular weight’ in a censorship statute the 
prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993. Parliament 
appears to have signalled its intention to limit the freedom of expression set out in s. 
14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 first by enacting the Films, Videos and Publications 
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Classification Act 1993, and secondly by allowing the freedom of expression to be 
limited by reference to the prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights 
Act 1993. The reference to these prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Films, 
Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993 must also be taken as an indication 
that Parliament intended that the freedom of expression may be subordinated to 
the right to be free from discrimination if such expression falls within s. 3(3)(e) of the 
Act. There is, then, in the legislative scheme of the Films, Videos and Publications 
Classification Act 1993, the Human Rights Act 1993 and the Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
some indication that in a contest between the freedom of expression and the right 
to be free from discrimination, at least with respect to publications falling within s. 
3(3)(e) of the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993, that the right to 
be free from discrimination should prevail. 
 
It would therefore appear that the Board accepted the view of HRAG that 
freedom from discrimination, and the hatred and violence such discrimination 
can lead to, should be paramount, thus allowing limitations on freedom of 
expression.  As a result of this, the Board classified the videos as 
Objectionable, no longer available for public or private circulation, and they 
believed  
this classification to be a reasonable limit on the freedom of expression consistent 
with s. 5 of the Bill of Rights Act and consistent with Par1iament's intention in 
incorporating the prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993 
into the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and s. 3(3)(e) of the Films, Videos and Publications 
Classification Act 1993  
(Board of Review, 1997b: 18). 
 
Nevertheless, there was one Board member who, while not dissenting from the 
decision, would have preferred to classify the videos as R18 with excisions,  
and wished to record her concern that this decision should not be interpreted as 
precedent for suppressing mere opinion, as opposed to opinion plus misinformation 
of a nature that makes s. 3(3)(e) of particular importance  
(Board of Review, 1997b: 18). 
 
The members of HRAG believed we had won.  Membership had been 
declining since the OFLC decision in November 1996.  By the end of 
December 1997, there were only three of us left in Wellington.  Four were 
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elsewhere in the country, three were in Australia - in Sydney and Melbourne - 
and three were on their OE, an unable to be contacted.  Two of those who had 
moved from Wellington, had moved again subsequently and were also no 
longer able to be contacted.  Because we believed we had won, and there was 
little else to be done at that time, we almost began to dismantle the Group, with 
one more event to be held in February of 1998 when two people elsewhere in 
the country would be in Wellington, and two from Sydney would be visiting. 
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Chapter 11: The High Court 
 
Nevertheless, on 12 February 1998, HRAG received notification from John 
Oliver, Crown Counsel acting on behalf of the Board of Review, that the New 
Zealand distributor of the videos had lodged an appeal against the Board’s 
decision.  This was to be heard in the High Court in Wellington.  The appeal 
could only be on questions of law, and their lawyers, Armstrong-Murray and 
Paul Cavanaugh, had assessed five such grounds: 
Was the Film and Literature Board of Review (‘the Board’) in error in holding that the 
videos, because they dealt with matters pertaining to homosexual people and to the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases, thereby deal with matters ‘such as sex, 
horror, crime, cruelty, or violence’ and so fall into the category of publications 
covered by s3(l) of the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993 (‘the 
Act’)? 
 
The finding that is contested is to be found at page 7 of the decision, first and second 
paragraphs. The appellant submits that the videos do not deal with matters ‘such as 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence’ and therefore do not fall within s3(l), as 
publications liable to be held objectionable. 
 
Was the Board in error in failing to properly apply the definition of ‘objectionable’ 
(s3(l)) by concluding that, because in its opinion the videos represented homosexual 
persons and people ‘living with HIV’ as inherently inferior to others (being one of the 
criteria to which it is directed to give particular weight under s3(3)(e) of the Act, the 
videos were for that reason ‘likely to be injurious to the public good’ in terms of 
s3(l). 
 
In so concluding, the Board failed to give any independent force or effect to the 
words ‘likely to be injurious to the public good’, and in effect determined that the 
videos were objectionable simply because s3(3)(e) could be held to apply to them. 
The portions of the Board’s decision so challenged, are to be found at the first 
complete paragraph at page 13, at page 15, lines 15-21; page 17 at lines 4-8. 
 
Was the Board in error in failing to give any or any proper consideration to the 
matters listed in s3(4) which, as that subsection states: ‘shall also be considered’? 
The only reference to s3(4) matters may be found at page 13 lines 5-8. 
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Was the Board in error in its application of s(3)(e) by determining that the videos, 
because they expressed certain views about homosexual orientation, the link 
between that orientation and Aids, and the political agenda of certain homosexual 
persons, thereby depicted homosexual persons as ‘inherently inferior’? 
Reference is made to the decision at page 12, commencing, line 4 to page 13, ending 
line 2. 
 
Was the Board in error in failing to correctly apply the provisions of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 to its determination and to the interpretation of s3 of the Act? 
The Board assumes that s3(3)(e), although directed at representations depicting 
persons as inherently inferior, is concerned with protecting persons from 
discrimination such that s3(3)(e) may thereby be taken to implement a right in the 
Bill of Rights and so construed as to justify suppression of opinion. Reference is 
made to page 15 of the decision, line 11 to line 18. 
In holding that the enactment of the Act signalled an intention by 
Parliament to subordinate freedom of expression in s14 of the Bill of Rights 
(page 15, lines 11-18). 
In giving insufficient importance to the affirmation of freedom of expression 
in s14 of the Bill of Rights in its determination. 
In holding that its determination to classify both videos as objectionable 
was a reasonable limit on the freedom of expression consistent with s5 of 
the Bill of Rights, page 18, lines 12-16. 
In interpreting ‘freedom of expression’ in s14 of the Bill of Rights so as to 
not to include an expression which is or may be injurious to the public good, 
page 17, line 13 to foot of page. 
In purporting to give effect to sl9 of the Bill of Rights to support its 
determination and its interpretation of the Act, even though in neither 
video is there evidence of any relevant discrimination against any group by 
any body or person subject to the Bill of Rights so that sl9 therefore had no 
application.  
In failing to give any consideration to the expression ‘injurious to the public 
good’ in s3(1), and in also failing to properly apply the Bill of Rights to the 
interpretation and application of that phrase pursuant to s6 of the Bill of 
Rights  
(Murray & Cavanaugh, 1998: 2-6). 
 
These were, however, re-ordered when the case went to eventually went to 
Court 13 October 1999, with the appellant placing Bill of Rights Act concerns 
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at ground 1 (formerly ground 5); the “gateway” of “such as” at ground 2 
(formerly ground 1); the tests of ‘objectionable’ and injuriousness to the public 
at ground 3 (formerly ground 2); and cross referencing s3(4) of the Act became 
ground 5 (formerly ground 3).  The original ground 4, on ‘inherently inferior’, 
was changed, and became: 
Failing properly to address and apply the statutory test for ‘objectionable’ in s 3 of 
the Act by not having regard to the ‘extent and degree to which, and the manner in 
which’ the publication made (as held by the Board) representations as to 
homosexual persons  
(Cavanaugh & Rishworth, 1999: 2). 
 
Introducing their submissions, the appellant stated (Cavanaugh & Rishworth, 
1999: 2): 
This is an important case. Two videos have been classified as ‘objectionable’ and 
banned because of the opinions they are said to express on matters of values, 
politics, and social policy. 
 
The Board itself acknowledges that this is the type of expression at stake: in its 
Decision (reported as Re Gay Rights/Special Rights: Inside the Homosexual Agenda 
(1997) 4 HRNZ 422 (p 425, lines 7 – 14)). It says that each of the videos presents an 
‘opinion’ about the ‘political and social ramifications’ of claims by gay people for 
‘equal rights’ and about the spread of HIV and AIDS.   
 
In short, the case concerns expression of a type which is at the very core of the right 
to freedom of expression in s14 of the Bill of Rights; moral and political expression. 
 
The starting point, it is submitted, is that this type of expression ought not to be 
banned by censors (here the Board of Film and Literature Review) unless there is the 
clearest mandate to do so in law. 
 
In what follows it is submitted that there is no clear legislative mandate to ban either 
video. These videos clearly ought not to have been banned. Opinion on such matters 
is protected by the Bill of Rights. 
 
The Board partially recognises this in its acknowledgement that opinion ought not 
ordinarily to be banned. The Board’s attempted justification of its decisions is that 
the videos contain ‘misinformation’ as well as opinion (p 432, line 35-41). 
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It is the appellant’s contention, however, that what the Board terms 
‘misinformation’ is: for the most part, simply expressions of opinions with which the 
Board disagrees; or a misdescription of each video’s message. 
 
Further, even if there were ‘misinformation’, which is vigorously contested, the 
position would be no different. Freedom of expression under the Bill of Rights is not 
contingent on having one’s facts correct (nor, it might be added, is it contingent on 
the Film and Literature Review Board agreeing with one’s statements). 
 
While correct in claiming the case was important, they were incorrect in stating 
that the claim the videos were full of misinformation was a “misdescription” of 
the videos’ message.  There was sufficient evidence to prove that the videos 
were factually incorrect.  To state that errors of fact are misinformation is 
truthful.  To claim otherwise, and to make the claim the description of 
misinformation is a misdescription, indicates, to me at least, a degree of 
incredulity. 
 
However, in the Court, the main areas of contention were ground 1 on issues 
around freedom of expression in s14 BORA, and the gateway test: whether or 
not the videos came under the rubric of “such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty or 
violence”, contained in Ground 2.  Comment was also made by counsel for the 
appellant about the “apparent” misinformation, indicating the videos contained 
no misinformation, but fact. 
 
There are no specific limitations on freedom of expression in s14 BORA, 
unlike those contained in the ICCPR, reference to which is contained in the full 
title of BORA (emphasis added): 
An Act— 
To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New 
Zealand; and 
To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
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The ICCPR does, however, at Article 19(3) provide limitations on freedom of 
expression, and therefore these should be classed as ‘justifiable limitations’ 
under s5 BORA.  This Article states: 
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:  
i. For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
ii. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), 
or of public health or morals. 
The prevention of discrimination and violence, thus ensuring the safety of 
citizens, should, I believe, meet the requirements of protecting the public order 
and public health, and thus would be, in my opinion, a justifiable limitation. 
 
Under their section on BORA, they stated that: 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights recognises that rights may be reasonably limited to 
such extent as is ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.  But the 
censorship decisions here impose more than a reasonable limit.  Opinions on matter 
of morality and social policy ought not to be suppressed in a free and democratic 
society.  Even if it can be said that there are factual errors leading to the expression 
of the opinion, that is immaterial. 
 
In short, the ultimate question on the appeal is ‘has this decision resulted in a 
restriction of freedom of expression that is not justifiable as a reasonable limit in a 
free and democratic society?’ If it has so resulted, then it is not a decision authorised 
by s3  
(Cavanaugh & Richfield, 1999: 4-5). 
 
While I agree that most opinions on social policy should be able to be 
expressed, and not restricted, there are limitations to that freedom where 
questions of social policy and morality endanger the well being of groups of 
people in society.  If there were no such limitations, then it would be 
acceptable to allow discussions about bomb making, to call for the death of 
unbelievers, or at least those who do not believe in the same deity as you, and 
to openly advocate for the persecution of groups of groups in society, etc.  All 
of these are questions of social policy and morality, yet are restricted in one 
way or another. 
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Furthermore, freedom of expression is indeed limited in various ways, not least 
of which is defamation.  The messages behind these videos are that gay men 
spread disease, are paedophiles seeking children, and are not worthy of the 
same rights as everyone else.  To state that, in the manner of these videos, 
about an individual, would lead to charges of defamation.  If one claims that 
“X is Y” or “X does Y”, and Y is false, one may have to pay damages for 
defamation, because it does not meet the standard of truth required to defend 
defamation charges in New Zealand courts.  However, if you say “In my 
opinion, X is ...” or “In my opinion, X does ...” and complete this with “and I 
believe that opinion to be honest”, and even back it up with some form of 
evidence, although you are not required to prove every opinion, then, at most, 
you may be required to publish an apology. 
 
Although counsel for the appellant claims the videos are opinion, not once in 
either of them does the word “opinion” appear.  Throughout the videos, when 
LGBT people are accused of something, it appears as “homosexuals are ...” or 
“homosexuals do ...”, and uses the language of absolutes.  It never says “in our 
opinion, homosexuals are ...”, or “in our opinion, homosexuals do ...”.  
Because of the mass of misinformation and factual errors in the videos, if 
defamation of groups were allowed in New Zealand, I believe there may be a 
good case against these videos.  Furthermore, the videos present this absolutist 
term in respect to information that is not factual.  During the hearing, Heron J 
requested Counsel for HRAG to provide a list of the misinformation within the 
video.  On 13 December, a memorandum was filed that contained examples of 
41 items of misinformation in respect to GR/SR, and 56 items of 
misinformation in respect to AWYHBT. 
 
Upon the Introduction of a Bill, the Attorney General is required to report to 
Parliament if there are any inconsistencies between the introduced Bill and 
BORA.  Such a report is a section 7 report.  Counsel for the appellant claimed: 
There is, however, no reason to conclude that Parliament intended the Films, Videos 
and Publications Classification Act 1993 to authorise individual censorship decisions 
that are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. This is because: 
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There was no report by the Attorney-General under s7 of the Bill of Rights when the 
Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993 was introduced as a bill. Nor is 
there any mention in Hansard that the legislature saw itself as overriding freedom of 
expression in the Bill of Rights  
(Cavanaugh and Rishworth, 1999: 7). 
 
Yet this claim is false.  Upon the introduction of the FVPCB, the Attorney 
General, Paul East, reported to Parliament as required under BORA: 
As the House knows, one of my responsibilities under section 7 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, is to advise the House on the introduction of any Government 
Bill when any provision of the Bill appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights 
and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights 1990. 
 
Clause 121 of the Bill makes it an offence to for any person to possess an 
‘objectionable’ publication.  That expression is contained within clause 3 of the Bill 
and encompasses both depictions that are objectionable in themselves and 
objectionable when considered against the criteria and balancing factors listed in the 
clause. 
 
An obvious feature of the clause is that the publication possessed by a defendant 
may not have been classified as objectionable at the date on which it was found in 
that person’s possession.  If the nature of the publication is disputed, the publication 
will be referred to the classification office for a decision on whether or not it is 
objectionable.  If it is found to be objectionable, the offence of possession of an 
objectionable publication will be established – although the publication had not 
been found to be objectionable at the date, or dates to which the possession charge 
relates.  That is the consequence of clause 121, which does not confine the offence 
to publications classified as ‘objectionable’. 
 
Although it is not free from any doubt, it is my opinion that it would be inconsistent 
with the purpose and scope of clause 121 to confine the possession offence to 
classified material.  The provision relates to the possession of both material that is 
classified and material that has yet to be classified.  Accordingly, there is nothing in 
section 6 of the Bill of Rights 1990, which requires a court, where possible, to 
interpret an enactment in a way consistent with the Bill of Rights 1990, can apply.  
One cannot interpret that provision in a way that will allow it to conform with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
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... Accordingly, pursuant to section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990, I report to the 
House that clause 121 of the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Bill is 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights 1990  
(Hansard, 1992a: 12764-65). 
 
Butler and Butler (2005: 204) also state that a section 7 report was done for the 
Films, Videos and Publications Classification Bill.  The problem which arises 
is that it is not a mandatory report, but only where, in the opinion of the 
Attorney General, a Bill, as introduced to the House, is inconsistent with 
BORA that a report need be done (Butler & Butler, 2005: 199).  Furthermore, 
until 1995, a report need only be a statement in the House, as was done in this 
case, or partly by statement and partly by written report (Butler & Butler, 
2005: 202).  It is therefore clear that, according to the standards of the time, an 
Attorney General’s report was completed on the FVPCB, contrary to the claim 
made by the appellant’s counsel. 
 
Counsel for the appellant continued their claim under s14 BORA indicating 
there had been no discussion of s3 of the FVPCB during the Parliamentary 
debates: 
It is not merely possible, it is mandatory to interpret and apply s3 so that it does not 
extend to legitimate a censorship decision that is inconsistent with s 14 of the Bill of 
Rights. Only if s3 were taken to expressly, or by necessary implication, override the 
Bill of Rights could such a decision be made. 
 
Plainly s3 does not expressly override the Bill of Rights. Nor does it implicitly do so. 
The reasons it cannot be read as implicitly doing so are the same as set out above: 
that it was not seen by the Attorney – General or the House as doing so, and that s 6 
militates against all but necessary implications. No implication that the Bill of Rights 
is overridden is necessary here  
(Cavanaugh & Rishworth, 1999: 7-8). 
 
Yet Parliament had considered s3, then clause 3, of the Bill.  Jenny Shipley, 
then Minister of Social Welfare, who introduced the Bill on behalf of the 
Minister of Justice, stated: 
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In relation to the new classification criteria, one of the most important features of 
the Bill is clause 3, which explicitly outlines the type of material that will be 
prohibited or restricted.  ... The decision to prohibit or restrict the availability of any 
publication is a serious matter.  The Bill proposes that a decision be made according 
to a uniform set of statutory criteria.  The decision to prohibit a publication turns on 
whether that publication is objectionable.  The term ‘objectionable’ replaces the 
term ‘indecent’, which is used currently in both the Indecent Publications Act and 
the Video Recordings Act.  For the purposes of the Bill, clause 3(1) provides that ‘a 
publication is objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals 
with matters of sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the 
availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good  
(Hansard, 1992a: 12759). 
 
Discussion of clauses 3(2), 3(3) and 3(4) occurs stating that the Bill is to 
employ the “contextual” to censorship matters.  In relation to subclause 3(3), 
Shipley states: 
I will mention briefly some factors that now must be given special weight or 
attention in subclause (3).  For example, subclause (3)(a)deals with material that 
describes or depicts a range of extreme violent behaviours.  Subclause (3)(b) deals 
with the exploitation of nudity of children or young people.  Subclause (3)(e) relates 
to material that represents, either directly or by implication, members of the public 
by reason of their colour, race – ethnic or national origin – sex,  physical or 
intellectual capacity, or religious beliefs of members of those classes.  In summary, 
the Bill retains useful features of existing law but builds upon them to provide 
classification authorities with much clearer, firmer, and more workable guidelines  
(Hansard, 1992a: 12760). 
 
From the remaining Hansard records, it is clear that Parliament, not just 
government, intended that material classed as objectionable was to be banned, 
and that material not classed as objectionable could be restricted.  It is 
therefore very clear that Parliament knew, and intended, that this Bill was to be 
a justifiable limitation on the freedom of expression allowed under s14 BORA.  
Furthermore, in subsequent discussions with Dalziel and O’Regan, they have 
both said that Parliament as a whole know that they were dealing with 
censorship of materials, that this necessarily meant a limitation on freedom of 
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expression, and was therefore a justifiable limitation (Personal 
communications, 1999-2006). 
 
Counsel for the Board stated in reply to the appellants claims: 
In Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48, the High Court dealt 
with the issue of balancing the right to freedom of expression with other freedoms 
and rights affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act 1990. The Court indicated that freedom of 
expression is intrinsically limited in certain ways. 
 
The High Court held at page 59 that: What is guaranteed in freedom of expression is the right to everyone to express their thoughts, opinions and beliefs however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the general opinion or to the particular opinion of others in the community. But some forms of expression are not within that guarantee. 
 
The Court then went on to hold that the right to freedom of expression did not 
outweigh the right to a fair and impartial trial under s 25 of the Bill of Rights Act. The 
Court held that the right to freedom of expression is qualified by the necessity to 
preserve and protect fundamental elements in the jury system such as the finality of 
the verdict, the preservation of frankness and deliberation and the privacy of jurors. 
In determining this limitation of right to freedom of expression the Court had regard 
to the tests for reasonable limitations prescribed by law (under s 5 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act) as laid out by the Canadian and New Zealand 
jurisprudence  
(Oliver, 1999: 24). 
 
The effect of that, and other judgements, legislation, and regulations made 
under legislation, is that freedom of expression is not absolute, and there are 
limitations upon it in many different ways.  Counsel for HRAG (Chauvel, 
1999a: 2-11) expanded on these, and upon the apparent clash between the right 
to freedom from discrimination, and the hatred and violence that may cause, 
and the right to freedom of expression, as discussed above during the hearing 
of the Film and Literature Board of Review.  As a result, they concluded 
(Chauvel, 1999a: 11): 
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In its legislative context, the Parliamentary intention that FVPCA form part of a raft 
of measures to better enhance New Zealand’s anti-discrimination laws, and to 
protect those particularly vulnerable to discrimination from its ill-effects 
discrimination, is clear. 
 
The statutory framework is internationally unique, and 
Means that foreign and pre-1993 domestic authority can only be applied to the 
extent permitted by the August 1993 changes; and 
Means that, in this country, fundamental principles of legality must be taken to 
include at their heart the freedom from illegitimate discrimination, or the oft 
inevitable effect thereof: illegitimate denigration; and 
Means that the decision of the Board is therefore particularly apt. 
 
In reply, counsel for the appellant stated: 
The appellant’s case is, it follows, not a complaint about what Parliament has done. 
It is a complaint that the Board in this case has made a decision in respect of each 
video that breaches s 14 of the Bill of Rights, and that there is nothing in s 3(l) and 
(3) of the Films Act that mandates or even permits a decision that breaches rights in 
the Bill of Rights. The section permits reasonable limits on freedom of expression, 
not unreasonable ones. If Parliament had intended it to permit unreasonable limits, 
we could have expected it to say so (or the Attorney-General to have reported that it 
was doing so). 
 
It is explicit in the Respondent’s and the Board’s submissions that one should 
approach this as a case where rights are in conflict and to decide which should 
‘prevail’. It is respectfully submitted that this is the wrong approach. It is important 
to be clear about the rights involved: 
The New Zealand state through the Board is restricting not only the 
appellant's freedom of expression but that of all New Zealanders to receive 
it: note s 14 expressly extends to the right ‘to receive and impart 
information’. 
The state is not discriminating against the Respondents, or anyone else. 
Nor even do the videos discriminate, since they cannot by themselves actually do 
anything. They are simply watched. 
 
Even if, contrary to fact and common understanding, a video could ‘discriminate’, 
the resulting ‘discrimination’ would be perpetrated by the video-maker or its 
importer. It would not be a case of the state discriminating against the affected 
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group of persons. (And the Bill of Rights gives rights only against the state and public 
actors.) 
 
Rather, the point is that Parliament has accepted that publications might need 
restriction or banning in order to protect groups of citizens from being depicted by 
other citizens as inherently inferior, and to prevent those ideas from taking root and 
causing harm.  (Note that this is not restricted to minority groups: after all, every 
person has a race, a sex, a political opinion, a sexual orientation). 
 
When it comes to justifying as ‘reasonable’ the limits that s3 places on freedom of 
expression, its purpose – of preventing harm that may be wrought by private actors 
– is significant.  The protection of people from depictions that infringe s 3(3)(e) is a 
statutory reason for limiting freedom of expression. 
 
The appellant accepts all the above. But the point is simply this: there is no clash of 
rights in the Bill of Rights. S19 (rights against discrimination) is not implicated at all: 
the state is not doing any discriminating here. Rather, the state (through the Films 
Act) is limiting freedom of expression so as to promote equality and seek to prevent 
private acts of discrimination in the future. 
 
All this is to say that the Board’s predecessor, the Indecent Publications Tribunal, 
had this point correct when, in Re Exposing the AIDS Scandal, it said (in a passage 
that the Board actually quotes in its Decision) that freedom of expression and 
freedom from discrimination do not collide but ‘career past each other’ because a 
publication itself cannot discriminate  
(Rishworth, 1999: 10-12). 
 
While a publication itself cannot discriminate, it can incite discrimination, 
hatred, and violence towards a particular group in society – this is what 
Parliament had decided in enacting s3(3)(e) FVPCA and ss61-63 and 131 
HRA.  S19 BORA, while affecting public discrimination by government 
bodies, was not intended to affect private bodies.  Nevertheless, section 21 
HRA does affect private bodies, and both BORA and the FVPCB were 
amended due to the passage of the HRA to include, among other things, sexual 
orientation. 
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Furthermore, if, under s3 BORA, public bodies cannot discriminate against a 
person on the basis of their sexual orientation under s19 BORA, then the Board 
would have been remiss in its actions if it had turned a blind eye to issues of 
sexual orientation, as the Board itself is a public body that has to abide by the 
requirements of BORA.  Butler and Butler (2005: 94) indicate the Court of 
Appeal regarded the Board to be covered by s3 BORA, and in accordance with 
Re J (an infant): B and B v Director General of Social Welfare [1996] 2NZLR 
134, 146 (CA) (in Butler & Butler, 2005: 124-125), the Board would have had 
to take the effects of private acts into account, including private discrimination.  
However, as Butler and Butler indicate (2005: 125) the Court of Appeal, rather 
than taking this precedence into account, made an ad hoc decision contrary to, 
and without reference to, the earlier decision in Re J. 
 
The other main ground of appeal, the “gateway” of “matters such as sex, 
horror, crime, cruelty or violence”, counsel for the appellant submitted that: 
The expression ‘such as’ in s 3(l) is designed to extend the reach of the 
‘objectionable’ concept to publications which are not about ‘sex, horror, crime, 
cruelty or violence’.  Plainly, however, the words are words of limitation: they cut 
down the total field of all publications and limit it to those publications which are 
ejusdem generis with the previous words. 
 
It is submitted, first, that the Gay Rights Special Rights Video cannot be characterised 
as being about sex, nor about a matter ‘such as’ sex. The video is about politics; it is 
an argument against law reform proposals. The accident that the law reform 
proposals are advanced by and relate to the interests of members of a group 
distinguished by a particular sexual orientation cannot convert the publication into 
one that ‘describes, depicts or otherwise deals with’ matters ‘such as’ sex, 
 
Construed ejusdem generis with sex, horror etc the words ‘matters such as’ must be 
taken to extend only to publications that appeal to some prurient (sex) or 
illegitimate and potentially harmful interest (horror, crime, violence: cruelty): an 
example would be a publication that deals with bomb-making or drug production. 
These may do so in a manner that is not caught by the word ‘crime’ or ‘violence’, and 
yet be capable of being injurious to the public good.  
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The harm wrought by including the Gay Rights / Special Rights video within s 3 is this. 
It effectively elevates the Films Act into a means for censoring political debate about 
matters to do with sexual orientation. The superficial link between sexual 
orientation and sex is taken to confer jurisdiction on the censors. This is an odd 
result, since a publication made, say, by a gay organisation that cast aspersions on 
religious persons (by, say, implying they were all bigoted and thereby inherently 
inferior) would not be similarly susceptible to banning. Being about religious 
persons, it could not be said to depict or describe a matter such as sex, nor anything 
else in s 3. 
 
The Board’s approach, therefore, exposes to potential censorship anything that is 
adverse to the gay and lesbian community, on the grounds that the arguments made 
against their positions depict them as inherently inferior, while not similarly catching 
arguments made about other groups. This is viewpoint discrimination of the type 
struck down by the Supreme Court of the United States in R A V v City of St Paul 120 
L Ed 2d 305 (1992) where it was said (p 323) there can be ‘no authority to licence 
one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of 
Queensbury rules’. 
 
If there is an alternative way of reading s 3(I) it should therefore be so read. There is 
an alternative way: ‘such as’ means matters like sex and horror etc, which appeal to 
prurient interest or deal with seriously illegal or violent themes. 
 
A similar argument may be made about the AIDS video although admittedly the 
connection between sex and the asexual practices spoken of   the video is a little 
more real. Even so, the AIDS video is about the public health dangers of AIDS, and 
the claimed illegitimacy of the homosexual lifestyle, and so the submissions above 
can equally be made with respect to the AIDS video  
(Cavanaugh & Rishworth, 1999: 35-36). 
 
In reply, Counsel for the Board said: 
The Board set out s 3(1) in full and then concludes that although the videos do not 
strictly speaking depict ‘sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence’ the definition is 
inclusive but qualified by the final phrase ‘injurious to the public good’. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Board referred to Collector of Customs v Lawrence 
Publishing Company Limited [1986] l NZLR 404 where the Court of Appeal, in looking 
at the definition of indecency under the Indecent Publications Act 1963, concluded 
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that matters other than sex, horror, crime, cruelty and violence were included within 
that definition but those other things had to be injurious to the public good in order 
to be banned. The Board held that in dealing with a sexually transmitted virus and 
with matters of sexuality, the videos deal with matters ‘such as’ sex, and 
consequently fall within s 3(1)  
(Oliver, 1999: 15-16). 
 
In addition to this, counsel for HRAG, Charles Chauvel, said: 
There is no doubt, then, that Parliament intended to permit the broad and inclusive 
definition adopted by the Board. Did such doubt exist, Hansard assists to dispel it. 
The Hon. Graeme Lee, Minister of Internal Affairs at the time of the enactment of 
FVPCA stated: ... I must assure the house that whilst a list of material that is automatically prohibited is not exhaustive – nor is it intended to be – the classification office can determine that a publication is objectionable for reasons other than those listed   (Hansard, 1993: 17063). 
The then Minister of Justice, Hon. Doug Graham, added that: the inclusion of the words ‘such as’ in clause 3(1) ensures that the definition of the matters likely to be considered harmful is not closed off. That is important, because the legislation must have the flexibility to accommodate changing social perceptions. In summary, the Bill manifests a clear intention to strengthen the censorship laws, and gives censors the tools to carry out that task.... (Hansard, 1993: 17052). 
 
It should also be noted that in its decision in Toonen vs the State of Tasmania, the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee held that the word ‘sex’ included, in the 
context of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and for 
the purpose of the protection of human rights and the prevention of discrimination, 
‘sexual orientation’. 
 
The videotapes ‘AIDS: what you haven’t been told’ (AWYHBT) and ‘Gay 
Rights/Special Rights: Inside the homosexual Agenda’ (GRSR) attempt to link certain 
types of sexual behaviour and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. 
 
The Appellant’s description of the videotape GRSR as a videotape ‘about politics’ is, 
with respect, far too general. Airing and discussion of arguments against certain law 
reform proposals cannot take place unless the substance of and issues contained in 
those proposals are similarly aired and discussed. Lt is no ‘accident’ that the 
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proposals ‘relate’ to matters of sexual orientation. On the contrary, such matters go 
to the heart of the proposals. This is simply not a video about politics generally, or 
wholly about politics to the exclusion of other matters. 
 
Moreover, in discussing homosexual persons, the videotapes make direct links 
between a person’s sexual orientation and their sexual behaviour. Examples include: ‘no one should have special rights or privileges or minority status because 
of their sexual behaviour’(Ralph Reed, transcript GRSR, p14, ll 4-7). ‘Our intent is to see that ... every one being treated fair and equal, and they 
are being treated fair under the law as a citizen of America, but their 
behaviour should not dictate special preference for them’ (Cheryl Coleman, transcript GRSR, pp 14-15, Il 32-4). ‘...  it’s bad law to codify into public policy a special protection based on 
nothing other than what you do in the privacy of your own bedroom, (Ralph Reed, transcript GRSR, p15, Il 9-12). ‘To most people when they think about homosexuals, as pictured in the 
media, its ... two guys, ... who simply have a very deep affection for each 
other. They wanna be partners through life ... to help each other financially 
and so on. The national media does not tell us anything about the 
abhorrence of these people. The ingestion of faeces, they engage in 
such things as the anal intercourse, they engages in such things that 
known’s as fisting, in which one person takes his fist and inserts it into 
the anus of the other person’ (Marlin Maddoux, transcript GRSR, pp44-45, ll 7-16; 31-2). 
‘The ingestion of urine, urinating on one another it’s called golden 
showers; they do rimming, where they lick one another’s rectums. These 
are things that are going on, and it’s all part of the behaviour disorder 
that goes along with homosexuality’ (Cathy Kay, transcript GRSR, p45, ll 7-13). 
‘A moderately active homosexual can average thirty to fifty different 
sexual partners a year’ (Commentator, transcript AWYHBT, p16, ll 16-19). 
‘The homosexual movement, and they’re practising homosexuality if 
they believe in that’ (Judith Reisman, transcript AWYHBT, p23, ll 28-30). 
(Emphasis added in all cases.) 
 
Throughout the videotapes AWYHBT it is sexual behaviour, specifically homosexual 
sexual behaviour, that is discussed. By linking sexual orientation with sexual 
behaviour, it is clear that the makers of this videotape, and GRSR, are not merely 
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dealing with sexual orientation as defined in the Human Rights Act 1993. It is 
therefore equally clear that because these publications deal with ‘matters pertaining 
to homosexual people’, and also because these publications deal with matters 
pertaining to ‘the spread of sexually transmitted diseases’, that these videos deal 
with matters ‘such as’ sex  
(Chauvel, 1999a: 4-7). 
 
It was believed, therefore, that due to earlier IPT and court decisions, the 
videos did indeed deal with sex because they discussed sexual behaviour in 
detail, and dealt specifically with sexual orientation, with the relevant decision 
of the UNHRC in Toonen.  As stated earlier BORA was enacted to give force 
to the rights contained in the ICCPR, under which Toonen was decided. 
 
In response, the counsel for the appellant stated: 
Mr Chauvel deals with this at paras 5 to l5. There is nothing in paras 5 to 11 of the 
Respondent’s submission with which the Appellant would disagree. Plainly, the 
words ‘such as’ appear in s 3 and must be given meaning. In the end the question is 
simply whether each video can be said to deal with matters ‘such as sex’. That is 
where the parties differ. 
 
It is worth noting that the underlying vision of s3(1), when linked with s 3(3)(e), is 
difficult to discern. It seems odd that virulent disparagement of persons on account 
of their race or religion will escape the impact of s3(3)(e) because it could be 
accomplished without dealing with matters ‘such as sex, horror’, etc. Conversely, on 
the Board’s argument in its Decision and in Mr Chauvel’s submission, when gay or 
lesbian persons are the subject of criticism then s 3(3)(e) potentially comes into play, 
simply because of the suggested link between ‘sexual orientation’ (which defines 
those groups) and the words ‘matters such as sex’ etc . 
 
The appellant’s argument, however, was that the fortuitous coextensiveness 
between the words ‘such as sex’ in s 3(l) and the inclusion of ‘sexual orientation’ in s 
3(3)(e) ought not to lead to a simplistic conclusion that any publication about gay 
people is about sex or a matter ‘such as’ sex. Rather, the AIDS video is about public 
morality, and about public policy on health in light of the AIDS epidemic. The Gay 
Rights video is about law reform proposals. 
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A rigorous inquiry into whether s 3 properly extends to the publications in question 
is vital if we are to avoid a situation where one side of debates about morality and 
policy runs the risk of censorship (as here) while the other does not. 
 
A word is necessary about Toonen v Australia case decided by the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations (referred to in para 10 of Respondent`s 
submissions). It is one thing to say, as the Committee did, that ‘sex’ includes sexual 
orientation for the purposes of a list of prohibited grounds of discrimination. It is 
quite another to extend that observation so as to suggest that for all purposes ‘sex’ 
includes sexual orientation, wherever and whenever it appears in legislation. In s3 of 
the Films Act the reference to ‘sex’ is a plain reference to visual or literary depictions 
of sexual acts and sexual organs, not to sex as an abstraction nor even as a synonym 
for gender. 
 
In any event, the Board`s decision was not that sex included sexual orientation, but 
that the videos depicted matters ‘such as’ sex. It is that assertion that the Appellant 
challenges. The videos do not deal with matters such as sex, but with politics, public 
health and morality  
(Rishworth, 1999: 12). 
 
On 1 March 2000, Heron and Durie JJ issued their decision.  In respect to the 
gateway issue, they stated: 
Dealing with the second ground of appeal first, there are two questions, whether the 
videos deal with sex as such and whether the videos deal with some other topic 
within the ambit of S.3. As to the first, sex is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
as including ‘Physical contact between individuals involving sexual stimulation of the 
genitals, sexual intercourse, spec. copulation, coitus.’ The appellant argued that the 
videos dealt only peripherally with sexual matters, being more to do with the politics 
of persons of certain sexual orientation, and accordingly that the definition 
contained in S.3(1) did not apply to them. While there is certainly a focus on a 
perceived homosexual agenda nonetheless homosexual sex is dealt with. The 
question is not whether this is central or marginal to the overall discourse but 
whether it forms part. It does, and that appears to us to satisfy the jurisdictional 
point, though whether it is dealt with in an objectionable way is another matter. 
 
However as the Board's primary finding relates to the impact of the videos on a class 
of persons defined by sexual orientation the more pertinent question is whether the 
impact of publication on such a class is within the section's purview. The use of the 
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words ‘such as’ suggests the generality of the approach and the possibility of a 
publication which referred to none of the specified items still being the subject of 
classification as objectionable. Indeed the inclusion of references to s.21(1) of the 
Human Rights Act 1993: resupposes that some publications could avoid references 
to any of the matters which are used by way of illustration in s.3(1) and still be 
determined as objectionable and within the jurisdiction of the Board. The list may 
thus be added to but the reference to s.21(1) more explicitly justifies the inclusion of 
the topic of sexual orientation, as it does for race and gender. Again the manner in 
which sexual orientation is dealt with, and whether it is in fact objectionable on that 
ground, is a separate issue  
(AP26/98, 2000: 6). 
 
In respect to BORA, they indicated that the Board of Review had indeed given 
lengthy consideration of s14 BORA in respect to freedom of expression 
(AP26/98, 2000: 7-15).  As a result, they dismissed the appeal, without 
awarding costs (AP26/98, 2000: 16). 
 
This time, we did not relax, though there were only three members of HRAG 
left in Wellington.  On 24 March, counsel for LWD lodged an appeal with the 
Court of Appeal.   
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Chapter 12: The Court of Appeal 
 
When the papers were lodged with the Court of Appeal there were originally 
11 grounds of appeal, including (1) a breach of the appellant’s right to freedom 
of expression, (2) the Board is a specialist tribunal that the High Court has to 
defer to, (3) the Board did not take into account the BORA issues as held by 
the Court of Appeal in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review CA 
42/99 of 17 December 1999, (4) the Board was wrong to classify opinion as 
objectionable even if it was misinformation, (5) the Board was wrong in 
claiming the videos contained misinformation, (6) the High Court was wrong 
in saying the Board interpreted the videos correctly, (7) the gateway of ‘such 
as sex, horror, cruelty crime or violence’, (8) issues of HIV/AIDS are not sex, 
(9) s3(4) FVPCA were not properly considered, (10) the High Court did not 
consider freedom of expression when considering whether the videos treated 
LGBT people as inherently inferior, and (11) the High Court and the Board 
were wrong in considering the videos treated LGBT people as inherently 
inferior to others. 
 
Counsel for HRAG, and the remaining members, found it unusual that the 
appellant’s counsel included reference to Moonen v Film and Literature Board 
of Review (CA 42/99 [1999], of 17 December 1999, henceforth, Moonen) 
claiming the Board had not taken it into account, as that case was not decided 
until almost two years after the Board had issued its decision.  Although Heron 
and Durie JJ had not completed their decision on the High Court appeal, it is 
likely they would have been unable to take it into account as oral submissions 
to the court had been completed in October 1999, and none of these had 
addressed a case that had not yet been decided. 
 
Realising the importance of this case in respect to freedom from 
discrimination, the effects on freedom of expression, and other issues, the 
Attorney General, the HRC and Race Relations Conciliator, the NZAF, and the 
New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties (NZCCL) all applied to be 
intervenors in the hearing by 20 May. 
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By the time the appellant’s submissions were made, the eleven grounds had 
shrunk to five: 
1. The gateway issue of ‘such as sex, horror, cruelty crime or violence’; 
2. The High Court was wrong to defer the description and the assessment of the 
videos given by the Film and Literature Board of Review; 
3. That the Film and Literature Board of Review had erred in failing to properly 
apply the requirement of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to freedom of 
expression (as provided by Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review CA 
42/99 of 17 December 1999); 
4. That the Film and Literature Board of Review had erred in failing to properly 
apply s14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 in holding that the videos 
contained misinformation, and through misdescribing the scenes from and 
opinions in the videos; and  
5. The Film and Literature Board of Review had failed to give due consideration to 
section 3(4) of the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993  
(Rishworth & McKenzie, 2000: 5-6). 
 
After considerable discussion of the decisions of the Film and Literature Board 
of Review and the High Court, Counsel for the appellant concluded that: 
The words ‘such as’ maybe [sic] read as linking the word ‘matters’ with the five 
categories that follow so as to indicate that matters which as ejusdem generis or 
closely resemble those categories are included within the meaning of the word 
‘objectionable’.  Read in this way, ‘such as’ can be sensibly read as being designed to 
extend the reach of the ‘objectionable’ concept in publications which are not about 
‘sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence’ but are intended to be words of limitation.  
They cut down the total field of all publications and limit it to those publications that 
are ejusdem generis with those categories.  
 
This interpretation of the section gives proper meaning and content to the five 
categories referred to, and also provides some sensible reason for Parliament having 
replaced the word ‘includes’ by the words ‘such as’. 
 
It is submitted that when s3(1) is read in this way it cannot properly be regarded as 
covering either of the videos which are subject to appeal.  To come within the 
meaning of objectionable the reference to the item ‘sex’ in s3(1) must carry with it 
features which also render horror, crime, cruelty or violence objectionable.  It is not 
every dealing with sex or treatment of a sexual theme which renders a publication 
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objectionable.  It is submitted that the common feature which the treatment of sex 
may have with these objectionable items is a treatment which bypasses any rational 
approach and makes a debased appeal to the emotions; for example a masochistic 
delight in causing pain in the case of cruelty and in the case of sex a prurient or 
salacious interest which debases the sexual object. 
 
There is nothing of that sort in either video.  The Gay Rights video is primarily 
concerned with the politics of the ‘gay movement’ and whether sexual orientation 
should be included as a prohibited ground of discrimination.  The AIDS video is 
primarily directed to the sexual health implications of the homosexual lifestyle in 
relation to the AIDS epidemic.  Neither video can be said to deal with sex or sexually 
related issues in a prurient or salacious way.  That is simply not the videos’ point  
(Rishworth & McKenzie, 2000: 12-13). 
 
They argued therefore that in order to get through the gateway of sex, horror, 
crime, cruelty or violence, it must be ejusdem generis, or of the same kind, not 
merely a discussion about any one of the gateways, but an active portrayal of 
one or more of them.  Their second argument was based on the decision in 
Moonen.  The important part of that decision was that before something can be 
classed as objectionable, it must effectively be the worst of its kind in order to 
overcome freedom of expression.  Anything lesser may be restricted, but 
cannot be banned (Moonen).  There are, I believe, a number of problems that 
presents.  However, as noted above, Moonen had not been decided at the 
conclusion of the High Court case, let alone when the Board made its decision 
in December 1997.  Nevertheless, counsel for the appellant stated: 
The Board’s error is understandable in view of the timing (this case was decided by 
the Board two years before Moonen) but is error nonetheless.  Further, for reasons 
advanced below, it is a more serious error.  That failure is all the more significant 
because this case was not about s3(2) – which concerns child pornography and other 
essentially criminal activities, and where the Board’s discretion is justly 
circumscribed.  Rather, this case is about subsections 3(1), (3) and (4) in the context 
of the expression of opinions on controversial moral and political matters. 
 
The High Court felt able to conclude that the approach prescribed in Moonen had in 
fact been observed by the Board in this case.  The Court rested that conclusion on 
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the following passage.  It will be submitted, however, that, far from signifying 
compliance with Moonen, this passage is completely at odds with it. 
 
... 
 
Moonen required the BOR to be applied to the FVPA when making decisions.  It is 
not merely enough to mention it. 
 
This means, first and foremost that the manner of its impact must be properly 
articulated.  In Moonen, the relevant impact of the BOR was on the words in s3(2) – 
‘promotes or supports’.  Similarly, the Court made this requirement – of identifying 
possible meanings of enactments – plain in paras 16, 17 and 18 of Moonen (setting 
out general instructions on how to apply to BOR in statutory interpretation cases). 
 
This was never properly done by the Board here.  Indeed, it’s BOR discussion appears 
to be directed at a different end – to explain why, in the Board’s view, freedom of 
expression was not an issue at all.  Even on its own terms, that discussion is flawed 
(and that is to be dealt with shortly).  But the present point is simply that the 
passage of the Board cited by the High Court does not amount to compliance with 
this Court’s directions in Moonen. 
 
A proper application of s14 BOR would have identified the critical words in s3 whose 
interpretation and application was to be discerned in light of the BOR.  And when 
that exercise is undertaken, it can be seen that the interpretative impact of s14 is 
much greater here than in Moonen.  For Moonen was all about s3(2) which deems 
certain publications objectionable.  Here, however, the Board is required to exercise 
a discretion about classification, and the relevant criteria set out in s3 include: ... the extent and degree to which, and the manner in which, the publication ... [s3(3)] represents (whether directly or by implication) that members of any particular class of the public are inherently inferior ... [from s3(3)(e)] in such a manner that the availability of the  publication is likely to be injurious to the public good [from s3(1)]. 
In short, deciding this case involved at least these three points of application of the 
BOR.  At each step, the Moonen methodology requires adoption of such ‘tenable 
meaning and application as constitutes the least possible limitation’  
(Rishworth and McKenzie, 2000: 19-21, emphasis in original). 
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Counsel for the appellant therefore held that s14 BORA had not been applied 
as required.  Stating that this was compounded by a second error that was 
contrary to Moonen, that the Board had subordinated s14 – freedom of 
expression – to s19 – freedom from discrimination – BORA 1990.  If this were 
so, they claimed that s14 would be removed from the equation entirely, while 
Moonen states that a lawful decision made under the FVPCA requires that s14 
must be applied, not merely taken into account.   
 
Furthermore, counsel for the appellant claimed that there was no “clash” 
between the right to freedom from discrimination in s19 BORA, and freedom 
of expression provided for in s14: 
It is misconceived because it is not a case where Government owes two rights to two 
separate persons, such that its obligations to each of the two persons potentially 
conflict and need reconciliation.  Rather, Government is here restricting the freedom 
of expression of the appellant.  That is what engages s14.  Government is not 
discriminating against the respondent or gay people in general.  There is no person 
before the court who may claim s19as a shield against government action.  To 
repeat, the only person in this case that may invoke a right in the BOR is the 
appellant.  The appellant is the person whose freedom of expression is the subject of 
abrogation by Government (through the Board). 
 
Yet the Board’s approach assumes that the rights of persons under s19 to be free of 
discrimination are, as it were, ‘in play’.  That assumption, if examined, rests on a very 
complex and unarticulated chain of suppositions.  At its simplest, the implicit 
argument appears to be that: 
if the videos are shown, then ... 
some members of the public ... 
may in the future, ... 
develop attitudes that 
may lead to acts of discrimination ... 
But these discriminatory acts, even if they were to happen, would be perpetrated by 
private persons and not by Government, and hence by persons who are not even 
bound by the BOR to refrain from discrimination  
(Rishworth & McKenzie, 2000: 23, emphasis in original). 
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Yet, I believe this is incorrect.  While it is true that BORA applies to 
Government and its activities and not to private persons, and while the bulleted 
points in the appellants submissions are correct to a point, their counsel has not 
considered the acts of violence that surrounded the showing of these videos in 
each centre they appeared.  If the Board did not act to classify the videos as 
restricted in some way, the Board is complicit in allowing violence against a 
minority to continue.  Therefore the Board is effectively saying that it is 
acceptable to commit acts of violence against this group but not to commit 
them against other groups.  As Ioannis Mookas (1998: 354-355) states: 
Violence is always already present in the everyday lives of lesbians and gay men; it is 
part of the air we breathe. ... When added to the daily circulation of homophobic 
messages in popular culture, Gay Rights/Special Rights becomes a powerful 
incitement to violence, too powerful for some to resist.   
Any government body that encourages this violence by indicating it is 
acceptable, by not making any attempt to prevent it, is discriminating against 
the LGBT communities, and is therefore in breach of s19 BORA.  As indicated 
by Butler and Butler (2005), the Court of Appeal held the Board to be bound 
by s3 BORA, and, in accordance with the Court of Appeal ruling in Re J, 
private acts endangering rights allowed under BORA can be prevented by the 
judiciary. 
 
Tony Ellis, counsel for the NZCCL concentrated solely on issues of freedom 
of expression, pointing out the videos constitute political speech, and are 
historical because they precede 1990 relating to an American political debate 
occurring at that time, presenting a religious/moral point of view in that debate.  
Given that GR/SR was made in 1993 and contains information from both pre 
and post 1990, it was not ‘historical’ at the time the original complaints were 
made in 1995.  Furthermore, many of the concepts and ideas put forward in 
that video are still being discussed openly in America, and elsewhere, today.  
These ideas are used by individuals, groups and governments to restrict the 
rights of LGBT people, to criminalise (or continue the criminalisation of) 
LGBT people, and to execute LGBT people. 
 
Nevertheless, counsel for the NZCCL did state: 
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As Sedly LJ said recently in Redmond-Bate v DPP (1999) 7 BHRC 375, 382-383 Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome, the provocative provided it does not tend to provoke violence.  Freedom to only speak inoffensively is not worth having  
(Ellis, 2000: 3). 
This is, of course, true, and I would have no qualms with it because it 
specifically states “provided it does not tend to provoke violence”.  It is this 
violence, which occurred wherever and whenever these videos were shown in 
New Zealand that we were trying to stop, trying to prevent.  As shown above, 
in a very real sense, these videos provoked violence.  Nevertheless, Ellis 
continued to hold the position that these videos are propaganda rather than hate 
literature, neglecting the violence that occurs against the LGBT communities 
on a daily basis, to which these videos add, and to which these videos 
contribute (Mookas, 1993: 354-355).  As a result, the NZCCL took the ‘free 
speech is paramount’ line rather than a ‘protection from violence’ line. 
 
Although they acknowledged that Moonen came after the 1999 High Court 
hearing on the videos, NZCCL counsel insisted that the High Court had 
misapplied Moonen.  How a Court could misapply a decision that had not been 
made prior to the hearing?  At oral submission before the Court of Appeal, at 
which I was present, I remember their Counsel being asked this, though he 
appeared to ignore it, not providing a reply. 
 
In support of their submission, they cited Article 19 ICCPR, which deals 
specifically with freedom of expression and the restrictions allowable.  They 
included a quotation from the Human Rights Committee’s decision on 
Faurisson (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1996b).  
This entry led me to believe that if the videos were about race, ethnicity or 
religion, the NZCCL would have supported restrictions on the videos.  The 
paragraph they cited was the individual decision of Elizabeth Evatt and David 
Kretzmer, co-signed by Eckart Klein.  Evatt, Kretzmer and Klein supported the 
majority decision of no violation of the right to freedom of expression, and 
stated at paragraph 8, cited in part by Ellis (1996: 17): 
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The power given to States parties under article 19, paragraph 3, to place restrictions 
on freedom of expression, must not be interpreted as license to prohibit unpopular 
speech, or speech which some sections of the population find offensive. Much 
offensive speech may be regarded as speech that impinges on one of the values 
mentioned in article 19, paragraph 3 (a) or (b) (the rights or reputations of others, 
national security, ordre public, public health or morals). The Covenant therefore 
stipulates that the purpose of protecting one of those values is not, of itself, 
sufficient reason to restrict expression. The restriction must be necessary to protect 
the given value. This requirement of necessity implies an element of proportionality. 
The scope of the restriction imposed on freedom of expression must be proportional 
to the value which the restriction serves to protect. It must not exceed that needed 
to protect that value. As the Committee stated in its General Comment 10, the 
restriction must not put the very right itself in jeopardy UNHCR. 
 
Nevertheless, at paragraph four of their individual decision, Evatt, Kretzmer 
and Klein stated that incitement to certain types of discrimination was an 
allowable restriction on freedom of expression: 
 
Every individual has the right to be free not only from discrimination on grounds of 
race, religion and national origins, but also from incitement to such discrimination. 
This is stated expressly in article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is 
implicit in the obligation placed on States parties under article 20, paragraph 2, of 
the Covenant to prohibit by law any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. The crime for 
which the author was convicted under the Gayssot Act does not expressly include 
the element of incitement, nor do the statements which served as the basis for the 
conviction fall clearly within the boundaries of incitement, which the State party was 
bound to prohibit, in accordance with article 20, paragraph 2.  However, there may 
be circumstances in which the right of a person to be free from incitement to 
discrimination on grounds of race, religion or national origins cannot be fully 
protected by a narrow, explicit law on incitement that falls precisely within the 
boundaries of article 20, paragraph 2. This is the case where, in a particular social 
and historical context, statements that do not meet the strict legal criteria of 
incitement can be shown to constitute part of a pattern of incitement against a given 
racial, religious or national group, or where those interested in spreading hostility 
and hatred adopt sophisticated forms of speech that are not punishable under the 
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law against racial incitement, even though their effect may be as pernicious as 
explicit incitement, if not more so  
(UNHCR, 1996b: 16, emphasis added). 
 
While Article 20 cited by Evatt, Kretzmer and Klein, deals specifically with  
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence,  
Article 26 prohibits discrimination, and allows  
effective protection against discrimination,  
on the basis of  
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status  
(UN, 1966, articles 20 and 26).   
 
The UNHCR held, in the Toonen decision of 1994, that “sexual orientation” is 
included in “sex” in articles 2 (paragraph 1) and 26 ICCPR (UNHCR, 1994, 
paragraph 8.7).  Therefore, it could be held that “effective protection against 
discrimination” in Article 26 would therefore allow restriction on freedom of 
expression in the same way Article 20 allows restrictions on freedom of 
expression where that expression “constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence”, given the parameters set by Evatt, Kretzmer and Klein in 
the paragraph above.  This was not addressed in the Court of Appeal. 
 
Counsel of the HRC, Rodney Harrison QC, stated that the HRC’s main 
concern was not with the videos as such or a defence of specific censorship 
decisions, but was  
to see that New Zealand’s censorship laws are fully effective to enable censorship 
bodies to deal effectively with publications which incite or promote, or have a 
tendency to incite or promote, the kinds of discrimination which the Human Rights 
Act seeks to prohibit directly, and to educate the New Zealand public against  
(Harrison, 2000: 1).   
He also stated that s3(3)(e) FVPCA  
is seen by the HRC as both supporting and having been intended by Parliament to 
support those aims  
(Harrison, 2000: 1-2). 
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In reference to the gateway issue, Harrison (2000: 6-7) pointed out that rather 
than a mechanical approach of if a then b – if it qualifies under the gateway 
then and only then can it be considered for censorship, the law should be 
approached holistically.  It would be entirely possible to imagine a scenario in 
which a publication  
so seriously degraded, dehumanised or demeaned a particular person or group of 
persons, but without describing, depicting, or otherwise dealing with any of the 
matters listed in 3(1) that questions of censorship on the grounds of injury to the 
public good might well arise  
(Harrison, 2000: 7).   
Similarly, it would be possible to envision a similar scenario where a person or 
group of people was represented as being inherently inferior to others because 
of their membership of that group. 
 
For example, the images and text in Der ewige Jude (Hørnshøj-Moller, 1997) 
do so.  Although it is an offence against s131 HRA 1993 to incite racial 
disharmony  
on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of 
persons,  
it is not a crime.  Nor is it a crime, or even an offence, to incite disharmony 
against a person because of their religion.  It would therefore be possible to use 
images and text similar to that used in Der ewige Jude (Hørnshøj-Moller, 
1997) to legally create a publication that incited disharmony against Christians, 
or a particular group of Christians, or Muslims, or <name of religion here>. 
 
In terms of the appellants ground relating to a Moonen analysis of the Board’s 
decision, counsel for the HRC pointed out that Moonen was only about 
freedom of expression, and that BORA not only had “freedom to” rights, but 
also “freedom from” rights, including freedom from discrimination, contained 
in s19 (Harrison, 2000: 22-23).  He contended this interplay of freedom 
to/from was important and in order to consider whether a limitation on 
freedom of expression was justifiable under law,  
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some analysis of the nature of the (contemporary New Zealand) society in question 
is justified  
(Harrison, 2000: 23).   
Counsel then built up the argument that restrictions on freedom of expression 
allowable under s3(3)(e) FVPCA  
in the context of s3 of the Act as a whole [have] been developed as an expansion of 
earlier statutory restrictions on freedom of speech, which were particularly directed 
to protection from racist utterance.  These protections were progressively extended 
to other prohibited grounds of discrimination as these became the subject of human 
rights legislation.  While the present case is about sexual orientation as a 
‘characteristic’, it could just as easily have been about race, or gender, for example. 
Because s3(3)(e) properly and inevitably draws no qualitative distinction between 
the various prohibited grounds of discrimination, the s5 Bill of Rights evaluation 
must it is submitted likewise consider the implications of any limitation on freedom 
of speech in the context not merely of the particular prohibited grounds in issue, but 
across the whole range of grounds and consequently of protected groups  
(Harrison, 2000: 24). 
 
Harrison then showed the development of restrictions on freedom of 
expression across a number of New Zealand laws, from the repealed Race 
Relations Act 1971, the Films Act 1983 and the Video Recordings Act 1987, 
to those contained in the current HRA 1993 and the then current Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 (subsequently replaced by the Employment Relations Act 
2000, continuing the same restrictions contained in the earlier Act).  He 
continued, stating that 
The New Zealand tradition, therefore, is not one of invariably upholding unrestricted 
freedom of speech at the expense of significant injury to the reputations or indeed 
the feelings of others, in particular racial or minority groups.  ...  Freedom of speech 
in New Zealand is therefore not seen as an end in itself, but as a means to an end.  
Unrestrictive freedom of speech has not been seen as conducive to the enduring 
vision of New Zealand as the tolerant, mutually supportive but essentially cohesive 
society  
(Harrison, 2000: 25-26). 
 
Counsel for the Attorney General, Claudia Geiringer, pointed out that the 
Board treated the videos as dealing with matters ‘such as’ sex because they 
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dealt with sexually transmissible infections and matters of sexuality, while the 
High Court treated them as dealing with matters ‘such as’ sex because 
homosexual sex was dealt with, and because the nature of s3(3)(e),  
 ‘more explicitly’ justifies the inclusion of ‘sexual orientation’ in the matters within 
s3(1)’s purview  
(Geiringer & Warburton, 2000: 8).   
Geiringer also urged the Court to look at other cases and documents where 
‘such as’ was giving a wider reading than a purely  
salacious prurient, or gratuitous nature, for example, portrayals of explicit sex and 
violence  
(Geiringer & Warburton, 2000: 8).   
These documents not only included those relating to the drafting history of the 
Bill, but to international documents and treaties, such as the ECHR, where the 
phrase ‘such as’, given in the list  
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion 
... or other status  
has  
been treated as illustrative and not exhaustive (see Engels & Ors v The Netherlands 
(No 1) (1976) 1 EHRR 647, para 72, and James v United Kingdom (1968) 8 EHRR 123, 
para 123) 
(Geiringer & Warburton, 2000: 9).   
 
Counsel for the Attorney General was making it clear that a restrictive 
meaning for ‘such as’, allowing only the five subjects of sex, horror, crime, 
cruelty or violence, would be contrary to national and international 
developments, and the intention of Parliament. 
 
Considering the request for a Moonen analysis, Geiringer and Warburton 
(2000: 21) stated that  
The Attorney-General agrees with the appellant that there is little support for the 
view that regulation of hate propaganda in this context triggers a direct conflict 
between ss14 and 19 of the Bill of Rights.  However, even if s19 is not directly 
triggered, it is nevertheless highly relevant to the Board’s task in that it indicates a 
strong legislative commitment to the ideals of equality and human dignity which also 
underlie s3(3)(e) of the Classification Act. 
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Observing that the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the 
ICCPR all contain obligations on States party to protect vulnerable groups 
from discrimination and hate propaganda, counsel for the Attorney General 
also noted that they tended to widen and extend the reach of anti-
discriminatory principles.  However, the restriction on freedom of expression 
in relation to hate propaganda has remained restricted to race and religion 
Geiringer and Warburton (2000: 22).  Nevertheless, statutes in various 
countries and states are widening that limitation to include sexual orientation 
and other grounds.  The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 of NSW, in particular, 
ss38R-38T, 49ZS-49ZTA, and 49ZXA-49ZXC, which also make vilification 
on transgender status, homosexuality or HIV status illegal, is a case of a near 
neighbour which has done so.  Similarly, Queensland amended their Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 to extend the anti-vilification section in s124A and 
the serious vilification section in s131A to include sexuality or gender identity. 
 
Noting that the counsel for the appellant claimed that the videos were  
expressing a view that homosexual sexual activity is morally wrong and sinful, when 
judged against the teachings of the Bible and Christianity,  
Frances Joychild, counsel for the NZAF, as Intervenor, agreed that if it were 
so,  
there can be no censorship of them  
(Joychild, 2000: 4).   
Nevertheless, indicating that to suggest this is the theme of the videos was 
incorrect, she submitted that there are two dominant and most injurious aspects 
of the videos: 
The first aspect is their likeliness to create, in the mind of the viewer, strong 
emotions of fear, horror and repulsion against homosexuals as a class and a 
powerful sense of threat to the viewer from homosexuals as a class.  In seeking to 
attain this purpose they represent homosexuals as ‘other’ and inferior.  The 
potential effect is intended and calculated – despite a few words which may be to 
the contrary in each.  The videos seek to create their effect in two ways.  First by 
linking people of homosexual orientation to a range of repulsive and abhorrent 
sexual practices.  Examples abound but include: 
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 67 The ingestion of faeces, they engage in such things as anal intercourse, they engage in such things ... that’s known as fisting, in which one person takes his fist and, ah, its inserted into the anus of the other person. The ingestion of urine, urinating on one another, it’s called golden showers.  They do rimming where they lick on another’s rectums. 68 After a while I knew this was abnormal.  Twenty three year old men with colostomy bags? ... I mean everyone was gravitating towards this intense sex. 81 An unquenchable sexual desire eliminates any moral integrity. 83 A moderately active homosexual, can average thirty to fifty different sexual partners a year. ... And those homosexuals who frequent gay resorts or bath houses can be involved in sexual orgies with ten to fifteen partners a night resulting in more than five hundred sexual partners a year. 
 
Even when referring to non sexual aspects of homosexual life, such as emotional 
relationships, homosexuals are disparaged and these aspects are quickly linked to 
claimed sexual behaviour: 107 homosexuality tends to be very compulsive, whither it an emotional level and sexual, or just plain sexual level; it’s very compulsive, very controlling, um, so like I say, it can range from mutual masturbation all the way up to defecating on one another. 
 
The videos also aim to provoke fear, repulsion and horror of homosexuals, by 
suggesting homosexuals as a class have a callous, cynical and calculated disregard for 
the safety, health and rights of others and in this way representing homosexuals as 
of a lower class.  Examples include: 85 Since March 1985 a blood test for AIDS has been available to the general public, however, many homosexuals refuse to take the test. 88 Doctors warned officials that the blood pollution was directly attributable to donations from IV drug users and homosexuals.  Nevertheless public health authorities failed to act for three reasons.  First there was pressure from the homosexual community which did not want to be discriminated against ... public health officials are far more concerned with appeasing the homosexual community.  (Emphasis added) 
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 112 Those in the infectious disease area know that homosexuality spreads hepatitis B, venereal diseases and AIDS so we cannot say that this is a normal, healthy lifestyle, not matter how active they get politically. 119 As a result of political manipulation by homosexual leaders people with AIDS who have knowingly infected other go unprosecuted while doctors who simply tell a nurse that a person has AIDS, is subject to prosecution. 126 Also represented in the lesbian and gay rights struggle is an organisation called NAMBLA.  Founded in 1978 the North American Man Boy Love Association may soon change its name to include all adult sex with children ... 127 They maintain that if an adult could have sex with a child, the adult’s possibility of acquiring AIDS would be greatly reduced, if not eliminated. 
127 The above commentary is followed by a scene of a gay man 
walking on the march with a child on his shoulders with a banner 
saying ‘Parents Flag’.  Thus linking gay fathers to paedophilia. 
 
These descriptions of extreme and offensive sexual practices impugned to 
homosexuals, and representations that they have gross and callous disregard of the 
health and safety of others appears to be aimed to work on the aforesaid emotions 
so as to exhort and motivate people to ‘act’ against homosexuals, particularly (but 
importantly not exclusively) to deprive homosexuals of equality of rights.  
(Joychild, 2000: 4-6). 
 
Noting there is one reference stating those viewing the videos should love 
AIDS victims as Jesus loved lepers and one indicating they are against 
assaulting gay men, counsel for the NZAF notes that in the above  
it is significant that these fighting words have an ‘open ended’ quality about them  
(Joychild, 2000: 6-7). 
 
Taking the above examples into consideration, and numerous others 
throughout the videos, responding to the gateway claim of the appellant, 
Joychild stated: 
Regardless of whether 3(1) is a precursor to 3(3) submitted that the test is met.  
While explicit descriptions of sexual behaviour, attributed to homosexuals as a class, 
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are not the majority of the words in the videos they play a pivotal role in the overall 
thesis and purpose of the video.  The descriptions of sex are a necessary part of the 
engendering of repulsion, shock, and fear which again are the emotions used to 
motivate the viewer to ‘act against the homosexual agenda’. 
 
If, contrary to this the Court views the videos as not one describing matters such as 
sex, horror then it is submitted that the videos come within the wider ambit of the 
words matters such as.  The words were deliberately inserted so as not to close off 
the definition of matters likely to be considered harmful and so as to  accommodate 
changing social perceptions. 
 
The presence of 3(3)(e) is an indication of a modern social perception, and one 
endorsed by Parliament, that persons, including homosexual persons, should not be 
represented as inherently inferior.  To do so is harmful.  As such material which may 
do this is entitled to be classified further to section 3 of the Act  
(Joychild, 2000: 37-38). 
 
Les Taylor and Antoinette Russell, counsel for the respondent, were clear that 
the Board was accurate in its assessment of the videos ability to meet the 
gateway requirements, as they specifically dealt with “matters such as sex ...”, 
and indicating that Parliament was unambiguous in its intention to ensure that 
the phrase “such as” was wider: 
The then Minister of Justice, Hon, Doug Graham, stated that: 
the inclusion of the words ‘such as’ in clause 3(1) ensures that the 
definition of matters likely to be considered harmful is not closed off.  That 
is important, because the legislation must have the flexibility to 
accommodate changing social perceptions.  In summary, the Bill manifests 
a clear intention to strengthen the censorship laws, and gives censors the 
tools to carry out that task ... (Hansard, 1993, 17 052). 
 
The impression gained from reading Counsel for the Appellant’s submissions is that 
the word ‘sex’ as it appears in s3(1) is confined to meaning, essentially, the physical 
act of sexual intercourse and even then, on one suggested interpretation, is limited 
to sex which has ‘features of horror, crime etc’ (paragraph 5.21 of Appellants 
submissions).  It is submitted that there is no justification for reading s3(1) such a 
way  
(Taylor & Russell, 2000: 5). 
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Counsel therefore held that the words ‘such as’, were to be interpreted as 
meaning ‘for example’, and furthermore, in line with the submission from the 
NZAF, that in dealing with a discussion on same sex sexual acts, the videos 
therefore deal with matters ‘such as sex’ (Taylor & Russell, 2000: 6).   
 
In regards to the Moonen analysis urged by counsel for the appellant, 
respondent’s counsel agreed with the HRC and others that not only must s14 
BORA, dealing with freedom of expression be taken into account on such an 
analysis, but also s19, dealing with freedom from discrimination (Taylor & 
Russell, 2000: 9-12). 
 
In reply, counsel for the appellant stated that the Minister of Justice’s 
statement before Parliament  
does no more than indicate that matters of the same kind and nature as those 
referred to were intended to be included.  This statement cannot be used to support 
an interpretation of the provision which would permit bringing under the subsection 
matters akin to the depiction of sex in a gratuitous of a salacious manner, cruelty, 
violence, horror – all indicate images of a grossly offensive and emotionally charged 
kind  
(McKenzie & Rishworth, 2000: 6).   
Much of their remaining submission reiterated points already made, yet 
continued to ignore the discrimination the videos engendered, the violence that 
followed them around the country, and that Article 19(3) ICCPR allows 
restriction on freedom of expression for  
respect of the rights or reputations of others.   
 
During the hearing, on 10 and 11 July 2000, I recall Gault J stating that if the 
Courts did not take s19 BORA into account, then they were not applying 
BORA correctly, as they have a duty to consider the whole Act, not just parts 
of it.  Therefore it is possible to have a ‘clash’ between certain sets of rights, in 
this case freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination, and 
therefore the Courts or any judicial body would need to balance the whole, 
taking, as Harrison (2000: 6) said, an holistic approach.   Tipping J then asked 
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McKenzie what would happen if, in allowing for freedom of expression, the 
court breaks the spirit of freedom from discrimination.  The notes I took have 
McKenzie replying that the Government’s wish to allow freedom from 
discrimination is worthy in some cases, but not in others (emphasis added).  
When Richardson J asked if the words of s3(3)(e) should be read down, 
McKenzie replied “yes”.  It therefore appears that counsel for the appellant 
believes some forms of discrimination against the LGBT communities are 
acceptable. 
 
During the respondent’s reply, Thomas J stated he had difficulty in seeing 
sexual orientation as a sub-branch of sex, and under the appellant’s ‘gateway’ 
principle, sexual orientation would not be able to be read into it, yet also noted 
that a video based on race would also not be able to pass through the 
‘gateway’.  
 
On 31 August, the Court of Appeal gave its decision.  The Court agreed with 
the appellant that the gateway was the first hurdle before anything could be 
censored.  As such, they remitted the videos back to the Board for 
reconsideration.  Thomas J who concurred with the majority decision, but 
would have quashed the decision of the Board and the High Court entirely, 
agreed that the videos do cause harm: 
While directed at the danger of an AIDS epidemic in the one case and the threat of 
an enlarged protection of civil rights embracing homosexuals in the other, both 
videos reveal an abhorrence of what is called the ‘homosexual lifestyle’.  This phrase 
is used persistently throughout the videos without being defined.  It is, however, 
identified with promiscuous and irresponsible sexual behaviour by male 
homosexuals.  Lack of balance is evident in the dogmatic way in which these 
characteristics are attributed to all homosexuals, and there is no recognition of the 
diversity of homosexual associations which do not accord with this stereotyped 
description. Nor is any appreciation shown as to the nature and depth of gay and 
homosexual orientation, such as the appreciation which has resulted in sexual 
orientation becoming a prohibited ground of discrimination in this and other 
countries. The propensity for such presentations to cause harm is apparent: they 
may mislead the uninformed; they simplify the issues in a manner which is 
unrealistic; they give credence to false facts and figures; they demean and trivialise 
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homosexual associations which do not fit the popular negative stereotype; they are 
hurtful and oppressive to the homosexual community; they pose a wounding 
challenge to the personal belief that sexual orientation is a deeply personal 
characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable 
personal costs; they may psychologically scar homosexual individuals who would not 
otherwise repress their sexual orientation; and they tend to victimise and alienate a 
sizeable proportion of the population (Living Word Distributors (Ltd) v Human Rights 
Group (Wellington), [2000]  NZCA 179  
(31 August 2000), para 67). 
 
The Court explained their decision (Living Word Distributors (Ltd) v Human 
Rights Group (Wellington), [2000]  NZCA 179) thus: 
[25]  Clearly, and as brought out in that para [4], s3(1) serves two purposes.  The 
first is to define the reach of censorship in terms of the subject matter of 
the publication.  The second is to set the test of ‘injurious to the public 
good’ as the yardstick for determining whether a publication which has 
qualified in terms of subject matter can be classified as objectionable.  
[26]  ‘Such’ is a flexible relative word whose meaning is to be gathered from the 
context in which it is used.  The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed) notes 
that syntactically it may have backward or forward reference.  In 
combination, the words following the expression ‘such as’ may be 
demonstrative of the words which precede it without restricting the 
breadth of the preceding words; or they may introduce examples of a class 
and in context limit the meaning to the kinds or types specified.  Clearly, the 
description of the subject matter in s3(1) is used in that latter sense.  If it 
were intended that ‘matters’ should extend to ‘all matters’, there would be 
no need for the expression ‘such as’ and no sense in it.  
[27]  The words ‘matters such as’ in context are both expanding and limiting. 
They expand the qualifying content beyond a bare focus on one of the five 
categories specified.  But the expression ‘such as’ is narrower than 
‘includes’, which was the term used in defining ‘indecent’ in the repealed 
Indecent Publications Act 1963.Given the similarity of the content 
description in the successive statutes, ‘such as’ was a deliberate departure 
from the unrestricting ‘includes’.  
[28]  The words used in s3 limit the qualifying publications to those that can fairly 
be described as dealing with matters of the kinds listed.  In that regard, too, 
the collocation of words ‘sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence’, as the 
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matters dealt with, tends to point to activity rather than to the expression 
of opinion or attitude.  
[29]  That, in our view, is the scope of the subject matter gateway.  Thus, in 
answer to Mr McKenzie's alternative submission, there is no justification for 
reading down ‘matters such as sex’ by limiting the expression to abusive or 
degrading sex.  However, features of that kind will be relevant at the next 
step in determining whether the publication deals with the subject matter 
in such a manner that the availability of the publication is likely to be 
injurious to the public good; and in applying subss (3) and (4).  
[30]  Equally, the presence of the subject matter requirement of s3(1) cannot be 
ignored or by-passed or added to by invoking s3(3)(e).The subject matter 
provision is obviously designed as imposing an immediate limitation on the 
reach of the censorship laws.  Parliament could never have intended that a 
simple test of ‘injurious to the public good’ could be used to ban discussion 
of any subject.  
[31]  We are also satisfied that the High Court erred in concluding in its para [9] 
(para [15] above) that the reference to s21(1) of the Human Rights Act in 
s3(3)(e) of the 1993 Act justifies including sexual orientation, race and 
gender within the s3(1) net.  In terms of the statutory scheme, and 
consistently with s3(1), the opening words of subs (2) ‘A publication shall be 
deemed objectionable’ and of subs (3) ‘In determining ... whether or not 
any publication ... is objectionable’ must refer to a publication qualifying as 
to subject matter under the preceding subs (1). That conclusion is 
reinforced by the consideration that subs (3) is concerned only with the 
weight to be given in determining whether the publication is objectionable.  
Further, all six categories in s3(2) and categories (a) to (d) of s3(3) can 
readily be related back to the subject matter referred to in s3(1).And, the 
written submissions for the Attorney-General note that, whereas 
international anti-discrimination principles have gradually extended their 
reach to protect wider classes of vulnerable persons, the international 
prohibitions of hate propaganda have remained confined to the categories 
of race and religion; and that prohibition of hate propaganda is not seen as 
synonymous with more general anti-discrimination protections.  
[32]  In that context there could be no warrant for reading s3(3)(e) as importing 
all of the grounds of discrimination specified in s21(1) of the Human Rights 
Act as stand alone topics for potential censorship.  Those grounds include 
age, religion, political opinion, employment status, and receipt of a social 
benefit as well as race, ethnic origin, disability, family status and sexual 
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orientation.  If a publication dealing with a matter coming within s3(1) 
represents that members of a particular class of the public are inherently 
inferior by reason of a characteristic of members of that class within 
s3(3)(e), then s3(3) of course requires that particular weight be given to that 
feature of the publication.  That is the purpose and effect of s3(3)(e) in the 
statutory scheme.  
[33]  In short, the 1993 Act recognises an obvious distinction between censorship 
legislation with its proper purpose and subject matter and anti-
discrimination legislation with its own (different) purpose and subject 
matter.  As well, each has its own remedies and sanctions.  Section 3(1) sets 
boundaries of content-based regulation of speech.  The applicability of s21 
Human Rights Act grounds is included under s3(3)(e) as a factor to be 
weighed in relation to subject matter coming within s3(1), not as a separate 
reason for censorship.  
[34]  For these reasons we are satisfied that the High Court (particularly in its 
para [9]) and the Board erred in law in the interpretation of s3(1). However, 
it seems, in terms of the High Court's description of the videos (para [2]) 
and its initial conclusion in its para [8] (para 15 above), that the videos to 
some extent describe, depict or deal with sexual practices and accordingly 
may come within the expression ‘matters such as sex’. It is unnecessary to 
examine this point any further because, for reasons we shall give when 
dealing with the second question, we are satisfied that the error of law 
involved there requires reconsideration of the videos by the Board and on 
any such reconsideration the Board will be required to determine in terms 
of our interpretation of s3(1) whether, as to subject matter, the videos can 
be considered for classification under the 1993 Act. 
 
This in itself was sufficient for the appeal to be won and the videos sent back 
to the Board for reconsideration, but the Court also found the High Court and 
the Board had made an error in law in respect to Moonen and BORA: 
[38]  In its para [13] the High Court saw the right to free expression (s14) as 
clashing with the right to freedom from discrimination (s19) and thought 
that clash might be seen to be a specific pointer towards the modification of 
the s14 right to freedom of expression.  It was because they saw s19 as 
incorporating ‘the very same protection about which the decision of the 
Board is concerned’ that they considered it not helpful to refer to s6 (the 
High Court's para [14]).While accepting that fundamental rights in the Bill of 
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Rights were not to be seen as taken away by general words in the 1993 Act, 
they considered that the argument ran straight into the s19 right (the High 
Court's para [17]).And they agreed that the sting in the videos, which 
according to the Board was the degradation of homosexuals, lesbians, 
bisexuals and others, ran counter to s21(1) of the Human Rights Act and 
was to be rejected by the Board in terms of the 1993 Act underpinned by 
s19.  
[39]  As a matter of interpretation we have already suggested that the expression 
of the subject matter in s3(1) tends to point to activity rather than to the 
expression of opinion or attitude (para [25]).To construe likely injury to the 
public good in s3(1) in that light would accord with s6 of the Bill of Rights 
and provide a reasonable limit as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society (s5).  
[40]  Further, the balancing required by s3 must be infused by due consideration 
of the application of the Bill of Rights.  The inquiry is whether the depiction 
in the videos of a qualifying subject matter (such as sex) is in such a manner 
that the availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public 
good.  At that point s14 must be given full weight in the application of s3(1), 
but s19 does not apply directly.  Section 3(3)(e) incorporates by reference 
the characteristics specified in s21(1) of the Human Rights Act as prohibited 
grounds of discrimination to which s19 applies.  To the extent that s3(3)(e) 
has application of the particular subject matter of s3(1) the values 
underlying s19 are imported and become particular considerations in the 
assessment of objectionability under s3(1).  
[41]  But in terms of the statutory scheme there is no direct clash of rights. 
Rather, it is a matter of approaching the ultimate inquiry under s3 as 
indicated in Moonen.  The Bill of Rights is a limitation on governmental, not 
private conduct.  The ultimate inquiry under s3 involves balancing the rights 
of a speaker and of the members of the public to receive information under 
s14 of the Bill of Rights as against the State interest under the 1993 Act in 
protecting individuals from harm caused by the speech. And the 
fundamental error on the part of the High Court was in treating s19 as 
prevailing over s14.  
[42]  That same error permeates the Board of Review's approach in invoking s19 
of the Bill of Rights.  Indeed, while the Board noted that s6 of the Bill of 
Rights requires ambiguities in the 1993 Act to be given a meaning consistent 
with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, it concluded 
that the legislative scheme of the 1993 Act, the Human Rights Act, and the 
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apparently competing rights in ss14 and 19 of the Bill of Rights provided 
some indication that, in a contest between the freedom of expression and 
the right to be free from discrimination, at least with respect to publications 
falling within s3(3)(e) of the 1993 Act, that right to be free from 
discrimination should prevail (p434).They went on to hold (p435) that when 
the rights in s14 and s19 came into conflict with each other, ‘the legislation 
gives precedence to the right to be free from discrimination’;and that if 
there is any doubt about that interpretation of the censorship legislation s6 
of the Bill of Rights would suggest that such doubt should be resolved in 
favour of s19.Put bluntly, it is an assertion that s19 trumps s14 and, 
extraordinarily, that s6 produces that result.  
[43]  It may be that the Board in its decision intended to convey that on its 
assessment the test of likely injury to the public good in s3(1) was made out 
even after giving due weight to the freedom of expression, and that in its 
preceding review of the relevant statutory provisions it was merely 
recognising that censorship in that situation necessarily limits freedom of 
expression which is just what the legislature contemplated.  However, as 
explained, the terms employed in that review go further than that and 
indicate error of law.  
[44]  It follows that both the High Court and the Board misdirected themselves in 
law as to the impact of the Bill of Rights in this case.  The only reasonable 
course is to remit the matter to the Board of Review for it to begin afresh.  
In doing so it will obviously need to assess whether the focus of the videos 
was, as the High Court saw it (para [2] above), on the expression of political 
and social opinion  
(Living Word Distributors (Ltd) v Human Rights Group 
(Wellington), [2000]  NZCA 179). 
 
The Court therefore concluded that: 
[51] The court has unanimously concluded that the Full Court erred in law, as did 
the Board of Review.  The appeal is allowed, the decisions of the Full Court 
and the Board are quashed and the matter is remitted to the Board.  On any 
reconsideration of the videos the Board will no doubt review their content 
having regard to the observations made in this judgment and the judgment 
of Thomas J.  We should add that we cannot see any possible basis in law 
for importing into s3 of the 1993 Act the anti discrimination provisions on 
public health grounds of s21(1)(h)(vii) of the Human Rights Act, as the Board 
did in its decision (para [23] above)  
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(Living Word Distributors (Ltd) v Human Rights Group 
(Wellington), [2000]  NZCA 179). 
 
This means that before any publication can be classified, it must deal with sex, 
horror, crime, cruelty or violence, and that the publication must depict such 
matters, and not merely be a discussion about them.  Combining this with a 
Moonen analysis as required, it means that only publications that deal with 
active depictions of sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence that are the worst of 
its kind, may be classified as objectionable, and publications may be restricted 
only if they deal with active depictions of sex, horror, crime, cruelty or 
violence to a lesser degree. 
 
What the Court of Appeal has done, therefore, is to effectively nullify 
subsections 3(3)(c) and (e) of the Act, which Parliament had intended to be 
able to protect the vulnerable, which, I believe, is in breach of s4(a) of BORA: 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after 
the commencement of this Bill of Rights),— 
Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in 
any way invalid or ineffective  
... 
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of 
Rights. 
 
As a result, the Board requested submissions on the two videos.  However, 
because of the restrictions imposed by the Court of Appeal, above, and 
regardless of submissions made pointing out the intent of Parliament, which 
indicates the intent behind s3(3)(e), and the ability to restrict freedom of 
expression under Article 19(3) ICCPR, the Board of Review had no option but 
to classify the videos as unrestricted as they did not fall within the matters sex 
out in s3(1) of the Act (Board of Review, 2001: 21-22). 
 
Nevertheless, Stephanie de Montalk, in a dissenting decision stated that the 
videos should be able to be classified, and should retain the R18 rating 
imposed by the OFLC in 1996.  Citing the paragraph from Thomas, above, she 
states: 
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It is my view that while the videos do indeed express attitudes and opinions, they 
also deal with sex or matters of sex in a manner that, in accordance with s3(l), is 
injurious to the public good, and therefore fall within the censorship scope of the 
Classification Act. 
 
It is also my view that, given the likely effect of these videos on young persons at a 
stage in their lives when they are coming to terms with issues of sexual identity, and 
in particular on young persons who are reaching the realisation that they might be 
gay, they should be classified as restricted to persons 18 years of age and over  
(de Montalk, 2001: 1). 
 
That would have been the end of the matter, but politicians were sufficiently 
concerned at the Court of Appeal abrogating the right of Parliament to request 
a Parliamentary investigation.  This is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 13: The Parliamentary Route 
 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification (Prohibition of Child 
Pornography) Amendment Bill 2000 
 
The first Parliamentary business to arise as a result of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision and subsequent decision by the Board was a Private Member’s Bill by 
Anne Tolley, then the Women’s Affairs spokesperson for the National Party.  
Her Bill, referred to the Government Administration Select Committee, sought 
specifically to have greater controls on child pornography, and was initially a 
response to the Moonen decision (Tolley, 2000). 
 
Supporting the Bill in essence, in my submission, I noted: 
I support the intention of Clause 4, but cannot support the way in which it is written.  
The Living Word decision showed that the Moonen decision can be used against any 
case referred to the Film and Literature Board of Review (the Board), or the Office, 
to drastic effect.  When combined with the Living Word decision, the results are 
even more drastic.  The gateway placed before the application of the Act would rule 
out many publications which could be classified as objectionable before the Living 
Word decision was made.  Now, not only does the Office have to take into 
consideration the requirements in the Act – ‘matters such as sex, horror, crime, 
cruelty, or violence’, but can only consider the worst of those kinds under that 
gateway.  The way in which clause 4 is written will not deal with this new 
requirement placed on the Office by the Court of Appeal through the Living Word 
decision. Thus it would entirely possible, even with this Bill enacted, to have child 
pornography available that would exploit those children sexually, or exploit their 
nudity, because they would not be ‘the worst of their kind’  
(Bennachie, 2000b: 3). 
 
As a result of this, I recommended that subsection 3(1) of the principle Act be 
rewritten as: 
3. Meaning of ‘objectionable’---(1) For the purposes of this Act, being a reasonable 
limit on freedom of expression in a free and democratic society, a publication is 
objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such 
as but not limited to sex, horror, crime, vilification, hatred, cruelty, violence, or 
246 
 
genocide in such a manner that the availability of the publication is likely to be 
injurious to the public good  
(Bennachie, 2000b: 4). 
 
This would have the double intention of nullifying both the Moonen and Living 
Word decisions of the Court of Appeal, allowing the Act to operate in the way 
Parliament had intended.  Because of the narrow focus on child pornography, I 
submitted: 
Under the Bill as it is written, it would still allow graphic images of rape and other 
forms of pornography that the Bill was originally intended to capture.  Even 
considering the Living Word decision, there are publications which would have been 
captured by the Act which would no longer be captured because of the Moonen and 
Living Word decision.  This current Bill is too narrow in its focus to capture those and 
allow them to be censored.  Freedom of expression would still be held paramount 
when it came to publications other than child pornography which are covered by this 
Bill.  This would include, among others, publications that dealt with rape or other 
sexualised violence as long as it ‘was not the worst of its kind’.  It would also allow 
hate literature, which the Act was originally intended to cover.  I shall devote some 
space to this  
(Bennachie, 2000b: 6). 
 
During the oral hearings I showed members a photograph that had been sent to 
me by e-mail that the Act had originally meant to capture: a posed photograph 
of boys around 14, partly or nearly completely undressed, but wearing parts of 
Scout uniforms.  By the combination of the Moonen and Living Word 
decisions – it must involve sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence with an 
active component, and be among the worst of its kind – it would no longer be 
able to be censored let alone classified in any way.  Members clearly found the 
image distasteful and offensive, and were surprised that the image could no 
longer be considered for classification.  The Chief Censor, present at the 
hearings, confirmed this. 
 
Ironically, the SPCS, which had long sought an extension to, and toughening 
of, censorship law, opposed the Bill, ostensibly because it did not go far 
enough, but in oral submissions, admitted that they did not want to see a 
247 
 
change in law that could overturn the Living Word decision, despite their 
written submission claiming they supported a tightening of the legislation 
(SPCS, 2000: 3). 
 
Nevertheless, David Lane, representing the SPCS, claimed during oral 
submissions I had misrepresented the Living Word decision, and attempted to 
say the Living Word decision did not mean the worst of its kind could only be 
considered for censorship, and that it did not mean that the ‘matter such as sex’ 
had to be active.  Given an opportunity to reply, in a supplementary 
submission, I noted: 
I was the respondent in the Living Word case that was heard before the Court of 
Appeal on 10 and 11 July 2000, with the decision being made on 31 August.  ...  Mr 
Lane was not a party to that case, nor was he present for the bulk of the case, or the 
delivery of the judgement.  He accused me of misrepresenting the Living Word 
Decision.  This is, with all due respect, incorrect.  Mr Lane also stated that the videos 
in question in the Living Word case were political.  That is a moot point.  They are 
propaganda aimed specifically at a minority group in New Zealand, and are as bad as 
the propaganda film Der ewige Jude produced for Nazi Germany against the Jews.  
Propaganda is of necessity, political in nature, regardless of whether it is attacking a 
group of people on the basis of their race, religion, or sexual orientation.  Given the 
Living Word decision, it would be difficult to see how the Chief Censor could now 
classify any hate literature targeted at any minority group in New Zealand as they 
have been able to do so in the past  
(Bennachie, 2000c: 1). 
 
I also cited various paragraphs from the Living Word decision, including 
paragraph 27, which specifically stated that  
the collocation of words ‘sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence’, as the matters dealt 
with, tends to point to activity rather than to the expression of opinion or attitude  
(NZCA 179 [2000]).  
I also reported the summation of Thomas J upon the delivery of the decision: 
that for a publication to be objectionable and injurious to the public good, it 
must be the worst of its kind (Bennachie, 2000b: 4). 
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Inquiry into the Operation of the Films, Videos and Publications Act and 
Related Matters 
 
The outcome of this was an Inquiry into the Operation of the Films, Videos 
and Publications Act and Related Matters, rather than an amendment to the 
Act.  This was heard in 2001. 
 
Relying on a Vox Deus argument, the Reformed Churches of New Zealand 
came heavily in favour of the Living Word decision: 
Christians are compelled to denounce homosexual practice as sinful and to be 
condemned and avoided. This warning is not just for homosexuals, but for all people 
both within and without the Church. When the Church objects to homosexuality she 
does so out of deep compassion for the sinner, and urges that person to repent of 
their sin of homosexuality and turn to Christ for Salvation. 
 
If such a Church attitude is deemed to be ‘objectionable’ in terms of the Act, the 
Church will be forced to rebel against any arm of Government which tries to muzzle 
her denunciation of sin  
(Reformed Churches of New Zealand, 2001: 3). 
 
The CHP (2001: 2) submitted: 
Today, there are some who wish to prevent others from expressing their views 
about contentious issues.  A current example is homosexuality. There are some in 
the present Government who appear unable to tolerate opinions which conflict with 
their own, and are seeking to repress, by legislation, those who would speak out 
against homosexuality. This is done under the guise of human rights. To Justify their 
planned abuse of power, they euphemistically label their opponents' views as ‘hate 
speech’ or ‘hate propaganda’. Even if it is granted, purely for the sake of argument, 
that such labelling is correct then the Committee should take careful note of 
paragraph 31 of the Living Word decision in which the Court of Appeal stated that: The written submissions for the Attorney-General note that, whereas international anti-discrimination principles have gradually extended their reach to protect wider classes of vulnerable persons, the international prohibitions of hate propaganda have remained confined to the categories of race and religion; and that prohibition of hate propaganda is not seen as synonymous with more general anti-discrimination protections. 
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This ignores changes to the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 that outlawed 
vilification on the grounds of homosexuality, etc., and the similar changes to 
the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991. 
 
They continued: 
We do not grant the propriety of the inclusion of sexual orientation in anti-
discrimination legislation. New Zealanders are being forced to accept the lifestyles of 
others, which are plainly offensive to them. It must never be forgotten that freedom 
from discrimination is not universal. No one suggests that child molestation, drug 
addiction, or other aberrant behaviour be tolerated. Our society does not treat all 
with equal respect, nor should it do so. But now many New Zealanders are being 
forced to tolerate and accept that which is repulsive to them. 
 
What makes this even more offensive is that homosexuals are not a vulnerable class 
of persons.  They constitute a vocal and powerful group within New Zealand society. 
What happened in the Living Word case is demonstrative of their influence. 
 
It is clear from the parameters of the inquiry that the Committee is considering the 
need for legislation to overturn the Living Word decision. To do so would not only 
violate the Bill of Rights Act 1990, but also be clearly repressive. It is of grave concern 
that freedom of expression appears to be of such slight importance, 
 
The primary focus of the Act is, and should remain, censorship of pornography and 
violence To remove the s3(1) gateway is to give the Classification Office virtual carte 
blanche to determine what is injurious to the public good, and to restrict freedom of 
expression accordingly. Such important decisions must remain the preserve of 
Parliament, and any restriction of the freedom of expression debated politically. Far 
too much is at stake to allow a handful of bureaucrats to make these decisions  
(CHP, 2001: 3). 
 
Similarly, this ignores the violence that, as Mookas (1998: 354) states, exists 
as part of the everyday part of the lives of LGBT people, and the psychological 
effects that has on LGBT people. 
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Opposing any move to criminalise hate speech, the SPCS stated that the claims 
of the falsehoods in the videos in question were not sufficient to consider them 
hateful as: 
In the ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor ‘truth’ is contestable. The FVPA is not 
directed at policing ‘truth’ or opinions. It is about harm. 
... 
The FVPA does not deal in the ascertaining of truth or the suppression of error.  
There are areas of law – fraud, trade misdescriptions, defamation, etc – where 
expression may be punished for being false. But this is wholly different. Falsity must 
in those cases be proved.  The reverse onus applies in defamation, but when put in 
issue there is still a requirement of proof (SPCS, 2001b: 7). 
This, of course, ignores that the Defamation Act 1992 can only be used in 
cases of defamation against individuals, not against groups of people, a point I 
made in reply during oral submissions. 
 
Continuing to read from their submission, Lane stated: 
The aim of the videos is not to advance a thesis of inherent inferiority. It is the 
opposite, that all persons deserve (as the video makers see things) better than a 
lifestyle that may lead to death.  The video is premised on the worth of all persons, 
and attributes inherent inferiority to no one (SPCS, 2001b: 8). 
Questioned, Lane admitted that “a lifestyle that may lead to death” meant a 
“homosexual lifestyle”.  This was not supported by the Committee members, 
even those who supported the SPCS (personal discussion with Sue Bradford, 
MP, who replaced Grant Gillon MP for some of the committee hearings). 
 
During their oral submission, Peter McKenzie and Paul Rishworth expanded 
on their paragraph: 
There are in our submission sound reasons for limiting such protection to racial 
discrimination and making no greater inroad into freedom of expression in relation 
to other minority groups referred to in the Human Rights Act. Social, political, 
economic, religious and moral attitudes differ, sometimes quite sharply, in relation 
to all of these other protected groups. To stifle even ill informed and distorted 
discussion or promotion of views on matters where there are such diverse attitudes 
is inconsistent with the open nature of New Zealand society. If one of these groups is 
singled out for protection as against others, again sharply diverging views will 
emerge. As has become the case with the blasphemy laws in most modem 
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democratic societies, to give one group in society the protection of its particular 
sensitivities as against freedom of expression on the part of others is to allow for a 
distortion of the freedom of expression generally permitted in an open society  
(McKenzie & Rishworth, 2001: 4-5). 
In doing so, Bradford asked if this meant they supported ‘special rights’ for 
churches, to which they admitted this was “most certainly the case” (personal 
notes taken at the hearing, discussion with Sue Bradford).  They failed to see 
the irony in this as they had previously been condemning the application of 
‘special rights’ to other groups. 
 
Nevertheless, other groups supported us.  Some, like the National Network of 
Stopping Violence Services (2001), the HRC (2001), and the OFLC (2001), 
were expected.  Others, like the oral submissions by the Catholic Women’s 
League of New Zealand (2001) and the Islamic Women’s Council of New 
Zealand (2001) were entirely unexpected. 
 
In my submission, I pointed out the legislative history of the Act, the intention 
of Parliament, and much of the material already provided in previous chapters 
of this thesis.  I concluded, prior to making various recommendations on 
legislative change: 
As noted above at paragraph 5.1, debate in New Zealand has referred to the United 
States paradigm of absolute freedom of expression, which is protected under the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution – which includes unspoken 
speech such as mime.  Yet this is often in conflict with other Amendments, such as 
the Fifteenth, which protect citizens against discrimination on the basis of race and 
religion, and the ninth, which prohibits the use of the Constitution to be used to 
deny rights held by the people.  While the first amendment, allowing freedom of 
expression is an active freedom, the fifteenth amendment is passive, by shielding 
others from something that is unacceptable. 
 
... 
 
To paraphrase the second to last paragraph of David Knoll (1994): ‘If the exercise of 
the rights [of freedom of expression] by one citizen prevents another from exercising 
his or her rights [to be free of violence] then the law can choose to intervene.  
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Equally it can choose not to intervene.  No intervention effectively condones the 
intimidation’  
(Bennachie, 2001a: 36). 
 
The Committee, whose report was not issued until 2003, correctly noted that 
the effects of the Living Word decision were far wider than just hate speech, 
but also had negative effects on other areas that the censor had previously been 
able to operate, as was intended: 
To illustrate the impact of the Living Word decision on the operation of the 
censorship regime, we provide examples of material that prior to Living Word would 
have been deemed objectionable by the censor but that are now unable to be 
classified as objectionable.  Such material includes covert filming, computer image 
files and photographs of naked children, publications representative of members of 
a particular class of the public, and offensive language  
(Government Administration Select Committee, 2003: 17-18). 
 
This Inquiry resulted in several recommendations.  Those that related to hate 
speech were: 
Section 3(1) of the Films, Videos, Publications and Classification Act 1993 (the Act) be 
amended to:  
‘3. Meaning of “objectionable” – (1) For the purposes of this Act, a 
publication is objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise 
deals with matters in such a manner that the availability of the publication 
is likely to be injurious to the public good.’  
Such amendment will provide a focus on the ‘injurious to the public good’ test and 
capture, for example, matters, other than explicit activities of a sexual nature, such 
as nudity, offensive language, invasion of privacy, mental illness, suicide, sexual 
orientation and the sexual transmission of HIV contained in publications.15 
Should recommendation 1 be unacceptable, Government members recommend the 
Act’s section 3(1) ‘gateway’ be widened by replacing the words ‘such as’ with 
‘including’. 
 
Members of the National Party recommend that the existing section 3(1) ‘gateway’ 
be extended by including offensive language and nudity that injures the public good. 
The Act maintain consistency with the Human Rights Act 1993  
(Government Administration Select Committee, 2003: 24). 
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The Committee believed that such an option, in respect of hate speech would: 
...  negate the need for the inclusion of a specific ‘hate speech’ section in the Act. If 
the Act is amended as we recommend, the censors would be able to address issues 
of this nature by application of the ‘injury to the public good’ test.  The censorship 
net would be able to reach, for example, the material that vilified certain groups in 
the Living Word videos without the need to explicitly identify such groups in the Act. 
Government members find this acceptable, particularly as it will not elevate the 
importance of any one group over another  
(Government Administration Select Committee, 2003: 23). 
 
Nevertheless, the minority view of National Party members was: 
... that section 3(1) should only be amended to include reference to ‘offensive 
language and nudity’. National Party members are not persuaded that this section 
should be redrawn in an open-ended manner so as to deal with issues such as 
invasion of privacy. National Party members consider that such issues are better left 
to the general law  
(Government Administration Select Committee, 2003: 17-18). 
 
Films, Videos and Publications Classification (Meaning of Objectionable) 
Amendment Bill 2003 
 
However, this was not to be the case, and in late 2003, Marc Alexander, MP 
for United Future, a party comprising members of the centrist United Party and 
the Christian fundamentalist based Future New Zealand Party, put forward a 
Films, Videos and Publications Classification (Meaning of Objectionable) 
Amendment Bill.  The meaning of objectionable that would have resulted if his 
Bill (Alexander, 2003) had passed would be (new words in bold, old word 
struck through):  
3(1) For the purposes of this Act, a publication is objectionable if it describes, 
depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such as including, but not 
limited to sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the 
availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good. 
A publication shall be deemed to be objectionable for the purposes of this Act if the 
publication promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support if the publication 
advocates, promotes, or encourages, or tends to advocate, promote, or 
encourage,— 
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The exploitation of children, or young persons, or both, for sexual purposes; or 
The use of violence or coercion to compel any person to participate in, or submit to, 
sexual conduct; or 
Sexual conduct with or upon the body of a dead person; or 
The use of urine or excrement in association with degrading or dehumanising 
conduct or sexual conduct; or 
Bestiality; or 
Acts of torture or the infliction of extreme violence or extreme cruelty. 
 
This would have opened the gateway from the narrow interpretation provided 
by the Court of Appeal in Living Word.  This was why he was criticised by 
members of his own party.  Nevertheless, the Bill was sent to a Select 
Committee, but before it could be considered, the Government introduced its 
own Bill, the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Amendment Bill, 
which only included recommendation 3 from the Inquiry given above. 
 
Films, Videos and Publications Classification Amendment Bill 2004 
 
The SPCS (2004a: 1) submitted that they were pleased that the  
option to remove the subject matter gateway contained in s3(1) of the Act  
as recommended by the Committee as a result of the previous Inquiry  
has been discarded.    
They again rejected the Chief Censors interpretation, which was correct and 
taken from the paragraph noted above, that the Living Word decision meant 
activity, not an expression of opinion or attitude.  Their Supplementary 
Submission did little to advance this, seeking to show how insidious the reach 
of gay activism had become (SPCS, 2004b: 3-5).  Rather than presenting any 
new evidence as oral evidence with supporting documents, Lane chose to read 
directly from their submission, an action that led to criticism from members of 
the Committee. 
 
In my submission, I noted much of what I had said before, and added parts 
from the submission of counsel for the HRC before the Court of Appeal, and 
from my submission on the SAP Bill that had added increased sentences due to 
hate: 
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I submitted to the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee on the affects and 
extent of hate crimes against members of the LGBT communities when it considered 
the Sentencing and Parole Bill.  As part of that submission, I included a list of attacks 
that I was aware of, either through reports in media or through personal contact 
with the victims.  In most of the cases, anti-gay prejudices were verbalised before 
and/or during the attacks.  
 
Different definitions of prejudice have been proposed over the years, but most of 
them include three key ideas. First, prejudice is an attitude—that is, a psychological 
predisposition or tendency to respond to an entity with a positive or negative 
evaluation (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). These evaluations occur along various 
dimensions such as good-bad and liked-disliked, and are based on emotional, 
cognitive, and behavioural information (Zanna & Rempel, 1988). Once formed, 
attitudes can guide an individual’s future actions. Second, the attitude is held toward 
a social group and its members. The targets of prejudice are evaluated on the basis 
of their group membership, not their individual qualities. Third, prejudice typically is 
a negative attitude, involving, for example, hostility or dislike (Herek, 2004: 17). 
 
Often prejudices against specific groups are enforced during a period preceding anti-
gay (or racist, etc.,) violence.  During a six week period in Wellington between April 
1999 and June 1999, eight people were assaulted because they were, or were 
assumed to be, gay.  Among these was Colin McLean, then a 22 year old gay man 
who was severely assaulted, requiring hospital treatment, on the south side of 
Courtney place near the St James.  Police officers were in a car, parked, on the 
opposite side of the road, near Espressoholic.  Despite cries from him and those who 
came to his assistance, the Police made no attempt to help him.  The most tragic 
victim was Jeff Whittington, a 14 year old who was beaten to death less than four 
hours after Colin had been assaulted.  The people who were convicted of his death, 
Jason Meads and Stephen Smith, are reported to have said that Jeff Whittington was 
a faggot, had girls make-up on and told them to ‘get fucked’.  They laughed and said 
that they had never seen anyone bleed out of the places he bled out of (CA 514/99, 
paragraph 39-41).  As the counsel for the NZAF notes at paragraph 36 of their 
submission, ‘[s]omehow [Smith and Meads] had been desensitised by [Whittington] 
being a “faggot” to the fact that this man was a human being worthy of respect’ 
(Joychild, 2000).  This period of violence against gay men was preceded by anti-gay 
pamphlets and other literature being distributed on the streets of Wellington.  While 
it is difficult to show a precise causal relationship between the availability of such 
material and anti-gay violence, there is enough evidence to indicate that there is a 
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correlation between the two.  However, it should be noted that not all people who 
receive or read such material, will act upon it  
(Bennachie, 2004a: 7-8). 
 
In my supplementary submission, I stated: 
The Department of Justice, advising this Committee in 1993 stated, in relation to 
what is now section 3(3)(e), ‘While not a direct counterpart of human rights 
legislation, the paragraph is intended to cover the core types of social
(Bennachie, 2004b: 1). 
 bigotry’.  The 
Department of Justice emphasised ‘social’ in that advice.  From this it can be seen 
what the intention of Parliament was, and how the Court of Appeal has read that 
down to a narrow definition based on active sex, horror, crime, cruelty and violence.  
It is now up to Parliament to reassert its authority, and specifically stress to the 
Court of Appeal, and to other bodies, what it’s intention truly was  
 
I also included comment about International covenants and the “marketplace of 
ideas”: 
International agreements to which New Zealand is party to, the UDHR and the ICCPR, 
guarantee freedom from discrimination and hatred.  Those agreements also contain 
articles on the freedom of expression.  Nevertheless, article19(3) ICCPR does allow 
for the restriction of freedom of expression.   
... 
If a person, or group of persons, is allowed unfettered and untrammelled freedom of 
expression, as would be allowed under the ‘market place of ideas’, this does indeed 
put people at risk from speech directed against them with the aim of depriving them 
of some of their rights – the rights to freedom from hatred, discrimination and 
violence. 
 
The ‘market place of ideas’ is a misnomer in and of itself.  The ‘market place of ideas’ 
is a fine concept, but it assumes that all ideas have the same worth, ignoring that 
some ideas are dominant, and form part of the dominant discourse.  Just as some 
things in a market place – the familiar, the comfortable – are popular and sold out 
very quickly, and other things sit on the shelves and are eventually discarded, the 
same happens with ideas.  Ideas that the public are used to – those they are 
comfortable with – are accepted without question.  Those they have been ingrained 
with through dogmatic indoctrination, are dominant.  Something that contrasts with 
those ingrained and entrenched ideas, such as equal rights for lesbians and gays, is 
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easily rejected.  On the other hand, something that supports the dominant discourse 
of homophobia, religious intolerance, or racism; something that allows people to 
think that it is acceptable to deny rights to lesbians and gays, or Jews, or Moslems, or 
Maori, or people with a disability, or any other group they dislike for any reason, is 
more readily accepted  
(Bennachie, 2004b: 4-6). 
 
I provided supporting evidence including media reports of violence against the 
LGBT communities, here and overseas, where anti-gay attitudes, which led to 
the violence, were shown to be linked with anti-gay material.  This material 
indicated that hate material directed at the LGBT communities is injurious to 
the public good (Bennachie, 2004b, attachments). 
 
However, rather than tackle the issue of hate speech itself, the Committee 
decided that a full Inquiry into issues of hate speech should be undertaken: 
We considered carefully whether to widen the meaning of ‘objectionable’ in section 
3 of the Act to include hate speech and concluded it was beyond the policy of this 
bill. The bill primarily caters, in terms of classification, for the proliferation of child 
sex abuse images via the Internet. Hate speech raises wider legal issues, including 
the fundamental right in a democracy to freedom of expression. In New Zealand this 
freedom may be subject to reasonable limits under section 5 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990. Section 3 is a specific example of such limits. We were mindful of 
the need to be cautious in placing further limitations on freedom of expression, 
however well-meaning, without very careful scrutiny to ensure that any limitation is 
reasonable and not open to exploitation. Hate speech also falls within the right to 
freedom from discrimination, and will require further consideration of human rights 
law. 
 
Therefore, the committee has initiated, under Standing Order 189(2), an inquiry into 
hate speech. Separately, the Minister of Justice has advised us that he will refer the 
topic to the Law Commission for further study. We anticipate this study and our 
inquiry will complement each other to provide a sound basis for the determination 
of these difficult issues  
(Government Administration Select Committee, 2004: 3). 
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Inquiry into Hate Speech 
 
The terms of reference for the Committee were included in the invitation to 
submit sent to me: 
Whether or not further legislation to prohibit or restrain hate speech is warranted. 
Whether censorship of material that vilifies certain groups would be a justified 
limitation on the rights and freedoms affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990. 
An appropriate threshold test for prohibition or restraint of hate speech. 
Whether any prohibition or restraint of hate speech or hateful expressions would be 
a justified limitation on the rights and freedoms outlined in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. 
 
The steps taken by the international community to control hate speech and hateful 
expressions  
(Personal communication from Lesley Fergusson, Clerk of the Committee, 
22 October 2004). 
 
In my submission, I reminded the Committee of the original intentions of 
Parliament, and the background to the Living Word case and decision.  I 
covered the allowable restrictions on freedom of expression under article 19(3) 
ICCPR, a list of cases where people had been assaulted or murdered on the 
basis of their sexual orientation, and how misinformation about a group could 
be construed as defamation.  Discussion of the work of Herek, D’Augelli, and 
others showed the effects of hate speech and hate crimes on members of the 
LGBT communities, while discussion of decisions under ECHR and the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR showed how sexual orientation had been 
included in the definition of sex or other status.  Examples from the Canadian 
Criminal Code showed how the relevant sections had been used to prevent hate 
speech against the LGBT communities.  I concluded with: 
All of this indicates that freedom of expression is not absolute, but is set within 
specific boundaries that respect the rights and freedoms of other people to be free 
from discrimination, hatred and violence, or to be free from the incitement of 
discrimination, hatred and violence.  Certain statements are seen as being 
unacceptable.  For example, statements equating people to animals on the basis of 
their race or religion, is no longer acceptable in civilised society.  ... 
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If such statements are unacceptable when it comes to race, religion, ethnicity and 
colour, then why are they acceptable when applied to people because of their sexual 
orientation?  Or their sex, marital status, age, political opinion, employment or 
disability?  The same standards should be applied across the board, and applied to 
all groups covered by subsection 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993.  A strong case 
could be put forward to include ‘transgender status’ or ‘gender identity’ in that 
subsection as people who are transgendered are often the butt of discriminatory 
actions and verbal victimisation, and are belittled, demeaned and dehumanised 
because of their gender.  I understand a Private Members Bill to do so is in the 
ballot, but this Committee has the ability to do something about that now  
(Bennachie, 2005: 36-37). 
 
Although the oral hearings were heard in early 2005, the Committee delayed 
making a decision until after the 2005 Election had been announced.  As a 
result, they withheld their decision until after the Election.  That Election led to 
a decrease in the Labour majority, meaning a greater reliance on smaller 
parties in order to form the Government.  Although United Future had also 
decreased, there was an increase in the New Zealand First party presence.  
Both of these parties were needed by Labour to form a Government.  As both 
had opposed the Inquiry into Hate Speech, they were able to have it stopped 
(New Zealand First and the New Zealand Labour Party, 2005).  Consequently, 
the Committee did not report back to Parliament, and although the Christian 
right treated this as a great victory, it was an effective defeat for democracy 
and freedom from discrimination.  As had happened with the Prostitution 
Reform Bill following the 2002 election, which saw an increase in United 
Future members, it would have been more correct for a new Committee to call 
for further submissions.  By preventing this from happening democracy was, in 
my opinion, subverted. 
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Chapter 14 – Where to next? A discussion. 
 
The failure of the Committee to report back left several issues stranded.  There 
appeared little consideration of the issues of violence and discrimination.  It 
had been agreed by the OFLC, twice by the Board, the High Court, and four 
Parliamentary Committees considering the issue of hate speech, that the 1993 
Parliament had, by the inclusion of s3(3)(e), intended the FVPCA to cover hate 
speech.  However, this had been sidestepped by the Court of Appeal. 
 
However, more evidence had been given to the lower courts and to the 
Parliamentary Committees than to the Court of Appeal, for the Court of 
Appeal could only consider questions of law, not any other evidence. 
 
Debate around the videos in question in the Living Word case has been centred 
predominantly around the absolutist paradigm of freedom of expression.  The 
submissions by LWD and the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties tend to 
this ideal, without thought, perhaps unwittingly, for what may result from such 
a paradigm in New Zealand.  New Zealand is not America, yet the submissions 
from the counsel for LWD would tend to support the lack of restrictions 
existing in American law.   
 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that even American law puts some 
restrictions on freedom of expression: child pornography, for example, 
“fighting words” for another.  Moreover, case law surrounding both of these is 
a minefield, with some decisions of the Supreme Court disallowing “fighting 
words” and other decisions supporting the right to express “fighting words” 
(Scahill, 1994: 25-26). 
 
While the Living Word decision may be taken to read that nowhere in New 
Zealand law is there any capacity to censor hate speech on the basis of 
religious belief, I believe that I have indicated in my recommendations below, 
and reasoning above and to follow, a method in which such hate speech can 
indeed be censored.  It would have consequences for New Zealand society if 
such hate speech was indeed unable to be censored.  This would have a long, 
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and lasting, devastating, effect on the fabric of New Zealand society, with at 
least the first four points of Allport’s scale, antilocution, avoidance, 
discrimination, and physical attack (Allport, 1958: 14-15), becoming more and 
more prevalent.  Similarly, the three dimensions of anti-Semitism (source of 
malefic qualities, latent-manifest preoccupation, and putative perniciousness) 
indicated by Goldhagen (1996: 35-36) can be applied to any group, and could 
also be seen to increase if hate propaganda against specific groups were to be 
allowed. 
 
The vast majority of anti-gay propaganda relies on the behaviour – real or 
supposed – of gay men.  During the debates in 2004 before the Government 
Administration Select Committee on the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Amendment Bill, the SPCS reported in several places repeats of 
Cameron’s flawed and inaccurate studies (SPCS, 2004a, 2004b).  These 
attitudes are further propagated by members of New Zealand’s fundamentalist 
community.  Furthermore, as seen in chapter 10, they are willing to break the 
law to promote these attitudes and hatred to young and/or vulnerable people, 
and to invent fallacies in their attempts to do so. 
 
The Board heard from Julian Batchelor that he had showed the video to people 
as young as 12, even though the video was originally R16, and to 5th formers 
(15-16 year olds) after the video had been classified as R18.  The group 
showing the videos around the country, Potters House Christian Fellowship, 
showed a similar willingness to defy the law and show these videos to people 
under the age restrictions.  This is concerning, due to the ability of these videos 
to convince even adults of the “truth” of the misconceptions, misinformation, 
and lies contained within them.  One only needs examine the statements of 
Nelson’s Potters House Christian Fellowship pastor John Blackburn, who has 
said he would not hesitate to show them again: 
 
 ‘People don't like to hear the truth,’ Mr Blackburn said. 
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‘It was documented in the videos that homosexuals think about going into schools 
to violate young boys. Why bother saying it if it doesn't happen?’  He said 
homosexuality was a sin in the eyes of God, like any other sin.  
(Scanlon, 2000, emphasis added). 
 
Under Article 19(3) ICCPR, freedom of expression may be restricted under 
certain conditions.  Article 19(3)(a) indicates that material may be restricted to 
protect the “respect of the rights or reputations of others”; while Article 
19(3)(b) indicates that material may be restricted  
for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals.   
This of course must be balanced with Article 5 ICCPR which states that 
nothing in the ICCPR may be interpreted in such a way to allow any State, 
group or person the right to do anything which is aimed at destroying any of 
the rights and freedoms recognised by the ICCPR.   
 
However, where freedom of expression may endanger the life the other people, 
the well being of other people, the general public order (ordre public) or public 
health, then there is adequate allowance under the ICCPR to restrict freedom of 
expression.  Furthermore, by allowing LWD to have their right to freedom of 
expression untrammelled, it is specifically restricting the rights of lesbians, gay 
men, bisexuals and transgendered people allowed under Articles 17 and 26 
ICCPR.   
 
Similarly, the UDHR allows, at Article 19, freedom of expression.  However, 
this is subject to the restrictions found at Article 29 which are similar to the 
restrictions in the ICCPR at 19(3) as well as a similar clause to Article 5 
ICCPR.  Under the Toonen decision, as indicated above, ‘sex’ is to be read as 
including ‘sexual orientation’ in these international agreements. 
 
Farrior (1996: 12ff) notes there were several concerns about the width of 
freedom of expression in the UDHR, and several proposals were put forward 
to limit incitement to discrimination.  She cites one of the British 
Government’s Comments: 
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 [I]t would be inconsistent for a Bill of Rights whose whole object is to establish 
human rights and fundamental freedoms to prevent any Government, if it wished to 
do so, from taking steps against publications whose whole objects was to destroy 
the rights and freedoms which it is the purpose of the Bill to establish  
(Farrior, 1996: 13).   
It can be seen that the final draft, while not incorporating the later restrictions 
on freedom of expression contained in the ICCPR, is subject to far more 
restraint than the original clause proposed for the UDHR:  
Subject only to the laws governing slander and libel, there shall be freedom of 
speech and of expression by any means whatsoever, and there shall be reasonable 
access to all channels of communication.  Censorship shall not be permitted  
(Farrior, 1996: 14, emphasis in the citation). 
 
Farrior (1996: 21) notes that the UNHCR had considered entering clauses 
prohibiting hate speech to any Human Rights Instrument before the UN 
General Assembly as early as 1947.  In the initial draft ICCPR, a clause 
prohibiting incitement to racial or religious hostility that constituted incitement 
to violence was included.  Furthermore, there was concern over the  
causal connection they saw between such advocacy and the problem of 
discrimination  
(Farrior, 1996: 22).   
Though supported by the Soviet Union, other Eastern Bloc nations, and other 
nations, including France, these restrictions were opposed by the United States 
(Farrior, 1996: 21-23). 
 
One can see in the Living Word videos the same techniques used by 
Riefenstahl in Triumph of the Will (1935, in Tomasulo, 1998: 99-118).  
Similarly, the same techniques are visible in A New Beginning (1984, in 
Morreale, 1991: 19-34).  But unlike A New Beginning, instead of the ‘I/you’ 
merger, a ‘we/them’ dichotomy established.  Nevertheless, I believe in GR/SR 
and AWYHBT there is the same “merger of histoire and discourse” that occurs 
in A New Beginning (Morreale, 1991: 28).  This makes it difficult to tell truth 
from fiction, especially as the producers of these videos have carefully 
synthesised misinformation and complete falsehoods with the truth.  Whatever 
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Goldhagen (1996: 35-36) states about anti-Semitism can also be said about 
homophobia:  
It is his [sexual orientation], his [identification], or his [sexual behaviour].   
The same three dimensions: source, latent-manifest, and perniciousness can be 
seen to exist in homophobia. 
 
New Zealand ratified the ICCPR on 28 December 1978, and the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR on 26 May 1989.  Article 19(3) ICCPR contains the 
ability to restrict freedom of expression under certain conditions.  If this is not 
done, I believe it could constitute a breach of the rights of LGBT people, 
covered under “sex” in the ICCPR and the UDHR, or PLWHA covered under 
“other status” in those agreements.  This could leave New Zealand open to 
international criticism and possible action before the UNHCR. 
 
Herek and Berrill (1992) indicate that the effects of hate speech on a person’s 
self-esteem cannot be ignored.  It has been shown in numerous studies that 
lack of self esteem can lead to suicide (Clayton, 1997; Fergusson, Horwood, 
Ridder & Beautrais, 2005: 979; Petrie and Brook, 1992; Rosenhan and 
Seligman, 1985: 342-343).  The effects of showing these videos to lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender emerging youth could be enormous, resulting in 
low self-esteem, and possible subsequent consequences.  All these are certainly 
injurious to the public good. 
 
Thomas J also, at paragraph 67 of the Living Word judgement of the Court of 
Appeal, noted the indirect harm that hate speech causes. 
 
In paragraph 9 of their submission to the Board, the counsel for LWD 
(McKenzie & Rishworth, 2000b) cite paragraph 31 of the Court of Appeal 
decision, in which the Court states “the international prohibitions of hate 
propaganda have remained confined to the categories of race and religion”. 
 
Nevertheless, New Zealand already has partial hate speech protection in the 
HRA.  Currently, this only covers race, colour and ethnicity.  Furthermore, 
NSW has anti-vilification sections directed against homosexual vilification and 
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transgender vilification in its Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, as well as racial 
vilification.  South Australia and Queensland have grappled with the issue to 
greater or lesser degrees, Queensland having included vilification against race 
and religion into their Anti-Discrimination Act in 2001, and in 2002, included 
sexuality, (defined as homosexual, heterosexual or bisexual), into that section 
on vilification. 
 
The United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 may, by being devolved from 
the ECHR, and by reference to Articles 10(2) and 14 of that Convention, offer 
protection from hate speech to everyone covered by the Convention.  Article 
10(2) of that Convention requires restrictions on freedom of expression as such 
a freedom  
carries with it duties and responsibilities, [which] may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary  
(Council of Europe, 1950, emphasis added).   
Since at least 1999, sexual orientation has been included under “other status” 
in Article 14 of that Convention (Salgueiro v Portugal). 
 
Similarly the Canadian Criminal Code already contains sections protecting 
people from hate speech (sections 318 and 319).  In 2000, the Canadian 
Broadcasting Standards Council prevented the re-broadcast by Canadian radio 
stations a programme by Laura Schlessinger, who was broadcasting material 
deemed to be hate speech directed at LGBT people (Canadian Broadcasting 
Standards Council, 2000a, 2000b).  Such use of Broadcasting Codes is a form 
of censorship.  The  
prohibitions of hate propaganda 
are no longer 
confined to the categories of race and religion 
as claimed by the Court of Appeal in Living Word at paragraph 31, but even at 
that time were expanding, however slowly.   
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McKenzie and Rishworth (2000b) in their submission to the Board, cite 
paragraph 82 of the Court of Appeal judgement.  Here Thomas notes that  
 [w]hat is emphasised in the perceived promiscuity and irresponsible sexual 
behaviour of male homosexuals ....   
Again this is a reference to sexual behaviour: how the video “describes”, 
“expresses” or “otherwise deals with” sex.  This should be compared to 
paragraph 59 of the judgement where Thomas again indicates the videos make 
reference to sexual behaviour.  Yet in paragraph 82, Thomas concludes by 
stating 
the videos are essentially political tracts  
(NZCA 179 [2000]). 
 
There are two ways of looking at this.  One way is that all propaganda aimed at 
any minority is essentially political.  The ICCPR specifically allows for 
restrictions on war propaganda – a political tract – at Article 20(1).  While all 
hate speech is propaganda of a sort, not all propaganda may be hate speech.  
The second way, that taken by Beck (2000: 22), suggests that Thomas  
displays some confusion in what is motivating the producers and intended audience 
of the videos, by suggesting both that the material is ‘political’ [at paragraph 82 of 
the judgement] and a manifestation of religious ‘fundamentalism’  
at paragraph 66 of the judgement. 
 
It should also be remembered that Pat Buchanan, one of the religious right 
leaders in America, had stated in 1992: 
The agenda Clinton and Clinton would impose on America–abortion on demand, a 
litmus test for the Supreme Court, homosexual rights, discrimination against 
religious schools, women in combat–that’s change, all right. But it is not the kind of 
change America wants. It is not the kind of change America needs.  
… 
There is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural 
war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself. 
And in that struggle for the soul of America, Clinton and Clinton are on the other 
side, and George Bush is on our side  
(Buchanan, 1992a: 4:05, 1992b: 4:18). 
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To many in America, this “war” continues.  The production of these videos 
was part of the ammunition they manufactured to continue the “fight”.  If this 
is true, then the videos could be classed as “war” propaganda, and thus able to 
be restricted under Article 20 ICCPR.  However, I would not advocate this 
move as it would admit that such a “war” exists to be fought. 
 
There are many other questions that Beck raises about the Court of Appeal 
judgement, which, while  
legally sound, in the application of traditional legal method it is apparent that the 
Court has adopted a timid approach on the wider question of the controversial 
‘social’ issue of ‘Gay bashing’  
(Beck, 2000: 5).   
Furthermore, Beck (2000: 5-6) also highlights how the Court of Appeal has 
failed  
to identify that such an analysis [of the interplay of the HRA and the FVPCA] 
highlights a gap in the law. 
 
During the Living Word case the appellant’s counsel questioned the 
applicability of s19 BORA and its apparent clash with s14 BORA.  There is 
interplay between the two sections when one considers the restrictions on 
freedom of expression allowed under the ICCPR at Articles 19(3) and 20, and 
the relationships of Articles 7, 19 and 29(2) of the UDHR. 
 
Seemingly ignoring the 1996 decision in Re J, McKenzie and Rishworth 
(2000b) argued that any discrimination which these videos incite is private 
discrimination and is thus outside the ambit of the BORA.  Nevertheless, any 
government body is bound by the terms of BORA to “affirm, protect, and 
promote” those rights and freedoms.  One of these is, at s19, freedom from 
discrimination.  If a government body fails to take any and all relevant sections 
of BORA into account when making a decision, it has failed in its obligations 
under BORA.  It is therefore concomitant upon the OFLC, the Board, the High 
Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Select Committee to not only consider s14 
268 
 
of BORA, but also any other section of BORA that may apply (Butler & 
Butler, 2005: 94).  This includes ss5 and 19. 
 
In their submission, counsel for the NZCCL noted that classifying these videos 
as objectionable was also a breach of the appellants rights under s15 of BORA.  
However, as noted in the HRAG submission to the Board (2000: 14), there is 
no theological or biblical discussion of homosexuality in the videos.  Therefore 
s15 BORA has no impact.  If there was some discussion of those supposed 
proscriptions, or some theological discussion, then s15 BORA may have some 
importance, though this would, of course, be a Vox Deus argument. 
 
At paragraph 22 of their submission to the Board McKenzie and Rishworth 
(2000b), cite paragraph 45 of the Court of Appeal judgement.  In this 
paragraph, Article 10 of the European Convention on Civil Rights is 
mentioned.  As noted above, similar restrictions on freedom of expression are 
contained in Article 10(2) of the ECHR as are contained in Article 19(3) 
ICCPR. 
 
At that same paragraph 22, McKenzie and Rishworth (2000b) mention the 
“marketplace of ideas”.  As noted above, at Chapter 2, such an idea as the 
“marketplace of ideas” assumes a level playing field for all from the beginning, 
omitting any reference to the dominant cultural discourse that informs, and 
may misinform as these videos do, the general public.  This omission 
negatively affects the ability of a person’s personal fulfilment if they are the 
target of hate speech which is based on the dominant cultural discourse.  In this 
case, this culturally dominant discourse places LGBT people, and PLWHA 
into the paradigm of “the other”, allowing stereotypes to be accumulated and 
grow into urban myth – “all gays are paedophiles”; “all gays have AIDS”; “all 
lesbians are man-haters”; “all transgendered people are sick”, etc. 
If the information flow is patently imperfect, then the free market principles cannot 
be applied [to ideas].  Allow vilificatory speech and the voices that are heard will lead 
to erroneous political decisions.  Allow enough vilificatory speech and vilification will 
become credible.  The credibility will then pursue the vilification into violence  
(Knoll, 1994).   
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Violence against minorities is injurious to the public good. 
 
Following the Living Word decision in the Court of Appeal, certain members 
of the Christian right in New Zealand celebrated.  It is apparent they felt that 
the Court of Appeal vindicated their “right” to promote discrimination and 
hatred.  This can be seen through the various letters and editorials in certain 
Christian publications, and on certain Christian programmes, for example, the 
SPCS, which had claimed, falsely, that the majority of gay men are 
paedophiles, using material from the Living Word videos and the discredited 
Paul Cameron (SPCS, 2004c).  If this same ‘right’ to promote discrimination 
and hatred was directed towards Christians, they would complain their 
freedom to express their religion was being affected.  If this same ‘right’ to 
promote discrimination and hatred was directed towards Jews, or Muslims, or 
people based on their ethnicity or colour, there would be massive public 
outcry.  Allowing hate speech to go unhindered, untrammelled, without control 
gives its proponents a carte blanche to continue to promote hatred against 
LGBT people, as well as PLWHA, which I believe is injurious to the public 
good. 
 
Effects of hate speech 
 
Lawrence, Matsuda, Delgado and Crenshaw note (in Matsuda, Lawrence, 
Delgado, & Crenshaw, 1993: 1-2) there is a disproportionate representation of 
people of colour, and members of the LGBT communities among those 
supporting the sanctions against hate speech.  The situation in New Zealand is 
similar.  However, some LGBT people, such as author David Herkt, argue 
there should be no censorship whatsoever, and people should be free to read 
whatever they want, no matter how distasteful that may be to some people, and 
only self censorship applied (personal communications, 2005, 2008, 2009). 
 
New Zealand already has partial hate speech laws.  These are intrinsically 
linked to the HRA 1993, and deal specifically with Racial Disharmony and 
Harassment, and Inciting Racial Disharmony (ss61, 63, and 131).  It is 
considered that these are a reasonable limitation on freedom of expression in a 
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free and democratic society in line with s5 of BORA 1990.  These only deal 
with the grounds of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group 
of persons.  As indicated previously, the original intention of subsection 
3(3)(e) FVPCA was to allow the censor some power over certain types of 
speech that would be injurious to the public good that specifically incited 
hatred and discrimination against the groups protected by subsection 21(1) 
HRA by treating those groups as inherently inferior to others in society. 
 
Although not focussing on the problems of hate speech directed at the LGBT 
communities, Mari Matsuda (in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw 
1993: 22-23) believes this form of hate speech requires public restriction as 
well as a separate analysis because of its complexity and the deadly violence 
that may accompany the unrelenting verbal degradation of those subordinated 
due to gender or sexuality that destroys the idea that there are differences 
between words and deeds.  Moreover, as Lawrence (in Matsuda, Lawrence, 
Delgado & Crenshaw 1993: 69-70) noted, there are similarities between racist 
speech and anti-gay speech. 
 
The ICCPR allows restrictions on speech at Article 19(3) where those 
restrictions are  
for respect of the rights or reputations of others, 
and 
for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals. 
Preventing discrimination, hatred, and violence against a certain group in 
society would qualify as respecting the rights of the people who comprised that 
group.  The French term “ordre public” can mean  
the protection of public security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of 
society  
(Beadle, 2004)  
and  
can be understood as the rules that ensure the peaceful functioning of society  
(Human Rights Watch, 2001).   
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Controls over hate speech would also be seen as therefore aiding the “ordre 
public”, in that they promote the “peaceful functioning of society”.  Article 20 
ICCPR allows for specific restriction on war propaganda and  
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence. 
 
The equal protection clause in Article 7 UDHR, by stating people are to be 
protected from incitement to discrimination, can be seen as a limitation on 
Article 19 ICCPR, which allows Freedom of Opinion and Expression.  
Similarly, Article 29(2) contains similar restrictions to the freedoms allowed 
under the Declaration.  Those  
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the 
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society  
(Farrior, 1996: 14, 19). 
 
Section 5 BORA could be seen in light of Articles 7 and 29(2) UDHR as 
demonstrably justified reasonable limitations on freedom of expression.  
Similarly, s5 of BORA could also be seen as a justifiable limitation on freedom 
of expression under Article 19(3) ICCPR as restrictions on hate speech 
promote  
respect of the rights or reputations of others,  
and  
the protection of national security or of public order (ordre publique), or of public 
health or morals. 
Such restrictions would therefore be demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society. 
 
The ECHR allows even more stringent restrictions on freedom of expression 
(ECHR, 2003):  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
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or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.   
Restrictions on hate speech can therefore be seen to be in accordance with this 
Convention as well.  The points made by Farrior (1996) can be seen in the 
wording on these allowable restrictions in the Convention. 
 
The United Kingdom has both the Human Rights Act 1998 that allows for the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR to be given effect in UK law, 
and may therefore have the same restrictions on freedom of expression 
contained within that Convention; and the Public Order Act 1986, s19 of 
which prevents the publishing, etc., of material likely to stir up racial or 
religious hatred.  Scotland has the Antisocial Behaviour, etc., (Scotland) Act 
2004, which allows for the placement of Antisocial Behaviour Orders 
(ASBOs) on a person who  
pursues a course of conduct that causes or is likely to cause alarm or distress  
to a person or group of people.  Conduct includes speech, and the Act therefore 
places a restriction on freedom of expression.  I would not advocate for the use 
of ASBOs, as I believe these may be misused, being dependant on the beliefs 
of the local authorities. 
 
Canada has entered hate speech provisions into its Criminal Code at sections 
318 and 319.  While s318 is mainly about genocide, this is in line with recent 
developments at the United Nations in regard to crimes of genocide.  S319 in 
particular specifically prohibits  
communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable 
group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. 
 
In Australia, the Commonwealth Broadcasting Services Act 1992 develops 
codes of Broadcasting and legislates that these codes are to prevent anything 
that is  
likely to incite or perpetuate hatred against, or vilifies, any person or group on the 
basis of ethnicity, nationality, race, gender, sexual preference, age, religion or 
physical or mental disability.   
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The NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 prevents vilification, or serious 
vilification, of people based on their race, transgender status, homosexuality, 
or HIV status.  The Australian Capital Territory’s Discrimination Act 1991 
prevents vilification, or serious vilification, on the basis of race, but has been 
amended by the Sexuality Discrimination Legislation Amendment Act 2004 to 
include sexuality, transsexuality and HIV status, as prohibited grounds of 
vilification.  As noted elsewhere, Queensland also has anti-vilification sections 
in its Antidiscrimination Act, and, furthermore, prevents barristers from 
vilifying people on the basis of their sexual orientation and other grounds 
(Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2004).  Victoria, on the other hand, still 
restricts vilification laws to the grounds of race and religion. 
 
The word ‘sex’ in Article 2 ICCPR has been read indicatively to include 
‘sexual orientation’ (UNHCR, 1994).  As indicated above, sexual orientation 
has been included under ‘other status’ in the ECHR, and could equally be read 
to be included in ‘other status’ in Articles 2 and 26 ICCPR.  Both the HRA and 
BORA make specific mention of sexual orientation as being a prohibited 
ground of discrimination.  The FVPCA also specifically mentions sexual 
orientation, as does Standard 6 of the Broadcasting Standards Authority Codes 
of Practice for television, as does Principle 4 of the Code for People in 
Advertising by the Advertising Standards Authority. 
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Chapter 15: Conclusion 
 
The previous chapters indicate that freedom of expression is not absolute, but 
is set within specific boundaries that respect the rights and freedoms of other 
people to be free from discrimination, hatred and violence, and the incitement 
thereof.  Certain statements are seen as being unacceptable.  For example, 
statements equating people to animals on the basis of their race or religion are 
no longer acceptable in civilised society.  Statements about people on the basis 
of their race are also unacceptable, and are covered under the hate speech 
provisions of the HRA.  If the Court of Appeal had not ruled to narrow the 
“gateway”, they would also have been covered by the FVPCA. 
 
By examining the effects of hate speech in chapters 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14, it can 
be seen that hate speech is “injurious to the public good” in the words of the 
FVPCA.  The continuum from antilocution (the open expression of 
antagonism), avoidance (of members of the disliked group), discrimination, 
physical attack, and extermination (Allport, 1958), can be seen to exist.  Hate 
speech eventually leads to violence 
 
If such statements are unacceptable with respect to race, religion, ethnicity and 
colour, then why are they acceptable when applied to sexual orientation? 
 
Censorship and Human Rights Legislation fit hand in hand in the continuum of 
controlling hate speech and other material.  It is possible to suggest changes to 
the HRA, the FVPCA, the Crimes Act 1961, and the Defamation Act 1992 that 
would enable a legislative control over hate speech similar to that in some 
states in Australia, and in Canada.  I would suggest that ss61, 63, and 131 
HRA are expanded to cover those groups included in s9(h) of the Sentencing 
Act 2002: race, colour, nationality, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, 
age, or disability.  I also believe that the FVPCA 1993 should be allowed to 
operate in the way it was intended.  In order for that to happen, it would need 
amendment, or the Court of Appeal would need to revisit their decisions on 
Living Word and Moonen.  This may require them to look at more evidence 
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than they normally would do.  In doing so, the Act would be able to prevent 
the denigration of all groups in s3(3)(e), not only the LGBT community. 
 
While it would be possible to write policy that would enable hate speech to be 
covered by the HRA and the FVPCA, this would be meaningless if there were 
no legislative base for this policy.  It could be changed at will to either negate 
the policy or to strengthen the policy without public debate.  Therefore, I 
believe both the solutions above, legislative and judicial, would provide the 
necessary protection from hate speech targeted against the LGBT, and other, 
communities. 
 
If it is acceptable to say “Gays are a cancer on society that deserves to be 
eliminated?”, then what group would be next? 
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